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ABSTRACT
Infectious diseases have recently found renewed significance in Canadian
scholarship, with a corresponding increased interest in Canada’s overall preparedness,
including legal preparedness, to combat infectious disease emergencies.
Nearly every Canadian province has emergency legislation containing a “basket
clause” – a provision which, for the duration of an emergency, authorizes a decision
maker to take ‘all necessary measures’ to defeat it. Public health legal preparedness
scholarship has not yet examined what criteria the decision maker must consider before
deciding to deploy measures that could seriously impact the rights of individuals,
including those under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
This thesis proposes that decision makers ought to have legislative guidance on
how to use these special powers. The incorporation of public health, ethics, and legal
principles into reformed legislation could provide for increased accountability,
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, while allowing for more focused judicial
review.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCIES
Over the past fifteen years, infectious diseases have found renewed significance in

Canadian legal discourse. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of
September 11th, 2001, Anthrax-laced envelopes were sent through the mail from Trenton,
New Jersey, to three news network stations and the offices of two Senators. Despite the
fact that the United States Hart Senate Office Building and the House of Representatives
were briefly closed, and that government staffers were given prophylaxis, twenty-two
individuals were infected through either inhalation or coetaneous exposure. Five people
died.1
A few short years later, in 2003, the world experienced the emergence of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. This disease, originating in China, found
secondary outbreak centers in the Canadian cities of Toronto and Vancouver. The
outbreak led to 438 reported infections in Canada, with 44 deaths.2 At the height of the
outbreak, on 26 March 2003, Ontario declared a state of emergency under its Emergency
Management Act and began implementing special measures.3 SARS provoked much
more action in Canada than the 2001 Anthrax scare in the United States. It prompted

1

Lawrence O Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2d ed (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
“Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Adverse Events from
Antimicrobial Prophylaxis” in (2001) 50 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 973,
online: <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ mm5044a1.htm>.
2
Government of Canada, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health,
Learning From SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada (Ottawa, Health Canada,
2003) (Chair: Dr. David Naylor, Dean of Medicine, University of Toronto) [the Naylor
Report].
3
Naylor Report, ibid, at 28.
1

several inquiries into the affair: a federal advisory committee, 4 a senate committee
report,5 a provincial commission,6 as well as the striking of an expert panel.7 The events
of SARS and the reports that followed, as well as the prominent media attention they
received, encouraged noticeable change in Canada’s public health regime: organizational,
clinical, and legal.
Almost on cue, the 2009 H1N1/ swine flu pandemic then mobilized Canada’s
newly formed, and ostensibly reinvigorated, public health infrastructure. The spread of
the disease was truly global, and was classified by the World Health Organization
(WHO) as a phase 6 pandemic.8 In Canada, between 12 April 2009 and 3 April 2010,
there were over 33,000 laboratory confirmed cases of the H1N1 flu, resulting in 8678
hospitalizations, 1473 intensive care admissions, and 428 deaths.9 The vast majority of

4

Ibid.
Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
Reforming Health Protection and Promotion in Canada: Time to Act (Ottawa, November
2003) (Chair: Senator Michael Kirby).
6
Ontario, SARS Commission, Spring of Fear, Final Report (Toronto: Ministry of Health
and Long Term Care, December 2006) (Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell,
Ontario Superior Court of Justice) [the Campbell Commission, Final Report]. Contained
within the report were its two initial, interim reports: Interim Report: SARS and Public
Health in Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 15 April 2004)
[Campbell Commission, First Interim Report]; and Second Interim Report: SARS and
Public Health Legislation (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 5 April
2005) [Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report].
7
Ontario, Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious Disease Control, For the Public’s
Health: Initial Report (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2003 (Chair:
Dr. David Walker). [the Walker Report]
8
Phase 6 is, according to the WHO: “the pandemic phase, is characterized by community
level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the
criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic
is under way”, online : <http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/
h5n1phase/en/>.
9
Public Health Agency of Canada, “Flu Watch: March 28 to April 3, 2010”, (9 April
2010), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/fluwatch/09-10/w13_10/index-eng.php>.
5

2

these infections occurred in five months, between August and December 2009.10 While
these numbers seem high in comparison to SARS (at over seventy times the infection rate
and nearly ten times the death rate), the disease differed in that it was at least identifiable
and a vaccine was made available. It also did not end up being as deadly as originally
feared.11 In the words of the director general of the WHO: “This pandemic has turned out
to be much more fortunate than what we feared a little over a year ago. This time around,
we have been aided by pure good luck. The virus did not mutate during the pandemic to a
more lethal form.”12
Unlike during SARS, no states of emergency were declared in Canada during the
2009 pandemic. Had H1N1, a disease to which almost no one had a pre-existing
resistance or immunity, been a more aggressive virus, then the federal and provincial
governments may very well have felt compelled to institute more drastic, including
emergency, measures.
In 2015, a devastating Ebola outbreak emerged in West Africa.13 Today, the
number of globally confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory syndrome, or MERS,

10

Public Health Agency of Canada, “Flu Watch: December 20, 2009 to January 2, 2010”,
(8
January
2010),
online:
<http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/fluwatch/09-10/w5152_09/index-eng.php>.
11
During the H1N1 pandemic, Ontario actually suffered fewer deaths than it normally
endures due to seasonal flu: Ontario, Chief Medical Officer of Health, The H1N1
Pandemic: How Ontario Fared (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, June
2010) at 10.
12
World Health Organization, “H1N1 in Post-Pandemic Period: Director-General’s
Opening Statements at Virtual Press Conference” (10 August 2010), online:
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/h1n1_vpc_20100810/en/index.h
tml>.
13
For a critical analysis of how emergency powers were used in response to the
outbreaks, see: James G Hodge, Jr, et al, “Global Emergency Legal Responses to the
2014 Ebola Outbreak” (2014) JL Med & Ethics 595.
3

continues to climb,14 and the Zika virus has surfaced as a new source of regional, if not
yet global, anxiety.15
The showcasing of these relatively recent infectious disease “highlights” is not
meant to portray them as anomalies within the general trend in disease emergence of the
last thirty years. Quite the contrary is so. The report from the federal National Advisory
Committee on SARS and Public Health (the “Naylor Report”) 16 noted that infectious
disease emergence has, in fact, been constant:
SARS is only the most recent example of emerging infectious diseases
– diseases that are newly identified, or that have existed previously but
are increasing in incidence or geographic range. Since 1973, more than
30 previously unknown diseases associated with viruses and bacteria
have emerged. Examples include: Ebola virus (1977); Legionnaire’s
disease (1977); E. coli 0157:H7 – associated hemolytic uremic
syndrome (1982); HIV/AIDS (1983); Hepatitis C (1989); variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (1996); and H5N1 Influenza A or avian flu
(1997). West Nile virus infection is an example of a disease that has
increased in geographic range. As well, some known infectious
diseases, such as tuberculosis, have re-emerged in vulnerable
populations.17
Despite the fact that the emergence of infectious diseases is not now, nor had
been, an exceptional occurrence, the SARS events triggered an unprecedented call for
public health investigation and reform - reform that was to a certain extent tested during
the H1N1 pandemic. Undoubtedly, this was at least in part due to the wide media
coverage of the SARS events, which garnered global attention and put Toronto, Canada’s
biggest city in its biggest province, under the microscope; on April 23rd, 2003, the World

14

World Health Organization, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERSCoV), online: <http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/>.
15
World Health Organization, Microcephaly/Zika virus, online:
<http://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/en/>.
16
Supra, note 2.
17
Naylor Report, supra, note 2, at 2.
4

Health Organization placed a travel advisory on Toronto, advising against all but the
most essential travel.18 Ontario and Toronto suffered serious economic losses during
SARS.19 The losses, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, were extensive, and were
characterized by the Naylor report as follows:
As a disease outbreak, SARS was relatively small. Nonetheless, the
disease killed 44 Canadians, and caused illness in a few hundred more.
The response to the outbreak paralyzed a major segment of Ontario’s
health care system for weeks, and saw more than 25, 000 residents of
the Greater Toronto Area placed in quarantine. Psychological effects of
SARS on health care workers, patients, and families are still being
assessed, but the economic shocks have already been felt. Estimates
based on volumes of business compared to usual seasonal activities
suggest that tourism sustained a $350 million loss, airport activity
reduction cost $220 million, and non-tourism retail sales were down by
$380 million. It seems entirely possible that the direct and indirect costs
of SARS could reach $2 billion.20
While media attention, human hardship, and economic losses would each seem to
justify the after-the-fact attention SARS received in Canada, that attention may also owe
something to the fact that, as one American scholar has put it, SARS “in some respects
returned us to the late 19th-century Ellis Island days; its cause and mode of transmission
were initially unknown, there was no diagnostic test; there was no vaccine; and there was
no effective treatment.”21 In simpler terms, SARS was frightening.

18

Naylor Report, supra, note 2, at 37.
Ontario, The SARS Commission, First Interim Report: SARS and Public Health in
Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 15 April 2004)
(Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell, Ontario Superior Court of Justice) [Campbell
Commission: First Interim Report].
20
Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 211.
21
George J Annas, Worst Case Bioethics: Death, Disaster, and Public Health (Oxford:
University Press, 2010) at 221.
19

5

Finally, SARS likely garnered such extensive after-the-fact inquiry because it
exposed Ontario’s (and Canada’s22) lack of preparedness to deal with an infectious
disease emergency:
SARS showed that Ontario’s public health system is broken and needs
to be fixed. Despite the extraordinary efforts of many dedicated
individuals and the strength of many local public health units, the
overall system proved woefully inadequate. SARS showed Ontario’s
central public health system to be unprepared, fragmented, poorly led,
uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished,
and generally incapable of discharging its mandate.23
Even though Ontario’s public health system suffered from numerous, identified
shortcomings, SARS was eventually contained and the crisis ended. Perhaps fittingly, it
was old-fashioned 19th-century public health measures that were effective in combating
SARS, as recognized in the Naylor Report:
SARS has been contained, at least temporarily – not by the genomic
revolution, not by advanced pharmaceuticals, but by old-fashioned
public health measures like hand washing, infection control procedures,
isolation of cases, and tracing and quarantine of contacts.
What the SARS outbreak showed, perhaps more than anything else, is
the power of public health. The best current evidence is that without
effective public health measures, SARS would have eventually
sickened millions of people on this shrinking planet, causing not
hundreds of deaths, but countless thousands. The next outbreak,
however, may be even more insidious than SARS.24
While these old-fashioned measures were successful in combating the outbreak
(and so ought to be viewed positively), it should not be forgotten that public health
measures (especially emergency measures) such as isolation and contact quarantine,
mandatory treatment, compulsory vaccination, and others, have at the same time

22

Naylor Report, supra note 2 at 211.
Campbell Commission, First Interim Repot, supra note 6, at 25.
24
Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 42.
23

6

enormous potential to interfere with individual autonomy, bodily integrity, and other civil
liberties. They also have the potential to place disproportionate burdens upon
disadvantaged groups in society. Like a stick of dynamite, they are very effective and,
when used appropriately, can indeed be very safe. But they are anything but benign.
This thesis is set within this context of infectious disease emergence and outbreak,
and contemporary public health renewal in Canada.
1.2

RENEWAL
The various SARS inquires, panels, and commissions generated reports

containing recommendations for the renewal of public health in Canada, as well as
improved emergency preparedness and response. There was also a spike in interest from
the academic community. Substantial commentary emerged, which dealt with both the
general significance and applicability of public health25 (and public health law)26 as a
discipline and approach. This scholarship took its place alongside further research and
opinions dealing with more specific clinical and ethical issues, for example: emergency
triage;27 health care workers safety, ethical duties and responsibilities;28 ethics in

25

e.g. Lawrence O Gostin & James G Hodge Jr, guest eds, “Symposium on Global
Health, Law, Ethics and Policy” (2007) 35:4 JL Med & Ethics 519; MJ Selgelid,
“Pandethics” (2009) 123 Public Health 255; George P Smith II, “Re-shaping the
Common Good in Times of Public Health Emergencies: Validating Medical Triage”
(2009) 18 Annals Health L 1.
26
Lawrence O Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2d ed (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008); Christopher Reynolds, Public Health Law and
Regulation (Sydney: Federation Press, 2004); Bailey, Tracey M, Timothy Caulfield &
Nola M Ries, eds. Public Health Law and Policy in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2008).
27
e.g. James Downar & Dori Seccareccia, “Palliating a Pandemic: ‘All Patients Must by
Cared For’” (2010) 39:2 Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 291; Nathan
Emmerich, “Anti-theory in Action? Planning for Pandemics, Triage and ICU or: How
Not to Bite a Bullet” (2011) 14 Med Health Care and Philos 91; Smith, supra note 25;
7

planning;29 pre-existing group disadvantage;30 the coercion of individuals31 and the
emergency provision of scarce resources.32 By a healthy margin, scholarly commentary
concerned with the experiences, decisions, ethics, duties, and rights of health care
professionals dominated the discourse.
The prevalence of writing concerned with the predicaments faced by health care
workers is neither surprising nor inappropriate: they are the people who will be relied
upon to execute any emergency plan. They are also the individuals who are put at the
greatest risk. During SARS, health care workers accounted for a large portion of the
infected and fatalities. Nurses infected during the SARS outbreak launched a legal action

Jeffrey Kirby, “Enhancing the Fairness of Pandemic Critical Care Triage” (2010) 36
Journal of Medical Ethics 758.
28
e.g. Wendy Austin, “Ethics in a Time of Contagion: A Relational Perspective” (2008)
40:4 CJNR 10; Tracey M. Bailey et al. “A Duty to Treat During a Pandemic: The Time
for Talk is Now” (2008) 8:8 American Journal of Bioethics 29; Cara R Davies & Randi
Zlotnik Shaul, “Physicians’ Legal Duty of Care and Legal Right to Refuse to Work
During a Pandemic” (2010) 182:2 CMAJ 167; Margarita E Pena, Charlene B Irvin &
Robert B Takla, “Ethical Considerations For Emergency Care Providers During
Pandemic Influenza – Ready or Not…” (2009) 24:2 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine
115; James C Thomas, Pia DM MacDonald & Emily Wenink, “Ethical Decision Making
in a Crisis: A Case Study of Ethics in Public Health Emergencies (2009) 15(2) Journal of
Public Health Management Practice E16.
29
e.g. Nancy Berlinger and Jacob Moses, “Pandemic Flu Planning in the Community:
What Can Clinical Ethicists Bring to the Public Health Table?” (2008) 17 Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 468.
30
e.g. Connal Lee, Wendy A Rogers & Annette Braunack-Mayer, “Social Justice and
Pandemic Influenza Planning: The Role of Communication Strategies” (2008) 1:3 Public
Health Ethics 223.
31
e.g. Jacob Chapman, “Doomsday: A Look at the Ethical Issues Behind the
Government’s Coercive Powers in Response to a Public Health Nightmare” (2008) 9
Journal of Law & Social Challenges 24; Rev Clayton L Thomason, “It’s a Small World
After All: Global Health and the Ethical Lessons of SARS” (2004) 12 Mich St J Int’l L
315; Sara Mahmoud-Davis, “Balancing Public Health and Individual Choice: a Proposal
for a Federal Emergency Vaccination Law” (2010) 20 Health Matrix 219.
32
e.g. Carolina Alfieri, Proposal of an Ethics-Based Framework for Prioritization of
Scarce Resources During an Influenza Pandemic (MSc Thesis, McGill University
Department of Experimental Medicine, 2005) [unpublished].
8

in negligence against the Ontario government: Abarquez v Ontario,.33 The case was
dismissed however when the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the government did not
owe a private law duty of care to individual healthcare workers, but rather a public law
duty to the population at large.34 The decision is especially noteworthy considering that
the laws of many Canadian jurisdictions authorize the conscription of unwilling
healthcare workers as an emergency measure. This case discloses a prominent theme in
public health, public health law, and emergency preparedness scholarly discourse: the
inherent tension between the best health interests of the population at large (or: “the
public”) and the liberties (and health) of individuals or smaller groups.
While the SARS litigation was high profile, private law is not the dominant
sphere where law and public health converge during and after emergencies: public law is.
The SARS Commissions specifically identified many points of legislation and public law
mechanisms that required improvements in order to better combat future infectious
disease outbreaks, including, amongst others:
- Inter-jurisdiction cooperation and coordination (needed to manage
constitutional division of powers);35
- Improved access to enforcement orders;36

33

2009 ONCA 374, 95 OR (3d) 414. Abarquez was heard alongside four other similar
cases, all of which failed: Williams v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 378, 95
OR (3d) 401, leave to appeal to the SCC refused [2009] SCCA No 298 (QL); [Williams]
Laroza v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 373, 95 OR (3d) 764; and Jamal v Scarborough Hospital,
2009 ONCA 376, 95 OR (3d) 760. See also: Eliopoulus v Ontario (Minister of Health
and Long Term Care) (2006), 82 OR (3d) 321 (CA), [2006] OJ No 4400 (QL), leave to
appeal to the SCC refused [2006] SCCA No 514 (QL) [Eliopoulus].
34
Abarquez, ibid, at para 20, relying on Williams, ibid, at para 31, which itself relied on
Eliopoulus, ibid, at paras 19-20. The complaint in Abarquez also contained a Charter
damages claim, which was dismissed at paras 49-52.
35
Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 164.
36
Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 274.
9

- Improved inter-jurisdictional reporting requirements under revised or
clarified privacy rules;37
- Independence and visibility of the Chief Medical Officers of Health;38
- Creation of explicit statutory authority for extraordinary emergency
measures;39
From a legal scholarship standpoint, nowhere was legal structure so critical to
achieving public health ends as in the subjects of health information, privacy, reporting,
and sharing.40 This is especially so in the international context, where information sharing
on a global scale becomes critical to detecting and preventing, or mitigating, a coming
pandemic.41 But this thesis is mostly concerned with the last area for reform: the creation
of explicit statutory authority for necessary, extraordinary measures during an infectious
disease emergency. When it is truly needed, this authority is critical. As the SARS
Commission recognized:
[P]ublic health emergencies will arise despite the greatest vigilance of
public health authorities and the most vigorous exercise of their daily
powers.
The quintessential public health emergency is an outbreak of infectious
disease that overwhelms the capacity of the public health system. The
most serious predictable public health emergency is pandemic influenza
which would overwhelm not only the public health and hospital and
medical systems but also the other systems that keep the province
going. Pandemic influenza exemplifies the need for strong emergency
powers.
[…]
37

Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 175 – 210; 213 – 229.
Ibid, at 252.
39
Ibid, at 304.
40
See for example: Elaine Gibson, “Public Health Information Privacy and
Confidentiality”, chapter 4 in Tracey M Bailey, Timothy Caulfield & Nola M Ries, eds,
Public Health Law and Policy in Canada (Markham: LexisNexis, 2005).
41
Canada is a party to the World Health Organization and has signed on to the The
International Health Regulations (2005) 2d Ed. (World Health Organization, 2008).
38

10

Although Ontario got through SARS without any special emergency
powers, the prospect of pandemic influenza brings home the need for
such powers. Even if all the emergency measures taken during SARS
were explicitly enshrined in emergency legislation, those measures
would be hopelessly inadequate in the face of a much larger infectious
attack such as pandemic influenza.
[…]
The prospect of pandemic influenza or indeed any outbreak more
serious even than SARS requires the enactment of emergency powers
stronger than those available during SARS and available now.42
This thesis will argue that legislative amendments can be used to do even more.
The law can do more than grant explicit authority for emergency measures; it can
improve the very use of that authority towards achieving public health ends.
1.3

LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
The call from the various SARS commissions and committees for reform of

emergency legislation fits within a branch of commentary and scholarship that has come
to be know as “Legal Preparedness”.43 This field, a subset of public health emergency
preparedness, has entered into the prevailing public health scholarly commentary
relatively recently. Thérèse Murphy and Noel Whitty have provided a useful definition:
[A] term that requires some explanation is ‘public health
emergency legal preparedness’. Stated shortly, this is all
about having the right laws in place and then using them in
the right way in a time of public health emergency. In other
words, it is about both legal preparedness for, and response
to, public health emergencies – it is both proactive and
reactive. More generally, it can be said to be both an
essential part of both public and global public health
42

Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 345, 348.
Indeed, the Campbell Commission recommended that “Legal preparedness be an
integral component of all public health emergency plans,” Second Interim Report, supra
note 6, at 294.
43

11

security, and a subset of public health emergency
preparedness.44
B. Kamoie et al. have defined the concept as “attainment of benchmarks within a public
health system”,45 and A.D. Moulton et al. have similarly defined it as the “attainment by
a public health system… of legal benchmarks essential to the preparedness of the public
health system”. They further added that legal preparedness is a contribution that the law
makes towards the specified ends of the discipline of public health. 46 These benchmarks
are usually thought of in the ‘public health’ sense, taking the law as a means to a
particular public health end. In this author’s view, legal preparedness can be thought of as
an ongoing process,47 adaptable to changes in society and in the natural environment, that
attempts to improve the law so that we can better prevent, and if necessary respond to,
future public health emergencies.
In the context of public health emergencies, legal preparedness literature has quite
rapidly found itself enveloped by concern for national and international security. Given
the association infectious diseases like Anthrax have with biological warfare and
terrorism, this drift in the literature makes sense. However, it is not without its critics,48
and caution must be taken to not associate infectious disease legal preparedness too
closely with the preparations necessary to deal with other kinds of emergencies. In this
thesis, public health emergency preparedness is not taken up as principally a national
44

Thérèse Murphy & Noel Whitty, “Is Human Rights Prepared? Risk, Rights, and Public
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security issue, but rather primarily as a public health issue. It is acknowledged that this is
a point open to debate. However, the central proposal of this thesis, namely that the
legislature ought to provide guidance to decision makers, could just as easily be adopted
under a national security approach to the same facts.
1.4
THE PROBLEM: TO A HAMMER, EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A
NAIL
This thesis concerns one aspect of public health emergency legal preparedness
that has, to date, largely been overlooked in the literature: the decision-making process
undertaken by decision makers when choosing whether or not to deploy extraordinary
measures. It is argued that the law can do more than simply provide statutory authority
for extraordinary emergency measures. The decision maker should be able to turn to his
or her empowering legislation for more than a bare statement of authority. He or she
could find legal guidance on how he or she ought to go about deciding.
The extent to which the legislature ought to grant extraordinary powers to the
executive in times of emergency is not itself a new question. The Campbell commission,
in recommending that explicit legislative authority be granted post-SARS, was alive to
the benefits and drawbacks of various approaches. It noted two main models of
emergency powers – the first, in essence, relies upon enumerated powers specific to a
certain kind of emergency, and relies largely upon authorities already existing in other
statutes, either explicitly or implicitly. The second model relies upon the legislature
granting broad, sweeping authority to the executive during the emergency, even to the
point of permission to override existing laws.49
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The Commission debated the merits of each model in its Second Interim Report.
In so doing, it noted that (at the time) Ontario had the weakest emergency legislation in
the country – even in the post-Charter50 era, every other province had enacted the
“general” model of emergency legislation.51 The Campbell Commission, recognizing that
the Ontario Legislature already had a Bill before it adopting the general model,
recommended for increased legislation in this area to ensure that decision makers were
not inhibited by legal uncertainty. However, it also recommended that the Bill be
subjected to thorough review by Ontario’s Attorney General to ensure constitutional
compliance.52 Bill 138 eventually made major amendments to the Emergency
Management and Civil Protection Act,53 including the granting of broad emergency
powers, highlighted below, in the form of what will be referred to as a “basket clause”:
Emergency orders
(4) In accordance with subsection (2) and subject to the limitations in
subsection (3), the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make orders in
respect of the following:
1. Implementing any emergency plans formulated under section 3, 6, 8
or 8.1.
2. Regulating or prohibiting travel or movement to, from or within any
specified area.
3. Evacuating individuals and animals and removing personal property
from any specified area and making arrangements for the adequate care
and protection of individuals and property.
4. Establishing facilities for the care, welfare, safety and shelter of
individuals, including emergency shelters and hospitals.
50
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5. Closing any place, whether public or private, including any business,
office, school, hospital or other establishment or institution.
6. To prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of the emergency,
constructing works, restoring necessary facilities and appropriating,
using, destroying, removing or disposing of property.
7. Collecting, transporting, storing, processing and disposing of any
type of waste.
8. Authorizing facilities, including electrical generating facilities, to
operate as is necessary to respond to or alleviate the effects of the
emergency.
9. Using any necessary goods, services and resources within any part of
Ontario, distributing, and making available necessary goods, services
and resources and establishing centres for their distribution.
10. Procuring necessary goods, services and resources.
11. Fixing prices for necessary goods, services and resources and
prohibiting charging unconscionable prices in respect of necessary
goods, services and resources.
12. Authorizing, but not requiring, any person, or any person of a class
of persons, to render services of a type that that person, or a person of
that class, is reasonably qualified to provide.
13. Subject to subsection (7), requiring that any person collect, use or
disclose information that in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in
Council may be necessary in order to prevent, respond to or alleviate
the effects of the emergency.
14. Consistent with the powers authorized in this subsection, taking
such other actions or implementing such other measures as the
Lieutenant Governor in Council considers necessary in order to prevent,
respond to or alleviate the effects of the emergency.54
[Emphasis added]
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The Commission had it right: the above provision is typical of the legislation
found throughout Canada, which tends to enumerate specific powers but grants much
broader authorities either by leaving the list open (an “implicit” basket clause) or, as is
the case above, by explicitly granting the authority to take whatever action may be
required in order to meet the emergency.55As will be discussed below, it is arguable
whether such broad grants of power are truly in accordance with the Rule of Law at all.56
But assuming that they are, and even assuming the powers are always exercised within
the discretion granted by the legislation and in accordance with the principles of statutory
interpretation, surely the broad authority must still be subject to some higher level of
scrutiny. In other words, if the Rule of Law is to prevail, the otherwise lawful discretion
cannot truly be unfettered.
By the time the Commission released its final report the Bill had become law. The
Commission expressed trepidation at the existence of such power, and reiterated its call
to have the law examined, making the following comments:
It is understandable that the government in its desire to get the
emergency legislation into place before the next disaster did not pause
to address and to answer in detail the flaws referred to in the
Commission’s April 2005 report, flaws which are serious but easily
remedied. The government has taken no public position in respect of the
detailed flaws noted by the Commission. It is not as if the
55
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unimplemented recommendations have been considered and rejected
for publicly stated reasons. The unimplemented recommendations have
simply not been addressed publicly…
The problem is not with the good intentions of those who will
administer and exercise the emergency powers. The problem is that
these awesome powers represent a profound change in our legal
structure and raise issues that need to be addressed further in this statute
that so fundamentally alters our system of government by law.
Extraordinary powers like those in the Emergency Management and
Civil Protection Act are inherently dangerous and require now the sober
second thought and detailed legal clause-by-clause review and publicly
stated justification which they did not explicitly receive before.
Ontario’s emergency legislation brings to mind what President Lyndon
Johnson said about the potential danger of all laws:
You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will
convey if properly administered, but in the light of the wrongs it
would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered.
The Commission recommends the review and amendment of the
emergency legislation in accordance with the unimplemented
recommendations in Chapter 11 of the Commission’s April 2005
second interim report.57
Notably, the Commission did not call for the legislation to be scrapped, nor for the basket
clause to be eliminated. It called for examination for potential improvements. In a
passage that we will return to later in this thesis, the Commission noted:
Emergency powers are inherently dangerous. They carry the twin
dangers of overreaction and underreaction.
The first danger is overreaction. Every emergency power, once
conferred, “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”
To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. To some emergency
managers, every problem may look like an opportunity to invoke
emergency powers.
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The second danger is underreaction. In the face of a deadly new disease
with an uncertain incubation period, ambiguous symptoms, no
diagnostic tests, uncertainty as to its infectiveness and mechanisms of
transmission, and no idea where in the province it may be simmering,
decisive action may be necessary that turns out in hindsight to have
been excessive.
The central task of emergency legislation is to guard against
overreaction by providing safeguards and to guard against
underreaction by avoiding legal restrictions that prevent the application
of the precautionary principle.
There are no pure public health emergencies. Although pandemic
influenza might start as a public health emergency, it would rapidly
snowball into a general emergency. And big general emergencies that
arise outside the field of public health usually have a public health
component.58
It is this problem which this thesis seeks to address – how to improve the law to
be better prepared to meet an infectious disease emergency, particularly by guarding
against the spectres of overreaction and underreaction. These emergency-power-granting
legislative provisions form the nucleus of this thesis and its proposal for law reform.
Further, it is an objective of this thesis to make these provisions more clearly
constitutionally compliant. Written as they are, they are at the very least vulnerable to
constitutional challenges, if not on the face of the legislation then in how they are applied.
The Campbell Commission noted this risk, and highlighted the consequences:
Ontario’s emergency legislation will probably be challenged in court at
some time. It will be a major blow to the integrity of the legislation
should a court strike down as unconstitutional any part of the statute or
any emergency order made under the statute. It is essential to ensure in
advance, so much as possible, that the legislation conforms with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.59
This is precisely what the law reform proposed in this thesis is meant to do.
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1.5

THE PROBLEM CONTINUED: MAKING DECISIONS
It is easy to forget when discussing the high-stakes questions concerning

infectious disease emergencies that will be raised should the extraordinary legislative
powers ever be activated, that it will be a human being (or a group of them) who will
have to decide if, when, and how to use these powers. Likewise, it is easy to overlook
that the government decision maker, in the real world, is not apt to be alone, but rather
supported by advisors.
Prominent among them (and the most pertinent for this thesis’s purposes) will be
the legal advisor. Her job will not be easy. Even relatively straightforward legal activities,
such as enforcing an order, can become more complex during an emergency. In the words
of the Campbell Commission:
Legal counsel for public health units faced a daunting task during
SARS. When seeking judicial authority to enforce an order, they had to
navigate a confusing maze of overlapping and uncertain judicial powers
and procedures when speedy enforcement was vital to the containment
of SARS. As one lawyer involved in the response to SARS told the
Commission:
It is quite a challenge to be in a middle of an emergency with the
kind of huge range of legal issues coming up and you have to figure
out what the legal requirements are and how to get what needs to be
done, done in the face of those issues and still keeping everyone
within the law.60
Legal preparedness as a discipline includes a component that encourages legal
professionals to be pre-equipped to deal with the practical matters that will become timesensitive during the emergency. One can for example pre-prepare precedents, pre-map
the emergency court system, and pre-research a quick-reference table for legal
authorities. But this thesis is more concerned with the provision of advice to the decision
60
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maker on whether or not particular extraordinary measures can legally be deployed on a
given set of facts. This kind of advice during SARs was hard to come by, mostly due to
the confusing enforcement regime:
One lawyer told the Commission that their ability during SARS give
clear legal advice was at times hampered by weaknesses in the
enforcement portions the Act:
During SARS, I would often say when asked if we could do
something, ‘you can try it, but if we are challenged we may be on
shaky legal grounds and the courts will be in a very difficult
position.’61
Such advice can hardly be considered helpful, yet in the circumstances, it was
doubtless the best the lawyer could do. In response to this phenomenon, the Campbell
Commission concluded:
Public health officials and the lawyers who advise them require not
only the clear authority to act in the face of public health risks, they
require also a simple, rational, effective and fair set of procedures to
enforce compliance and to provide legal remedies for those who
challenge orders made against them. Delays in legal enforcement may
cost lives. Delays in legal remedies may put individual liberty at risk.
The above recommendations are necessary to secure effective access to
enforcement and to remedies.62
[Emphasis added]
This thesis proposes law reform in the same vein and towards the same objective, but
concerning a process that has up to now been largely ignored in the literature. During an
emergency, Canada deserves good, lawful decisions, made in a timely manner. The
legislature can give direction that will enable decision makers, assisted by their legal
advisors, to do just that.
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1.6

POWERS, VALUES, AND COERCION
Coercion is at the center of the individual/ public tension within public health.

Nola Ries has noted that during the global SARS outbreak coercive public health
measures, especially quarantine, were used very aggressively in China and Singapore.
She has also pointed out that, while Canada’s quarantines were almost universally
voluntary, a large portion of them may actually have been unnecessary.63 George Annas
has been extremely critical of the handling of the SARS crisis and the use of coercive
measures in both the United States and China, and has pointed out that Canada’s
response, though more tempered, was still questionable on several occasions.64
At the same time, the Campbell Commission noted that the level of cooperation
from Canadian residents during the emergency was quite remarkable, and was being
studied as such by researchers.65 This point goes to the inherent limitations of law, both
as a tool and as an enabler, for public health. As the Campbell Commission noted:
Laws are only the last resort. Legal procedures are useless without
overwhelming public cooperation of the kind demonstrated in SARS.
While it is important to strengthen the legal machinery available to
public health officials, it is even more important to strengthen the things
that encourage public cooperation.66
While law may empower decision makers to use coercion to achieve their
objectives, over-reliance on these measures can discourage cooperation, resulting in
diminishing returns as reliance on legal coercion begets more legal coercion. This means
63
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that any legislative reform should attempt to do more than just authorize powers and
provide for coercion. It should be crafted in such a manner that it will increase public
confidence and cooperation. The powers themselves, the Commissions noted, would
improve legal preparedness. Presumably this is with a view to improving post-emergency
public health outcomes. Building in to the legislation provisions designed to encourage
confidence, cooperation, and compliance could accomplish the same goals.
Within the public health discipline, it makes sense that professional decisions are
made by experts. They are the people best prepared for assessing the risks and
determining the appropriate measures. Weighing their professional judgment against the
applicable professional code of ethics, they will be well equipped for making a decision.
Law’s role, in this paradigm, is to enhance preparation by creating the structure that
enables this process, and grants the powers to decide, implement, and enforce compliance
if necessary.
This account might be effective. But it glosses over the inevitable legal
“balancing” that occurs when the public good come into conflict, or even potential
conflict, with constitutionally entrenched individual civil liberties. Even if a measure is
judged as scientifically the “best” measure, and is acceptable according to the standards
of public health as a discipline, this still does not mean, from a legal perspective, that it
ought to be deployed.
In this vein, this thesis taps into a paradigm of “decisional” legal preparedness
that is similar to what Tracey M. Bailey et al. called for in their 2008 article “A Duty to
Treat During a Pandemic: The Time for Talk is Now”. Arguing that health care
professional codes of ethics ought to be debated and prepared before, and not during, a
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pandemic in order to determine what professional governing bodies would demand of
their members during a crisis, the authors concluded:
For it is vital to know where we stand on this issue as a society, both to
plan for a future pandemic, but also to assess the society in which we
are living. Will we discover it is based on the values of the common
good? Or the preservation of autonomy in times of crisis, possibly at the
expense of our neighbors? Either way, it is a discussion that must be
carried on. To remain silent is, indeed, an unethical option for those that
would call themselves members of a profession.67
[Emphasis added]
At its heart, this thesis is posing just such an analysis from a legal perspective.
Much the same way as Bailey et al. called for health care professionals, reflecting upon
the society in which they live, to determine how they are going to act during a public
health emergency, it is advised that Canada, through elected legislatures, can and should
guide statutory decision makers on how they want emergency powers exercised.
Specifically, this legislative guidance should be in the form of principles that must be
taken into account – principles that would find their origin in public health, public health
law, and ethics, alongside constitutional and administrative law.
This thesis is not, however, advising that efforts to produce legislative guidance
ought to displace similar efforts to enhance professional codes of ethics, nor is it
suggested that efforts towards this law reform must take place at the expense of
developing and improving ethical frameworks. To the contrary, each will benefit the
other. Ethical guidance to emergency actors can actually inform and enrich our proposed
law reform, making it more attuned to the needs of public health. This is particularly easy
if the ethical guidelines have already been informed by, or perhaps even integrated with,
underlying Canadian constitutional principles and Charter values. But not all public
67
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health ethical systems are so amenable to incorporating Canadian constitutional values. In
fact, some call for a radical redirecting of ethical analyses away from the perceived
constitutional priority allocated to the protection of individual rights. Such a rigorously
fashioned, professional ethical framework may answer precisely the questions posed by
Bailey et al. But even though it may have been so fashioned by, and according to, the
experts, it will not necessarily be according to law. If such a framework were to be
referenced by a decision maker without adherence to the law, the choices made could
quickly run outside of legal authority no matter how ethical they were.
The law can do more for infectious disease emergencies than simply authorizing
professionals to issue orders in accordance with their own expertise and their profession’s
ethical code. Law can be used as a bridge, joining the fundamental values of public
health, ethics, and the law into one democratic expression.68 If we use legislation, in
addition to ethics, to articulate the principles to be considered in emergencies and so
answer the challenge given by Bailey et al, then we may also succeed in changing the
very focus of emergency legal preparedness. That is to say, it may help us to stop asking
ourselves “in an emergency, what are we going to do?” and encourage us to instead ask,
“In an emergency, what kind of a people do we want to be?”
1.7

DESIRED END STATE
It was stated above that public health emergency legal preparedness research is in

general conducted with a view to improving the law so that we can better prevent, and if
necessary respond to, future public health emergencies. Ultimately, the reforms proposed
in this thesis concerning the use of emergency powers are in support of two principle
68
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outcomes: first, better decisions; and second, more meaningful judicial review. The two
outcomes are not isolated from each other. There are three interconnected lines of
argument which demonstrate how the proposed legislative reform will accomplish these
objectives.
The first line is increased transparency and accountability. Transparency is a
fundamental value that cuts across public health, public health law, public health ethics,
and Canadian constitutional and administrative law. Though admittedly some legislation
can be difficult to navigate (even for legal professionals), statutes and regulations have
the advantage of being fundamentally ‘public’. Unlike professional ethical frameworks,
they are created through publicly elected and accountable representatives, often involving
public (rather than professional or expert) consultation. They are enacted through
parliamentary procedure, including debates whose transcripts are publically obtainable.
The finished products are relatively easy to access for the public and the press,
particularly in the Internet age. Going further, the legislation itself can be used to enhance
the transparency once the powers it creates are exercised by requiring the publication of
reasons for the decision made or actions taken with the powers.
Concerning accountability, having legislative guidance on the values and
principles which must be protected in deciding how to use emergency powers will greatly
enhance the utility and meaningfulness of judicial review. If crafted as proposed, the
legislation would have integrated the values of public health, ethics, underlying Canadian
constitutional principles and Charter values, as well as judicial precedents. In the context
of an infectious disease emergency, the stakes are going to be extremely high; the role of
the judge will be correspondingly daunting. Equipped with the legislature’s expression of
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constitutional meaning even during an emergency, judicial review for the
constitutionality of the statute itself will be more meaningful, and productive, than it
would be if a court were faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute conferring
broad discretionary authority. At the same time, substantive review of the decision itself
would be far more transparent to all parties. Again, the legislature having “spoken first”
regarding what principles the administrative decision maker must consider, judicial
review would be much more focused regardless of the standard of review.
Through the proposed law reform, the decision maker will be statutorily bound to
consider legislative factors and to publish reasons for decisions. He or she will be
accountable for those decisions: first, through meaningful judicial review informed by
that statute and considering those reasons; and second, to the concerned population, who
will be able to judge the decision maker’s actions against his or her articulated
justification.
This enhanced transparency and accountability should encourage greater public
trust, cooperation, and participation. This is the first and most obvious way the reformed
legislation could improve efficiency and effectiveness. Public trust is absolutely critical
to achieving our desired end state of responding to, and eliminating, the emergency. The
purposes of any extraordinary measures will be significantly frustrated if there is a
general lack of public cooperation, and no amount of coercive force can ever equal the
positive effect to be gained from public acceptance.
But binding the decision maker by statute to take account public health values and
ethics as they consider what extraordinary measures to deploy should not only lead to
more transparent decisions – it should lead to better ones. By using legislation to
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explicitly bring public health values and ethics into the legal discussion, the legislature
could re-orient the administrative decision making-process away from the classic
dichotomy between individual and the populations as a whole, and towards a richer
discussion taking full account of the state’s public law duty to the population as a whole.
The law, then, could serve to improve the technical quality of the decisions taken by the
decision-maker, while at the same time making the public health bases for those decisions
transparent to those affected. Having been given the force of law by the democratically
elected legislature, those principles may also come to have greater legitimacy in the eyes
of the population.
Efficiency will also be improved in another important way. If we provide
emergency decision makers with a more detailed statutory framework, they will more
efficiently be able to discharge their legal mandate without concern for ambient legal
ramifications. A corollary to this is that legal advisors will be better equipped to
discharge their own mandate alongside ethical, scientific, and other professional advisors,
underlying constitutional issues and Charter values having already been raised and
examined (even if not judicially resolved) during the legislative process. Decision makers
will therefore personally be able to more swiftly, and confidently, make their decisions
and express to the public the precise legal justification and authority they relied upon for
deploying the measure, instead of relying upon a nebulous authority to do “anything
necessary” or take “any necessary actions” to meet the emergency.
The third line is concrete respect for rights, focused and more meaningful, judicial
review and an enriched constitutional discourse, benefits that are admittedly more
abstract than the others. As the decision maker swiftly renders his or her decision
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according to law, there are probably going to be affected individuals displeased with the
decision. The proposed legislative reform would support more meaningful judicial
review. But more than that, the unique circumstance of an infectious disease emergency
provides us with a rare opportunity to enrich the Canadian constitutional discourse by
bringing public health and ethics openly into the discussion. Here, the “dialogue
metaphor” of Canadian constitutional scholarship69 can be invoked. If our “free and
democratic society” is to defeat the emergency, then the state will have to apply public
health and public health ethical principles and practices as it combats the spread of the
disease. These principles and practices may or may not call for actions that accord with
those expected by constitutional precedents.
Though aggrieved individuals can always ask a court to ‘speak’ an opinion on
‘what the rights mean,’ in the context of an infectious disease emergency, it is actually
the legislature that must ‘speak first’ if the expression is to be of any use at all. It is the
legislature that is best equipped to consider the principles and practices of public health
and ethics, and to integrate them, through legislation, into Canada’s constitutional
discourse in the specific context of emergencies. In particular, the legislature is well
positioned to find the commonalities that permeate public health, ethics, and the law, and
take advantage of those commonalities to craft constitutionally sound legislative
guidance. One value that public health, multiple ethical systems, and the constitution
appear to hold in common is the priority given to the protection of vulnerable minorities.
It is this principle that holds the greatest promise for bridging public health, ethics, and
69
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the law in a constitutionally sensitive manner. But more imaginatively, the legislature can
go even further and take steps to incorporate values into the legislation that have not yet
been given constitutional standing by the courts. For example, we will see below in
chapter three that social justice is a core value of public health and public health law, and
is of central importance across multiple ethical models. Legislation could bring social
justice considerations into the legal decision-making process in a way that, so far, the
courts have in general been reluctant to do.70
The legislature is also privileged in that it can proactively carry out this balancing
and bridging right now, before an emergency arises. Emergency legislation is an
anomaly; legislatures have granted remarkable power to the executive with equally
impressive discretion. In the face of a constitutional challenge to a decision made under
any piece of emergency legislation as it currently stands (and assuming the legislation
itself survived), the court might provide guidance to the decision maker on how she ought
to go about making future decisions such that they could pass constitutional muster. But
were we to rely exclusively on the courts to consider and balance the legal rights at stake
during the emergency, by necessity we would receive the decision too late: too late for
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the individual, the public, and for the decision maker. It is therefore also necessary for the
legislature to “speak first” as a matter of practical reality given the dire nature of
infectious disease emergencies and the seriousness of the rights at stake. Once the
emergency is over, if the state has unjustifiably violated the constitutional or other legal
rights of individuals or groups, it will be too late to begin discussing what the law is or
should be. Ex post, lawyers may be content to be provided with precedential guidance
from the courts about what a “correct” or “reasonable” decision would have looked like
in the circumstances, but no ex post remedy, not even those available under the Charter,
will probably be satisfactory to individuals or groups affected by an unlawful or
unreasonable decision made in the absence of legal guidance. On the other hand, if the
state fails to protect the public because of ultimately unjustified concerns about violating
rights, the consequences could be just as dire.
In summary, infectious disease emergencies have recently found renewed salience
in Canadian legal scholarship. One theme in this literature is emergency legal
preparedness. Because the emergency powers available to emergency decision makers
are exceptionally robust, they embody the public health tension between the public good
and individual civil liberties. However, to date there has been little attention paid in the
literature to the administrative decision to deploy extraordinary measures. In order to
improve transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and to provide for
more meaningful judicial review (resulting in concrete respect for rights in an enriched
constitutional discourse) for these decisions, legislation ought to be established
articulating specific principles to be considered by administrative decision makers when
they are deciding whether or not to deploy extraordinary emergency measures.
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1.8

SCOPE
In its Second Interim Report, the Campbell Commission succinctly noted that the

best infectious disease emergency measure is a robust day-to-day public health system:
The first goal of public health emergency management is
to stop emergencies before they start by preventing the
spread of disease. If a small outbreak is prevented or
contained, draconian legal powers available to fight a fullblown emergency will not be needed.
Legal Powers themselves are false hopes in times of
public crisis. Preparedness and prevention backed by
enhanced daily public health powers are the best
protection against public health emergencies.71
In a similar vein, Nuala Kenny et al., speaking from a relational-feminist approach, have
cautioned against over-focus upon emergency preparedness in the wake of SARS and
H1N1 at the expense of other, constantly prevailing public health concerns.72
However, these authors probably ought not to be taken to mean that emergency
preparedness, including legal preparedness, should be ignored. Nor should they be taken
to mean that where a gap has been identified in the prevailing literature concerning
emergencies, it ought not to be addressed. While this thesis is limited to the emergency
context, dealing with the substance of legal preparedness is not the same creature as
focusing upon the stockpiling of antivirals to the exclusion of clean water initiatives in
aboriginal communities. The underlying principles which will be fleshed out have the
potential to become very relevant to future non-emergency public health legal scholarship
and to administrative decision-making in public health more broadly.
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There are many different kinds of public health emergencies: Hurricane Katrina,
just as much as SARS, has the potential to fit within the public health paradigm as well as
trigger the deployment of special emergency measures. In choosing to limit the inquiry to
the context of infectious diseases, this thesis demonstrates agreement with the Campbell
Commission’s characterization, noted above, of infectious disease outbreaks that
overwhelm the standing acute care and public health systems as the “quintessential”
public health emergency. This is not simply due to their contemporary salience (though
that is indeed an immediate attractor). Rather, infectious disease emergency law provides
an opportune place to make the argument that legislated guidance ought to exist as a part
of the emergency decision-making process. The individual and group legal rights at issue
are most obvious during such an event, and also exist alongside the exceptionally high
stakes that can logically justify their transgression. Because of this, they also provide a
most convenient opportunity for building a bridge between public health, ethics, and the
law.
The bulk of the analysis in this thesis assumes a state of emergency, or public
health emergency as the case may require, has already been legitimately declared 73 and
the special powers are available to the relevant decision maker. Admittedly, the question
surrounding what state of affairs would actually justify such a legal declaration is highly
relevant to this area of scholarship. However, it is a separate line of inquiry, and is
beyond the intended scope of this thesis.
Lastly, it may become evident to the reader that this thesis is written from the
perspective of a practitioner. The goal of the proposed legislative reform is
73
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correspondingly a very practical one, which is: if and when the next infectious disease
emergency arises, then the real-life experiences of several actors – including the decision
makers, their advisors, and the public - will be improved in a concrete way.
1.9

STRUCTURE
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In the next chapter, we will consider

Canada’s constitutional legal framework, its underlying constitutional principles, and the
import of Charter rights and values, and consider them in relation to public health in
general and infectious disease emergencies specifically. In chapter three, we will explore
the definition, purposes, and scope of public health and public health law with a view to
both understanding the literature, as well as incorporating their core values into our
proposed legislative reform. We will also discuss two prominent public health ethical
systems: descriptive ethics and relational feminist ethics, as examples in order to consider
whether ethical models, on their own, could be used to achieve our stated objectives.
Chapter three goes on to consider: if ethical models cannot achieve our objectives on
their own, to what extent could they be integrated into and enrich legislative reform?
Chapter four will explore Canada’s complex statutory regime concerning infectious
diseases. This regime essentially involves three separate species of statutes: public health
laws; public health emergency laws; and general public welfare emergency laws.
Examples will be given of some of these statutory provisions as they currently stand, with
emphasis on the truly remarkable legal powers that are bestowed upon various decision
makers in times of emergency. In chapter five, the proposed solution will be provided in
the form of draft legislation. That chapter will then restate the expected benefits of
increased transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and briefly the
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benefit of increased concrete respect for rights, more meaningful judicial review, and an
enriched constitutional discourse. In chapter six, we will discuss the jurisprudential basis
for judicial review of administrative action in Canada, and attempt to predict how the
proposed legislation would fit into the current regime. Chapter six will also apply the
dialogue metaphor of Canadian constitutional scholarship in order to more fully explain
how legislative reform in pursuit of better infectious disease emergency legal
preparedness could provide an opportunity to realize some of the initial promise the
metaphor had for a constitutional-enhancing dialogue between courts and legislatures.
Chapter seven contains some brief concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
PRINCIPLES

LEGAL AUTHORITY
This thesis is focused on government (i.e. administrative) decision makers, and

what will guide them as they decide whether or not extraordinary measures are required
in order to confront an infectious disease emergency, and, if so, when or how to deploy
them. It is for this reason the second chapter is concerned with fundamental law.
By what right does this person decide during the emergency, and under what
authority may they direct such interference with people’s liberty? If, for example, an
international airport is to be closed, restricting the freedom and commerce of many
individuals and businesses, there had better be a good answer to this question. The
answer is: the person decides and directs under the authority of law. It is the law that
gives this person their jurisdiction, their vires. It is a fundamental principle of Canadian
law that a public official must be able to trace their authority back to a legal source.74
Correspondingly, the official cannot exercise authority beyond that grant.75 In this
chapter, we will examine the law that underlies our emergency decision maker’s source
of authority. Later on in chapter four, we will build upon this foundation by providing the
reader with a general overview of the current state of the legislation, the extraordinary
character and pervasiveness of basket clauses, as well the availability of some lesser
known enforcement measures.
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2.2

DIVISION OF POWERS
Canada is a federal state with a division of powers between the federal parliament

and the provincial legislatures.76 Health care systems, including public health, are shared
between the two levels, though acute healthcare is considered mostly within the
legislative authority of the provinces.
Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 Canadian Constitution list the areas of legislative
competence, or vires, applicable to each level of government. The constitutional language
of section 92 tends to situate public health laws within the domains of the provinces:
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next
hereinafter enumerated; that is to say:
[…]
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals,
Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the
Province, other than Marine Hospitals.
[…]
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province
[…]
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the
Province.77
Section 91, however, grants powers to the federal Parliament that might be applicable to
an infectious disease emergency:
Powers of the Parliament
Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
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91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the
Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater
Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms
of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in
this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of
Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects
next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, —
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
[…]
7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.
[…]
11. Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine
Hospitals.
[…]
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.
[…]
29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects
enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the
Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces.78
One of the earliest legal disputes concerning this division of powers between the
federal and provincial governments actually arose out of an infectious disease outbreak.
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In the 1886 case Rinfret v Pope,79 a five-judge panel of the Quebec Court of Queen’s
Bench (Appeal Side) ruled 4:1 that laws relating to disease epidemics were strictly within
provincial jurisdiction. However, a long dissent from Cross J. advocated for a federal
Parliament which could:
…take appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate an epidemic,
endemic or contagious disease, with which the Dominion, or any part of
it, was threatened, nor could it be objected that in the carrying out of
such general purpose, their measures descended in a minute detail or
preventive remedies.80
Cross J.’s dissent did not gain much traction concerning outbreaks confined to a single
province, but the federal Parliament is certainly responsible for legislating in order to
discharge Canada’s international obligations with regards to infectious disease
surveillance, notification, and control. It can also exert authority in the event of an interprovincial infectious disease outbreak, or, in the extreme case, an intra-provincial
outbreak that rises to the level of a national emergency.81 In today’s age of high
population density and rapid transportation, there is real potential for an infectious
disease outbreak to rise to this level.
Many infectious disease outbreaks, even those rising to the level of emergencies,
will of course be localized within one province, or even one locality. As in Rinfret v
Pope, such occasions would fall within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures.82
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2.3

HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY
The provincial/ federal jurisdiction question was not the only challenge made to

the authorities concerning infectious diseases in the 19th century. In the 1892 case of Re:
George Bowack,83 the applicant was detained upon his arrival in Vancouver, BC due to
his suspected exposure to smallpox across the straits in Victoria. He applied for, but was
denied, an initial writ of habeas corpus, but was successful upon a second attempt five
days later. The second judge interpreted the local bylaws in effect at the time, and
decided that public health officials had limited powers under the law to detain. As
described in Peter Johnson’s, Quarantined: Life and Death at William Head Station,
1879-1959:
The City of Vancouver bylaw stated “The Medical Officer shall have
power to stop, detain, and examine every person coming from a place
infected with a pestilential or infectious disease, in order to prevent the
introduction of the same into the City. But [Justice] Walkem revealed that
Bowack had been detained without examination. What was the point of an
examination “when it is impossible to discover whether a person has the
disease until it actually had broken out… and that takes 14 days to
incubate.” If that were the case, [Justice] Walkem asserted, only patients
with the disease could be examined. Bowack was not a patient, and
therefore Vancouver had acted beyond the limitations of its own bylaw.
The Justice ordered Bowack’s immediate release and gave him costs
associated with his detention.84

Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2007). Amir Attaran and
Kumanan Wilson have challenged this view, and have called for federal jurisdiction over
all infectious disease emergencies in “A Legal and Epidemiological Justification for
Federal Authority in Public Health Emergencies” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 381.
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So we see, well before 1982 and the introduction of the Charter, the courts were
prepared to enforce, based purely upon the doctrine of vires, restrictions upon what an
administrative decision maker could do, even when attempting to halt the spread of
infectious diseases. While public health professionals may scoff at the judge’s dismissal
of a valid public health tool, i.e. quarantine, as not appropriate because Mr. Bowack was
not yet sick (that is, after all, the point), the judge’s ruling was not based upon the
efficacy of the measure – it was based on whether or not the measure was authorized by
law.85
2.4

UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Bowack of course turned on its own facts. But facts are not alone in informing

judicial interpretation of a statute,86 or in assessing the reasonableness of a decision.
Underlying constitutional principles run throughout all Canadian law, as does the impact
of Canada’s constitutionally enacted bill of rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.87
Even at its enacting, Canada’s constitution encompassed more than the
delineation of legislative authority. It included then, as now, traditions, conventions, and
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common laws which, in the words of Canada’s Supreme Court, “embrace the global
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority in the
whole and in every part of the Canadian state.”88 The Supreme Court of Canada in a
variety of circumstances has discussed these underlying principles, which though
unwritten have the force of law. For example, in the Provincial Judges Reference,89 the
Court commented in detail on the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial
independence. In the course of that decision, the Court also reiterated other unwritten
principles, including: Canada’s form of the doctrine of full faith and credit;90 the doctrine
of federal paramouncy;91 the maintenance of the rule of law;92 Canada’s parliamentary
form of representative democracy;93 legislative and Parliamentary privilege;94 and the
protection of political speech.95 These examples of unwritten constitutional principles
were not exhaustive.
In the case Reference re Secession of Quebec,96 the Supreme Court of Canada
built upon some of the unwritten constitutional rules and conventions it had previously
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discussed in Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution,97 and Re: Objection by Quebec to
a Resolution to amend the Constitution.98 In so doing, it described the four constitutional
principles that hold the greatest promise for helping us bridge public health, ethics, and
the law:
Our Constitution is primarily a written one, the product of 131 years of
evolution. Behind the written word is an historical lineage stretching
back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying
constitutional principles. These principles inform and sustain the
constitutional text: they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which
the text is based. The following discussion addresses the four
foundational constitutional principles that are most germane for
resolution of this Reference: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism
and the rule of law, and respect for minority rights. These defining
principles function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in
isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude
the operation of any other.99
These four principles ought to inform all of the actors in our scenario: the
legislature as it enacts the law granting authority to the decision maker; the decision
maker as they determine what powers the law grants them, along with if, when, and how
to use those powers; and finally the courts, if and when they are asked to review any of
the preceding. But more than that, these underlying constitutional principles provide an
excellent opportunity to bridge public health, ethics, and the law because they are legal
principles that hold significant commonalities with certain fundamental values of public
health and ethics. Improved legislation could leverage these commonalities, along with
other legal considerations (such as Charter values), towards our stated goal of improved
infectious disease emergency legal preparedness.
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Continuing to elaborate on the four enumerated principles, the Court explained
the unwritten constitutional principle of federalism:
The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the component
parts of Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments to
develop their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction.
The federal structure of our country also facilitates democratic
participation by distributing power to the government thought to be
most suited to achieving the particular societal objective having regard
to this diversity. The scheme of the Constitution Act, 1867, it was said
in Re the Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935 (P.C.), at p.
942, was
not to weld the Provinces into one, nor to subordinate Provincial
Governments to a central authority, but to establish a central
government in which these Provinces should be represented,
entrusted with exclusive authority only in affairs in which they
had a common interest. Subject to this each Province was to retain
its independence and autonomy and to be directly under the
Crown as its head.
More recently, in Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at p. 1047, the
majority of this Court held that differences between provinces "are a
rational part of the political reality in the federal process". It was
referring to the differential application of federal law in individual
provinces, but the point applies more generally. A unanimous Court
expressed similar views in R. v. S. (S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, at pp. 28788.
The principle of federalism facilitates the pursuit of collective goals by
cultural and linguistic minorities which form the majority within a
particular province. This is the case in Quebec, where the majority of
the population is French-speaking, and which possesses a distinct
culture…
Federalism was also welcomed by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,
both of which also affirmed their will to protect their individual cultures
and their autonomy over local matters. All new provinces joining the
federation sought to achieve similar objectives, which are no less
vigorously pursued by the provinces and territories as we approach the
new millennium.100
[Emphasis added]
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This principle, if applied to infectious disease emergencies, can be thought of as
either aiding or inhibiting our stated goal of improved legal preparedness (or both). Amir
Attaran and Kumanan Wilson are two of the more vocal proponents of a unified, federal
emergency system under the prevailing constitutional structure. In their words:
It is telling that even after years of preparation and refinement,
Canada’s national plan for an influenza outbreak is still replete with
dozens of references to “F/P/T” – the usual shorthand for the federal,
provincial, and territorial levels of government.
But while the F/P/T lingo sounds harmonious and inclusive, it is
actually a deceptive balm that covers up a dangerous failure to
demarcate specific responsibilities and to assign them to individual
levels of government...
[…]
Succinctly put, viruses and bacteria behave independently of political
considerations. Therefore, to impose a federalist or provincialist view of
the world on their reality is awfully mistaken, maybe even suicidally
so.101
Attaran and Wilson go on to argue that, under contemporary Canadian constitutional law,
the federal Parliament can, and should, legislate and govern infectious disease emergency
responses in Canada.
For now, at least, the federal Parliament has made no specific effort to legislate
infectious disease emergency response on a national scale. The body of Canada’s
infectious disease emergency laws remains a multiplicity of federal, provincial, and
territorial statutes. Attaran and Wilson’s approach, if adopted, would certainly make this
thesis’s suggested law reform easier to implement (it would take only a single round of
amendments). On the other hand, there is nothing at present legally preventing the
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suggested reform from taking place in each individual province or territory, in addition to
federally. Further, there is nothing necessarily preventing each legislature from coming
up with different solutions, based upon their own consideration and weighing of the
relevant constitutional rules, public health principles, ethics, and Charter values.
Returning to the Secession Reference, after federalism the Court discussed the
principle of democracy. Going beyond the constitutional requirement for the democratic
election of the legislature, the Court elaborated that this constitutional principle embodies
something deeper:
The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our understanding
of a free and democratic society. Yet democracy in any real sense of
the word cannot exist without the rule of law. It is the law that creates
the framework within which the "sovereign will" is to be ascertained
and implemented. To be accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions
must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. That is, they must allow
for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, through public
institutions created under the Constitution. Equally, however, a system
of government cannot survive through adherence to the law alone. A
political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our political
culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of law and the
democratic principle. The system must be capable of reflecting the
aspirations of the people. But there is more. Our law's claim to
legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, many of which are
imbedded in our constitutional structure. It would be a grave mistake to
equate legitimacy with the "sovereign will" or majority rule alone, to
the exclusion of other constitutional values.
Finally, we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a
continuous process of discussion. The Constitution mandates
government by democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to
them, "resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion and
the interplay of ideas" (Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at p. 330). At
both the federal and provincial level, by its very nature, the need to
build majorities necessitates compromise, negotiation, and
deliberation. No one has a monopoly on truth, and our system is
predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best
solutions to public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably, there will be
dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is committed to
considering those dissenting voices, and seeking to acknowledge and
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address those voices in the laws by which all in the community must
live.102
[Emphasis added]
This underlying principle even more clearly connects with some of the core
values of public health. In fact, some public health writers have specifically called for
greater community involvement and consultation concerning public health initiatives.103
Keri Gammon seems to have given the same significance to local community needs and
involvement when she wrote:
[L]ocal needs, values and customs will often elude the federal
government, which does not have an effective means of identifying
these local needs and responding to them. In contrast, the local and
provincial governments are likely to be seized of such mechanisms and
therefore must be accorded deference in their legislative decisions…
[…]
[W]ith respect to regional differences in public health legislation, such
differences should not be dogmatically impugned and subjected to
standardization. Differences in approach do not suggest that provinces
have abdicated their responsibility or in any way compromised their
ability to protect the health of their citizenry. On the contrary, the very
fact of these differences suggests that provincial and municipal
governments have acted based on the needs and values of their
communities, thereby fulfilling their responsibility to protect health and,
at the same time, preserving local democracy and the relationship
between an individual and their local community.104
Whichever approach one finds compelling, empowering statutes (which will be
discussed below) exist currently in federal, provincial, and territorial jurisdictions.
Whether they are to remain separate and distinct, or made uniform, or absorbed under a
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single federal statute, is not critical to this thesis’s proposed reform; the reform is
required regardless.
Irrespective of which level of government has granted authority to a specific
decision maker, this deeper constitutional requirement for democracy ought to inform his
or her interpretation of his or her own statute, as well as their decision making process.
Taking this approach further empowers the decision maker. Any incorporation of
constitutional principles (as well as Charter values) into legal interpretation and
administrative decision-making would enrich the decision, and render it more legally
sound.105 And, as shall be seen in chapter three, the principle of democracy is also one
which lends itself to bridging public health, ethics, and the law.
It some ways, the constitutional principles of federalism and democracy may have
already found some implicit expression in Canadian health law and policy, most notably
in the reforms of the 1990s and 2000s towards more democratic, local decision making
regarding the allocation of (mostly acute) health care resources. Diane Longley is one
scholar who argued that the primacy of health in the human experience, alongside the
internationally accepted notion that governments had a responsibility to promote the
health of their citizens, makes for a strong case that health care resources and the systems
for their deployment ought to be considered of constitutional importance. 106 Writing,
from the perspective of the UK, on the reforms that were taking place throughout a large
part of the developed world in response to radically escalating health care costs and
public disenchantment with quality of delivery, she commented:
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The philosophy, or at least the rhetorical justification that underpins
many of the current changes to the public sector, including health both
[in the UK] and abroad is that of user choice. Much of the health
service reforms in the UK were predicated on enhanced local decision
making…
Such a focus implies that the public will be enabled readily to exercise
their preferences in relation to the provision of health services, and that
decisions will be justified by reflecting the values of those people most
affected. Where this is not the case, decisions will be open to
challenge… The twin tenets here therefore are choice and
accountability.107
We will see below that some public health scholars have called for increased
public engagement and participation in public health programs and governance. 108 Hester
Lessard has in a similar manner argued that the judiciary ought to take special account of
such local ‘democratic’ engagement and involvement in public health initiatives when
considering the constitutional division of powers between Parliament and the provincial
legislatures.109 These ideas are compelling from both theoretical and practical
perspectives. Similar to the ideas expressed by Longley, such engagement could be
thought of as giving effect to the fundamental value of democracy. As public health laws,
for example, were used practically as tools to further public health goals, they could also
be thought of as an expression of the democratic will of the communities who will bear
the burdens, as well as reap the benefits, of those same public health decisions and/or
policies. It is also possible that greater community involvement in public health policy
development will lead to the more specific needs of that community being met. If this
leads in turn to increased compliance with and participation in the public health initiative,
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it could lead to improved public health outcomes and at the same time engender trust and
cooperation. If, as the Supreme Court said, the legal “system must be capable of
reflecting the aspirations of the people”, then this is at least one principled area upon
which we might begin to bridge public health, ethics, and the law.
And we do need to consider the law if we wish to effectively and efficiently
defeat the emergency. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, all government action
must be able to trace its authority back to law, and that traceable path is always subject to
challenge before the courts. This reality finds its basis largely in the fourth underlying
constitutional principle from the Secession Reference: that of constitutionalism, and the
role of the judicial branch of government in guarding the rule of law:
…[S]imply put, the constitutionalism principle requires that all
government action comply with the Constitution. The rule of law
principle requires that all government action must comply with the law,
including the Constitution. This Court has noted on several occasions
that with the adoption of the Charter, the Canadian system of
government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of
Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy. The
Constitution binds all governments, both federal and provincial,
including the executive branch (Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen,
[1985] 1 SCR 441, at p. 455). They may not transgress its provisions:
indeed, their sole claim to exercise lawful authority rests in the powers
allocated to them under the Constitution, and can come from no other
source.110
[Emphasis added]
As will be seen in chapter three, infectious disease emergencies, by their very
nature provoke a population-focused response with a view to safeguarding the general
public before any one individual or group of individuals. This may be precisely the kind
of situation where the Court saw a place for the unwritten principle of constitutionalism:
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Secession Reference, supra note 96, at para 72. We will discuss this constitutional
principle, particularly with regards to administrative decision-making and judicial review,
in greater detail in chapter four.
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…[A] constitution may provide an added safeguard for fundamental
human rights and individual freedoms which might otherwise be
susceptible to government interference. Although democratic
government is generally solicitous of those rights, there are occasions
when the majority will be tempted to ignore fundamental rights in order
to accomplish collective goals more easily or effectively. Constitutional
entrenchment ensures that those rights will be given due regard and
protection.111
Of course, one might assume that the judiciary will be as alert to the seriousness
of an infectious disease outbreak as the rest of the population; the public interest in
having it effectively addressed will be evident. But the underlying constitutional
principles of federalism, democracy, and constitutionalism will not be suspended, even in
the face of emergency measures taken during an infectious disease emergency. The
public health decision maker, as well as his or her authorizing legislation, must be able to
pass a judicial review that will be informed by those principles in addition to the statutory
objectives.112 As they attempt to balance the interests of the population as a whole against
those of individuals or smaller groups, judges will be appropriately sensitive to the
unique facts, but they will at the same time have a constitutional duty to ensure that
government action, even emergency action, complies with the Canadian constitution.
This will become even more relevant shortly, below, when we consider Canada’s
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, the Charter.
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The final, though non-exhaustive, unwritten constitutional principle articulated by
the Court in the Secession Reference was the protection of minorities.113 It is this
principle that holds the most promise for bridging public health, ethics, and the law:
The fourth underlying constitutional principle we address here concerns
the protection of minorities. There are a number of specific
constitutional provisions protecting minority language, religion and
education rights. Some of those provisions are, as we have recognized
on a number of occasions, the product of historical compromises…
However, we highlight that even though those provisions were the
product of negotiation and political compromise, that does not render
them unprincipled. Rather, such a concern reflects a broader principle
related to the protection of minority rights. Undoubtedly, the three other
constitutional principles inform the scope and operation of the specific
provisions that protect the rights of minorities. We emphasize that the
protection of minority rights is itself an independent principle
underlying our constitutional order. The principle is clearly reflected in
the Charter's provisions for the protection of minority rights. See, e.g.,
Reference re Public Schools Act (Man), s. 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1
SCR 839, and Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342.
The concern of our courts and governments to protect minorities has
been prominent in recent years, particularly following the enactment of
the Charter. Undoubtedly, one of the key considerations motivating the
enactment of the Charter, and the process of constitutional judicial
review that it entails, is the protection of minorities. However, it should
not be forgotten that the protection of minority rights had a long history
before the enactment of the Charter. Indeed, the protection of minority
rights was clearly an essential consideration in the design of our
constitutional structure even at the time of Confederation: Senate
Reference, supra, at p. 71. Although Canada's record of upholding the
rights of minorities is not a spotless one, that goal is one towards which
Canadians have been striving since Confederation, and the process has
not been without successes. The principle of protecting minority rights
continues to exercise influence in the operation and interpretation of our
Constitution.
Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at
least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982
included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty
rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of
113
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aboriginal peoples. The "promise" of s. 35, as it was termed in R v
Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, at p. 1083, recognized not only the
ancient occupation of land by aboriginal peoples, but their contribution
to the building of Canada, and the special commitments made to them
by successive governments. The protection of these rights, so recently
and arduously achieved, whether looked at in their own right or as part
of the larger concern with minorities, reflects an important underlying
constitutional value.114
At first blush, it may not be obvious how the principle of the protection of
minorities could form a bridge with a discipline that takes as its focus the population at
large. But as we shall see in chapter three, public health, and public health law, have as
one of their core principles a commitment to social justice.115 Public health initiatives are,
in fact, powerful tools to achieve social justice as they can help diminish the gap in the
health outcomes between the wealthy and the marginalized. We will also see in chapter
three that some systems of public health ethics, though based upon significantly different
normative values, can nevertheless find common ground in the importance they give to
social justice and the protection of minorities. The protection of vulnerable minorities has
also been posited as part of the theoretical justification for judicial review. 116 Thus, it ties
together public health, ethics, underlying constitutional values, theoretical justifications
for judicial review, as well as Canada’s constitutionally enacted bill of rights.
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2.5

CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTRENCHED RIGHTS
In ending the focused discussion of Canada’s Constitution and its underlying

principles, we must discuss the significance of Part I (the first 34 sections) of the
Canadian Constitution Act, 1982,117 which incorporated a bill of rights into the Canadian
constitution. Under section 34 of that Act, Part I may be referred to as The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or often simply the Charter.118 This constitutional bill
of rights includes several individual rights guarantees that are quite relevant in the
context of an infectious disease emergency, most notably119 those protecting interests
such as liberty, bodily integrity, privacy, and due process:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.
9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned.
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and
to be informed of that right; and
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined
by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the
detention is not lawful.
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briefly at the end of this chapter.
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A complete analysis of the last 30 years of Charter interpretations and judicial
decisions would by far exceed the space or time available here. But we can point out that
these rights will be omnipresent in the context of an infectious disease emergency. For
example, warrantless entries and searches are commonly authorized under public health
emergency laws. While not necessarily unconstitutional in their existence (or
unconstitutionally unreasonable in their execution),120 their legality most certainly has a
constitutional dimension due to section 8 of the Charter. Likewise, mandatory
hospitalization or quarantine orders could engage sections 9 and 10. Section 7 “security
of the person” rights can be particularly tricky, in any legal situation. For example, as I
have previously written in the family law context, section 7 security of the person rights
have been found to include:
the constitutional right of destitute parents to representation by statefunded legal counsel when subjected by the state to child protection
legal proceedings, where those proceedings cause severe stress and/or
can attach a negative stigma to the parent.121
In the health law context, section 7 has been found by courts (though not yet by a
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada), to include the right to a private health
insurance option where a public-only system results in unacceptably long wait times.122 It
has been found to guard against, in one way or another, overly restrictive criminal-

120

Concerning the Charter protection against unreasonable search and seizure, see
mainly: R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67; R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281; Hunter v Southam Inc,
[1984] 2 SCR 145; R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265; R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527; R v
Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417; R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32.
121
Clark Colwell & The Honourable Justice Margaret E.L. Larlee, “Child Custody and
Access in Mobility Cases: Getting it Right the First Time” (2010) 26:1 Solicitor’s Journal
10, at 11, citing New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J),
[1993] 3 SCR 46 at paras 61 & 67.
122
Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791.
54

regulatory regimes for abortion.123 It has very recently been found to encompass the right
to medically assisted suicide for certain individuals.124 It was found to oblige courts to
take the views of mature minors into account when deciding what is in their best interests
in medical matters,125 while at common law individuals over the age of majority have the
right to refuse medical treatment even if it is not in their best interests to do so.126 If the
state were to purport to order medical treatment against such an adult, then section 7
would apply.127 These are but a few examples of how constitutionally rooted civil
liberties can be brought to bear in the spheres of health law, public health law, and legal
preparedness in general.128
But just because they can be brought to bear, this does not mean that if a Charter
right is engaged, then the offending public health initiative is immediately frustrated. No
right is absolute. The Charter contains two provisions that explicitly contemplate limits.
The first limit is contained in the very first section of the Charter, which reads:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted this section of the Constitution many
times, beginning with the landmark decision R v Oakes,129 which created the namesake
test. Though continuously revisited and refined, the general “steps” that the executive
must demonstrate in order to uphold the legislature’s limit of a right is:
(a) Is the limit prescribed by law?
(b) Is the purpose for which the limit is imposed pressing and
substantial?
(c) Is the means by which the goal is furthered proportionate?
(i)

Is the limit rationally connected to the purpose?

(ii) Does the limit minimally impair the right?
(iii) Is the law proportionate in its effect?130
If the government can demonstrate to the court that these steps are all satisfied, then the
prima facie violation of a Charter right is “saved” by section 1, and so there is no
violation at all.131
The second way that the Charter limits itself is section 33, which is an override
provision with regards to certain rights, with a built-in sunset clause:
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the
Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
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(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the
declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect
five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be
specified in the declaration.
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a
declaration made under subsection (1).
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under
subsection (4).
Though sparsely used outside of the Province of Quebec,132 the existence of s. 33
is relevant for our purposes in that it contemplates, at least in certain circumstances, the
legislature disagreeing with the courts concerning the scope of Charter rights. As this
thesis proposes that legislatures ought to provide, through statute, explicit guidance to
decision makers during infectious disease emergencies, it attempts to incorporate the
courts’ existing constitutional rulings along with public health values and ethics. The
example legislation in chapter five, included for illustration, is presented as
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constitutionally valid if enacted (and may be more easily interpreted as constitutionally
compliant than the basket clauses which exist currently). But this is just one approach. If
Parliament, or a provincial legislature, found that an emergency necessitated limiting the
scope of a Charter right, then it would probably believe the limit justified under s.1. This
is most likely how basket clauses are rationalized. But even if in the future judicial
rulings indicate otherwise, then section 33 provides the legislature with an explicit
constitutional authority to disagree with the courts and carry on with its legislation. In
chapter six, the ‘dialogue” metaphor of constitutional jurisprudence will be discussed
with a view to demonstrating the rare opportunity the subject matter of infectious disease
emergencies provides for the advancement of Canada’s constitution through ‘dialogue’,
including through the potential use of section 33.
There are two final points to be raised concerning the Charter during infectious
disease emergencies. The first relates to Charter values. Courts employ these
constitutional principles as an aid in interpreting statutes, common law, as well as
reviewing government actions. They include, “Human dignity, equality, liberty, respect
for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement of democracy.”133 The Supreme
Court of Canada recently re-articulated that these values are to be considered on judicial
review of administrative action in Doré v Barreau du Quebec:
It goes without saying that administrative decision-makers must act
consistently with the values underlying the grant of discretion,
including Charter values (see Chamberlain v Surrey School District No.
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36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 SCR 710, at para 71; Pinet v St. Thomas
Psychiatric Hospital, 2004 SCC 21, [2004] 1 SCR 528, at paras 19-23;
and Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’
Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 SCR 815, at paras 62-75). The
question then is what framework should be used to scrutinize how those
values were applied?134
After considering the somewhat conflicting precedent from itself (and particularly
Multani),135 on whether or not the Oakes test was the appropriate framework for
assessing the consistency of administration action with Charter values, the Court
concluded:
The alternative is for the Court to embrace a richer conception of
administrative law, under which discretion is exercised “in light of
constitutional guarantees and the values they reflect” (Multani, at para
152, per LeBel J.). Under this approach, it is unnecessary to retreat to a
s. 1 Oakes analysis in order to protect Charter values. Rather,
administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental
values. The Charter simply acts as “a reminder that some values are
clearly fundamental and . . . cannot be violated lightly” (Cartier, at p.
86). The administrative law approach also recognizes the legitimacy
that this Court has given to administrative decision-making in cases
such as Dunsmuir and Conway. These cases emphasize that
administrative bodies are empowered, and indeed required, to consider
Charter values within their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter
values into the administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise
of these decision-makers, opens “an institutional dialogue about the

134

Doré, supra note 112 at para 24. Doré was not without controversy. See: Matthew
Lewans, “Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter”(2014) 23:4 Const
Forum Const 19; Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative
Discretion and the Charter” (2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 561; Lorne Sossin and Mark
Friedman, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 391;
Matthew Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism”
(2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 361; Christopher D Bredt and Ewa Krajewska, “Doré: All That
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appropriate use and control of discretion, rather than the older
command-and-control relationship” (Liston, at p. 100).136
[Emphasis added]
We will return to the Court’s idea of “institutional dialogue” in chapter six.
The Court’s direction in Doré is clear: decision makers must consider
fundamental legal values, including Charter values.137 In reforming the law to increase
legal preparedness in a public health context, this must be taken into account. Therefore,
this thesis proposes to incorporate these fundamental values directly into legislation –
legislation that would also incorporate the principles and values of public health and
ethics. In this way, the law regarding infectious disease emergencies, the archetypical
public health concern, would reflect a public health approach, while at the same time
reflecting fundamental constitutional values. ‘Bridging’ public health, law, and ethics in
this way will leverage the law to its maximum effect in defeating the emergency through
the stated outcomes of improved transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, and more
meaningful judicial review.
By placing the guidance directly in the legislation, the administrative decision
maker will be more effectively supported by his or her legal advisor,138 and will be able
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to better understand the legal requirements in order to exercise what may appear in the
basket clause to be unfettered discretion. It may be easy for a lawyer to understand that
basket clauses are still subject to the constitution, and that decision makers must still take
into account constitutional, and especially Charter, values, but it is hardly transparent to
the public, and may not even be transparent to the decision maker. Explicit legislative
guidance will make it transparent to a much greater audience. The Campbell commission
was concerned that Ontario’s new emergency measures statute did not explicitly limit the
measures available under the basket clause to objectively ‘reasonable’ ones.139 This thesis
proposes that the law should do more than add the word ‘reasonable’.
The last point that in this chapter on the Charter concerns how it relates to the
protection of vulnerable minorities. In addition to the unwritten principle of the
protection of minorities, as well as the explicit minority protections built into Canada’s
original written constitution (i.e. religious and language minorities), the Charter contains
an explicit anti-discrimination provision:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The courts interpret this section in light of its purpose and underlying values:
As this Court has pointed out on several occasions, this value of
substantive equality at the heart of s. 15 is closely tied to the concept of
human dignity: Miron, at paras 145‑46; Law, at paras 52 and 54; Blencoe
v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 (CanLII),
139
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[2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para 77; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),
2002 SCC 84 (CanLII), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para 20. The innate and
equal dignity of every individual is invariably an “essential value
underlying the s. 15 equality guarantee”: Kapp, at para 21. Indeed, the
Court has said that “the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and freedom” (Law, at para 51) and to eliminate
any possibility of a person being treated in substance as “less worthy” than
others: Gosselin, at para 22. In other words:
This principle recognizes the dignity of each human being and each
person’s freedom to develop his body and spirit as he or she desires,
subject to such limitations as may be justified by the interests of the
community as a whole. It recognizes that society is based on
individuals who are different from each other, and that a free and
democratic society must accommodate and respect these differences.
(Miron, at para 145)
The principle of personal autonomy or self‑ determination, to which
self‑ worth, self‑ confidence and self‑respect are tied, is an integral part of
the values of dignity and freedom that underlie the equality guarantee:
Law, at para 53; Gosselin, at para 65. Safeguarding personal autonomy
implies the recognition of each individual’s right to make decisions
regarding his or her own person, to control his or her bodily integrity and
to pursue his or her own conception of a full and rewarding life free from
government interference with fundamental personal choices: R. v. Big M
Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 346,
per Dickson J; R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R.
30, at p. 164, per Wilson J.; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 554, per
Lamer C.J., at pp. 587‑ 88, per Sopinka J.; Blencoe, at para 77, per
Bastarache J.140
While it is possible that a challenge to a decision, or its enabling legislation, could
be brought during an emergency under section 15, this thesis does not take up this
question. The point to be made here is the strength that section 15 lends to the promise
the principle of protection of minorities has for bridging public health, ethics, and the
law. As the Supreme Court said in the Secession Reference, this section of the Charter,
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along with the provisions of the Constitution specific to Canada’s aboriginal peoples,141
demonstrate the continued endurance of this ideal in Canada’s legal history. In the next
chapter, it will be shown that many of the underlying legal principles, rights and values
which were discussed in this chapter hold commonalities with the values of public health
and ethics, with the protection of vulnerable minorities being particularly helpful. It will
also introduce the related claim that social justice, a core value of public health and
central concern of relational feminist ethics, could be brought in to the law through this
thesis’s suggested reform.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1

PUBLIC HEALTH, LAW, AND ETHICS

PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW142
Our goal is to use legislation to reconcile the principles of public health, ethics,

and the law with a view to improving the quality of decisions made during an infectious
disease emergency. This improved legal preparedness should realize superior real world
outcomes through better transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of measures, and
more meaningful judicial review. We have already discussed the principles underlying
Canada’s constitution, and asserted that they are compatible with the principles of public
health and ethics. It is time to discuss what some of those principles are.
First, it may be necessary to ask what exactly is meant by “public health,” and
“public health law”. Scientific, political, and scholarly disciplines concerned with the
prevention and management of infectious disease emergencies would intuitively fall
within a lay understanding of “public health”, but this does not explain all that public
health might mean.
This chapter will cover what can be meant by public health and public health law.
It further contains a brief foray into public health ethics, in that it describes two
prominent examples of public health ethical systems. With a view to providing an
example of how the law can (and should) do more to guide emergency decision making,
this chapter will develop that argument by demonstrating how fundamental constitutional
principles could be used to reconcile, at least in part, discrepancies between different
ethical models, while at the same time ensuring that at least some of the underlying
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values of a given system are paid attention as we reform the law. Specifically, the new
legislation ought to oblige the emergency decision maker to pay explicit attention to any
effects a decision may have on vulnerable minorities, and to weigh those consequences
separately and distinctly from any other negative effects expected from the same
decision. Such a provision would be a strong example of how law reform in this area is
capable of bridging public health, ethics, and law.
3.1.1

Public Health
Public health is at the same time a goal, a science, and a scholarly discipline. A

distinct practice from acute healthcare, public health has various definitions, varying
from the quite broad to the nearly universal. Barbara von Tigerstrom has proffered:
A much-quoted definition states that public health is “what we, as a
society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy.” It is “public” in the sense both of collective action (primarily,
though not exclusively, government action) and of concern with the
health of a population rather than specific individuals. Contemporary
public health practice is characterized by an approach that is
preventative, evidence-based, and holistic.143
Lawrence Gostin, building upon the same ideas found above in von Tigerstrom’s
definition, has proposed five “core values” of public health as a discipline, which are: 1)
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Collective responsibility for health and well-being; 2) Population focus; 3) Community
involvement and civic responsibility; 4) Prevention orientation; and 5) Social justice.144
It is from Gostin’s account of public health’s core values that we can immediately
find some common ground with Canada’s constitutional rights and values. Though the
values of collective responsibility and population focus do no fit as neatly with the values
of “human dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the
enhancement of democracy”,145 the core value of community involvement and civic
responsibility seems synergistic with the underlying constitutional principle of
democracy. Likewise, the core value of social justice could find some common ground
with the underlying constitutional principle of the protection of (vulnerable) minorities.
Though the definitions of what public health means, even taking into account
Gostin’s proposed values, are numerous, Christopher Reynolds has expressed a fairly
clear definition:
The process that keeps individuals and their communities healthy…
most obviously seen as the array of interventions directed to health
promotion campaigns, the things done to prevent the spread of
communicable disease, the food and sanitation requirements and the
pollution controls written into our environmental laws. Less obviously
it is also a series of initiatives in areas of product safety, the regulation
of drugs and therapeutics and a range of initiatives that aim to further
the World Health Organization definition of “health” as a “state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity.”146
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As Reynolds’ mention of “health promotion” and a “range of initiatives”
foreshadows, some authors have even more radically broad interpretations of what
“public health” might mean, and what matters of policy might legitimately be within its
discipline. Susan Sherwin, for example,147 has proposed that public health might
legitimately be concerned with far more than the fields cited by Reynolds. Championing
the WHO Ottawa Charter of 1986 on health promotion, a sub-system of public health, she
writes:
Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control
over, and to improve, their health. To reach a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be
able to identify and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to
change or cope with the environment. Health is, therefore, seen as a
resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Health is a
positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as
physical capacities. Therefore, health promotion is not just the
responsibility of the health sector, but goes beyond healthy life-styles to
well-being…
The fundamental conditions and resources for health are: peace; shelter;
education; food; income; a stable eco-system; sustainable resources;
social justice; and equity.
Improvement in health requires a secure foundation in these basic
prerequisites.148
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Thus, depending on one’s definition, the scope of “public health” as a discipline can be as
narrow as the provision of sanitation and disease control services, or as broad as
facilitating and supervising multilateral-peace treaties or guaranteeing income.
It is important to flag the differing views on public health’s scope in order to fully
articulate how the law can do more than it currently does for public health in an
emergency. Infectious disease management as a subject matter, even in the nonemergency context, fits squarely within the mandate of public health across all (or nearly
all) political philosophies. This is important, since the tensions which reside within public
health practice and literature is primarily political in nature, not scientific. That is to say,
the question is not truly (or at least, not at its heart) about whether supplying clean
syringes and safe injection sites to people with drug additions is a scientifically effective
health policy – it is about whether we ought to provide these syringes; whether it is good
or right to do so.149 It is probably safe to say that most, if not all, political philosophies
would agree that combatting infectious disease emergencies fits within the paradigm of
public health,150 and also that they ought to be combatted. But looking deeper, during that
emergency, a decision to deploy or not to deploy a measure will legally turn on more than
the scientific probability of effectiveness (though it will certainly turn on that as well).
The emergency decision maker will be considering other factors, both legal and ethical –
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factors which will be influenced at least in part by the official’s understanding of the
proper scope of public health.
Stepping back from the emergency itself, there is another reason we must
understand the wide scope of activities to which public health may lay a claim. When
reform is proposed, the way in which that reform is approached will surely be subtly
influenced by the underlying views various players have about the legitimate scope of
public health as a discipline and practice. Public health ethics is likely to be influenced in
the same manner, which we will examine in section 3.2 below.
3.1.2

Public Health Law
Within public health as a scholarly discipline, there exists the subdivision of

public health law. Law is a powerful tool of public health, and is the medium through
which many public health initiatives and actors find their powers, legitimacy, and
restraints. Nola Ries has observed that “[l]aw and legal instruments at all levels – from
international agreements to local government by-laws – play a key role in public
health.”151
But public health law is not only the corpus of laws that perform this role for
public health. Law, without any modifier, is not solely a tool for organizing society and
settling private and public disputes (though it surely is those things). Law is at the same
time a scholarly discipline and pursuit. In this vein, Lawrence Gostin has given his
definition of public health law:
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state,
in collaboration with its partners (e.g., health care, business, the
community, the media, and academe), to ensure the conditions for
151
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people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health
in the population), and of the limitations on the power of the state to
constrain for the common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty,
proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals. The
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible
level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent with
the values of social justice.152
[Emphasis added]
Christopher Reynolds has offered a connected, but more practice-centered description:
A general definition of public health law and its practice might be that
it:
-is the specific, often long-standing, statutory responses that assist and
empower public health regulators in the range of areas that they work;
- is the body of law and legal practice that affects public health practice
and the public’s health more generally;
- recognises that changing existing law and practices that damage the
public’s health is as significant a task for those involved in public health
law, as the supporting of laws which stand to improve health.153
Depending upon what one considers legitimately a public health issue, nearly any
law could be characterized as a “public health law” (which then might become the
concern of scholarly research in the field of public health law). However, as both Gostin
and Reynolds have noted, there is little to be gained from public health law making
imperial claims to laws from other areas; such an approach dilutes the discipline, departs
from traditional and long-held areas of expertise, and risks political polarization.154
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Law as a tool of public health can operate in several fashions. It can impose taxes
on unhealthy activities (e.g. alcohol taxes) and use those funds to promote healthier ones.
It can alter the informational environment relating to unhealthy products (e.g. tobacco
advertising prohibitions and mandatory warnings), or restrict access to certain products or
behaviours (e.g. underage alcohol consumption). Occupational health and safety and
environmental regulations are further examples of how law can be used as a tool of
public health. Law can also be used to address larger-scale risk factors for public health
ills, such as zoning for public housing, improved access to and quality of public
education, and even aggressive re-distribution of wealth. Again, taking the scope of
public health to its zenith, it would be difficult to argue that any law does not somehow
have a public health purpose in mind.
As we discuss the discipline of public health law, and its related real-world tools,
specific or combinations of public health laws, it becomes clear that public health law is
inherently interdisciplinary. Public health laws and policies concerning infectious
diseases, as well as their associated scholarly literature, reveal the migration of concepts
and language across disciplines. This is not surprising – lawyers, politicians, policy
reformers and legal scholars cannot help but bring to the table their pre-conceived notions
of legal and constitutional norms and rights any more than public health practitioners and
scholars cannot help but bring to the table the ethics and norms that form the substance of
their own disciplines. This adds some credibility to the claim that Canadian constitutional
and administrative law can (and does) inform public health law and ethics, and more
vitally for this thesis, vice-versa.
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Infectious disease control and the management of emergencies easily fall within
the scope of public health and public health law. But even as this thesis criticizes the
sufficiency of the current laws in Canada designed to effect that mandate, we must
remain aware of the broader landscape within which infectious disease emergency law
(and ethics) is but one of the challenges facing public health and public health law.
Further, one does not have to be a public health legal scholar to have an opinion about the
legitimate reach of public health laws into the lives of individuals or groups. Academics,
professionals, and individual citizens can quite reasonably disagree on these issues. Since
they will be exposed to the risks of the emergency just the same as the public health
scholar or professional, they should rightly expect to have a say.
This discord can potentially be mitigated with reference to public health law’s
own principles. Lawrence Gostin, as one example, has written:
… [M]any forward thinkers urge greater community involvement in
public health decision making so that policy formation becomes a
genuine civic endeavor. Under this view, citizens strive to safeguard
their communities through civic participation, open forums, and
capacity building to solve local problems. Public involvement should
result in stronger support for health policies and encourage citizens to
take a more active role in protecting themselves and the health of their
neighbors.155
Gostin further goes on to describe what this kind of involvement might look like:
Public health authorities, for example, might practice more deliberative
forms of democracy, involving closer consultation with consumers and
the voluntary organizations that represent them (e.g. town meetings and
consumer membership on government advisory committees). This kind
of deliberative democracy in public health is increasingly evident in
government-community partnerships at the [United States] federal,
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state, and local levels (e.g. AIDS action and breast cancer
awareness).156
It could be very difficult to carry out such consultation and community
involvement in the specific context of an infectious disease emergency, but this does not
mean that this principle cannot find its expression in some other way. This democratic
expression could be at least partially conveyed in the passing of reformed emergency
legislation, more informed, transparent and accountable decision making, and more
meaningful judicial review.
3.1.3 Public Health Legal Preparedness
This thesis argues for legislative reform in order to guide emergency
administrative decision makers during an infectious disease emergency. Consequently,
this thesis could equally be considered as calling for both administrative law and public
health law reform. A large portion of this thesis is dedicated to analyzing the legal
requirements for reform. But this does not mean that legal considerations alone drive the
need for change, nor is the call made at the expense of public health principles, goals, or
concerns. Public health professionals might quite rightly perceive such an approach as an
example of the tail wagging the dog.
The scholarship concerning public health legal preparedness was canvassed in
chapter one. Fitting in to that literature, the law reform proposed by this thesis is with a
concerted view to improving public health outcomes. This is, according to some authors,
the very purpose towards which public health legal research ought to be turned.157 While
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this thesis is not rooted in empirical research or behavioural science, it is grounded in the
significant coalescence of Canadian constitutional and public health legal principles.
Which principles already inform and frame both legal disputes, as well as public health
professional practice.
3.1.4

“Soft-Law”
The examples of law that common law lawyers and legal scholars tend to think of

as “hard” law sources, that is to say statutes, executive orders, and judicial rulings, are
not the only tools available to achieve outcomes in the course of public health practice.
They are likewise not the only tools available to help achieve the real-world objective of
ensuring decision makers make ethical, lawful, and accountable choices in times of
emergency. Professional codes of conduct, best practices, internal policy documents, and
other “soft law”158 instruments, have the potential to achieve some of our stated
objectives, but with the advantage (in a manner of speaking) of avoiding the cumbersome
legislative and/or regulatory process. The creation of something like an “ethical
framework”,159 a rigorous document that detailed factors to be considered when making
professional judgments, might achieve some of the desired outcomes. It might also be
158
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created by the kind of public consultation and professional engagement and partnership
that public health law encourages.
Clearly useful, soft-law instruments unfortunately lack the same binding (and
occasionally coercive) effect of law. They may not appear as transparent to the public,
and until such time as they are examined and adopted in whole or in part by a court, they
lack a legal (and certainly a constitutional) expression.160 They neither confer nor restrain
legal authority, or vires, in the constitutional or administrative law sense, nor do they
provide compulsory guidance on how existing authority ought to be exercised. A judicial
review of a law, or of an administrative decision made pursuant to that authority, would
be less likely to include deference to a soft-law document if free-standing legal rights
were in the balance.
For example, in the very recent case of Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration),161 Abella J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, reversed the
decision of an immigration officer taken under section 25(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.162 In that case, an immigration officer had relied on Ministerial
Guidelines in order to determine whether a foreign national who did not qualify for
admission to Canada ought to be permitted to remain on humanitarian or compassionate
grounds. In deciding that the officer’s strict adherence to the guidelines was
unreasonable, Abella J. wrote:
There is no doubt, as this Court has recognized, that the Guidelines are
useful in indicating what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of a
160
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given provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act:
Agraira, at para 85. But as the Guidelines themselves acknowledge,
they are “not legally binding” and are “not intended to be either
exhaustive or restrictive”: Inland Processing, s. 5. Officers can, in
other words, consider the Guidelines in the exercise of their s. 25(1)
discretion, but should turn “[their] mind[s] to the specific circumstances
of the case”: Donald J. M. Brown and The Honourable John M. Evans,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (2014), at p. 12-45.
They should not fetter their discretion by treating these informal
Guidelines as if they were mandatory requirements that limit the
equitable humanitarian and compassionate discretion granted by s.
25(1): see Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, at p.
5; Ha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA
49, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 195 (C.A.), at para 71.
The words “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship”
should therefore be treated as descriptive, not as creating three new
thresholds for relief separate and apart from the humanitarian purpose
of s. 25(1). As a result, what officers should not do, is look at s. 25(1)
through the lens of the three adjectives as discrete and high thresholds,
and use the language of “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate
hardship” in a way that limits their ability to consider and give weight
to all relevant humanitarian and compassionate considerations in a
particular case. The three adjectives should be seen as instructive but
not determinative, allowing s. 25(1) to respond more flexibly to the
equitable goals of the provision.163
In conclusion, Abella J. summarized the failure of the immigration officer:
Finding that no single factor amounted to hardship that was “unusual
and undeserved or disproportionate”, the Officer ultimately concluded
that humanitarian and compassionate relief was not warranted. But
these three adjectives are merely descriptive, not separate legal
thresholds to be strictly construed. Finally, the Officer not only
unreasonably discounted both the psychological report and the clear and
uncontradicted evidence of a risk of discrimination, she avoided the
requisite analysis of whether, in light of the humanitarian purpose of s.
25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the evidence as a
whole justified relief. This approach unduly fettered her discretion and,
in my respectful view, led to its unreasonable exercise.164
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The decision in Kanthasamy illustrates the double-sided vulnerability of soft-law
instruments. On the one hand, they may come to fetter the discretion of the decision
maker in a manner not intended under the authorizing statute and not permitted at law.
On the other hand, the decision maker may in good faith rely on them as they go about
applying the law, only to find out after the fact that the result of such reliance was
unreasonable. This can occur even if the soft-law instrument has previously been given
favourable treatment by the courts, as was the case in Kanthasamy.165
Still, soft-law guidance, incorporating both public health law and principles and
Canadian constitutional principles (especially Charter values) for emergency decision
makers would certainly be superior to the current state of affairs: no guidance of any
substance at all. And as we said, the great promise of soft-law instruments is that they are
particularly influential upon the decisions of professionals. Professional codes of conduct
and ethics, with or without the force of law, are more than morally binding upon their
subjects (though they could be that as well) – professionals are held accountable for any
contravening actions. In addition, soft-law documents that are not professional codes are
still likely to be consulted and followed if they represent the current professional or
clinical standard in a given field.
The literature already contains ethical frameworks designed to guide public health
planners and emergency managers. These frameworks would be useful to our infectious
disease emergency decision maker, but they are not specifically directed at him or her. A
possible compromise, then, would be this: if we cannot get emergency legislation on the
165
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agenda, then perhaps we can get the desired content of that legislation into soft-law
instruments explicitly directed at, and made available to, emergency decision makers. If
these instruments pay due attention to Canadian constitutional and administrative legal
norms, they may come close to achieving the desired public health outcomes. The courts
may also give them some attention. Lost, however, will be the binding force that comes
with legislation; the greater certainty with which the decision maker can rely on it in
exercising his or her discretion; the community consultation and democratic legitimacy;
the improved efficacy of the decision maker’s legal advisors; and the potential
opportunity for Canada’s constitutional discourse as described in chapter six.
3.2

PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS

3.2.1

Ethics Informing Law
Precisely because professional ethics are so likely to influence the behaviour of

public health professionals, public health ethics figure prominently in this thesis’s
proposed reform. The following section is meant to further explain the general
preference166 for law reform over ethical guidance. It is also meant to show the promise
the law has for bridging ethical systems and allowing for a richer development and
interpretation of the law.
Just as we saw that public health cuts a wide swath with regards to what may, or
may not, be considered legitimately within its scope, public health ethics, and what those
ethical theories or models might be, are equally diverse. A complete literature review of
the current Canadian state of public health ethics is well beyond the scope of this
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thesis.167 For illustration, we will briefly examine two major examples of public health
ethics, and use them to situate the proposed draft legislation. The chosen ethical models
are descriptive ethics on the one hand, and relational feminist ethics on the other.
Descriptive ethics was chosen both due to its prominence and close alignment
with the main body of public health and public health law literature. It was also chosen
because its findings, so obviously influenced by the same principles as Canadian
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constitutional law, provide a convenient and clear example of how public health ethics
could be seamlessly incorporated into law reform.
Relational feminism was chosen for precisely the opposite reasons. First, it is a
relatively novel approach, claiming a radical departure from the focus of other systems,
and is beginning to attract attention in the literature. It is prescriptive, and its proposed
values, providing an excellent contrast to the status quo exemplified by descriptive ethics,
are not at first glance easy to reconcile with prevailing constitutional legal precedents.
Despite this, it is still possible to give effect to certain aspects of the relational feminist
ethical model in the proposed law reform. In particular, relational feminism approaches to
public health ethics align particularly well with the core public health value of social
justice, as well as the unwritten constitutional principle of the protection of minorities.
Thus, the two representative ethical models were chosen because, in spite of their
considerable differences, they are both amenable to combining core principles of public
health with unwritten constitutional principles and Charter values, and can therefore both
inform and enrich a law reform effort concerning infectious disease emergency decisionmaking.
Further narrowing the scope, this discussion of public health ethics and law is not
meant, in any large degree, to include discussions of public health professional ethics,
based upon professional normative values. Rather it is focused on large-scale ethical
decision-making. In other words, the discussion is not focused on the ethics of whether
health care workers ought to refuse to go to work during an infectious disease emergency,
or under what circumstances it would be ethically permissible for them to do so. Rather,
the discussion is concerned with the kind of ethics that is supposed to guide the legal
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decision maker in deciding whether or not to order (for example) that health care
professional to work, and whether or not to physically enforce the order or to sanction
non-compliance.
3.2.2

Introducing Public Health Ethics
The most powerful factor driving public health ethics is the population focus of

public health. Given that the discipline is concerned not with the health of individuals or
groups, but rather with improving the health outcomes of a given population as a whole,
it is understandable that the discussion contained within public health ethics scholarly
literature often concerns the tension between individual rights, choices, and
responsibilities, and the health of the population as a whole. Infectious diseases, and the
problems they cause, can lead to classic examples of this tension.168
Michael J. Selgelid has aptly highlighted the kinds of ethical questions that can
arise in the context of infectious diseases. After pointing out that infectious diseases
ought to be addressed in greater detail by bioethicists169 if only due to their drastic
consequences, he writes:
A second reason why infectious diseases warrant more of bioethicists’
attention is that they raise serious, difficult philosophical/ ethical
questions of their own. Obvious examples arise from the fact that
infectious diseases can be contagious. Depending on the disease in
168
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question, infected individuals can threaten the health of other
individuals or society as a whole. The public health measures required
to protect other individuals and society from contagion (again,
depending on the disease) might sometimes involve surveillance,
mandatory testing, mandatory vaccination or treatment, notification of
authorities or third parties, isolation (of individuals), quarantine (of
entire regions), or travel restrictions. Because public health care
measures could infringe upon widely accepted basic human rights and
liberties, we are here confronted with conflicting values.170
In other words, we are confronted with ethical dilemmas.
3.2.3

First Example: Descriptive Ethics
In order to assist society in tackling these ethical dilemmas, some scholars have

taken up the challenge in the form of descriptive ethics. They have used the concrete, real
world examples of infectious disease emergencies (especially SARS) in order to identify
the specific normative values at play (and in conflict) during specific situations, for
example isolation, quarantine, and information sharing. This process is intricately
intertwined with the identification and selection not only of what ethical values are or
were at play during emergencies, but those the authors think ought to have been at play.
Peter A. Singer et al.’s article “Ethics and SARS: lessons from Toronto”171 is one
example of this kind of scholarship. In explaining the nine authors’ mandate, they write:
We formed a working group to identify the key ethical issues and
values most important for an analysis of ethical dimensions of the
SARS epidemic. The final list of issues and values was agreed by a
consensus process and found to have face value and credibility. We
170
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then developed a framework for looking at the ethical implications of
the SARS outbreak, identifying 10 key ethical values relevant to SARS,
and five major ethical issues faced by decision makers.172
The ten ethical values the authors identified were: 1) individual liberty; 2) protection of
the public; 3) proportionality; 4) reciprocity (ethical duty of society to compensate those
quarantined, isolated etc. for their economic losses); 5) transparency; 6) privacy; 7)
protection of communities from undue stigmatization; 8) duty to provide care (left
unresolved by the authors); 9) equity (in allocation of scarce health care resources); 10)
solidarity (ethical duty to the greater global community). Most of this language should be
familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, though the working group was purposefully
interdisciplinary: “The authors [who] formed the working group [are] scholars in
bioethics who come from various disciplines, including medicine, surgery, health law,
social work, teaching, nursing, and epidemiology.”173
Descriptive ethics is useful, especially in bringing to bear the full value of the
inherent interdisciplinary nature of public health, public health ethics, and public health
law. For example, an infectious disease outbreak may be localized within a ghetto
occupied almost exclusively by immigrants of a given ethnicity. Notifications need to be
made in order to help prevent further spread. By pointing out that there actually is an
ethical dimension to stigmatizing a given ethnicity (even if that was never the intent of
the scientifically justified informative measure), descriptive ethics has the potential to
influence behaviours and courses of action. A decision maker may alter their choice if
alternatives are available which satisfy both the values of “protection of communities
from undue stigmatization” and “protection of the public.” Alternatively, if there is no
172
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way to satisfy both completely, avenues may be considered which will at least lessen the
wrong done under a value that may not otherwise have been considered.
However, descriptive ethics has limited use beyond this identification function for
a legal decision maker during an infectious disease emergency. While it highlights the
need to consider certain normative values (whether they are characterized as “ethical”,
“legal”, “constitutional” or “Charter” values), it does not tell that decision maker how to
go about deciding or how to balance the values. In other words, it does not help the
decision maker deal with a true dilemma. Decision-making in the face of such problems
can only be accomplished by appealing to a normative baseline.
One place where it is temping to try to find these underlying normative values is
the scholarship of public health ethics. Sometimes descriptive projects take on a very
prescriptive dimension, selecting ethical values that ought to be at play based upon a predetermined set of norms. This is precisely what the expert panel did, above. These values,
in their recommendation, ought then to form part of the balancing act. Though in the
descriptive literature we are not necessarily told how to balance them, we are told we
ought to consider them. In any case, any attempt at balancing in the absence of concrete
facts and probabilities of outcomes would be a less than fruitful exercise.
Part of the challenge is that even within the descriptive exercise there can be
normative discord. For example, in the Singer et al. piece, no consensus could be reached
regarding the ethical duty of health care professionals to provide care. This is neither a
surprise nor a criticism; it is a divisive issue. The failure to reach an agreement on this
problem illustrates the lack of any scholarly consensus. Emergency decision makers will
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have little luck if they expect a definite answer on this difficult ethical question during an
infectious disease emergency.
But this challenge alone does not mean that descriptive public health ethics cannot
assist us with our goal of improving legal preparedness. Admittedly, the suggested law
reform will not solve this problem, and will in fact suffer from precisely the same
challenge. The decision maker will have guidance in the form of mandatory principles to
consider, but legislation can never decide for him or her. Still, if public health ethics were
to inform that law and if the law were to incorporate and pay attention to those values and
purposes, then the decision maker would have something more than he or she had before
– a democratic expression of what values and ethics the law demands he or she consider
as a condition for the authority and jurisdiction, the vires, to act. Further, as we can see
from the ethical values indicated above, despite public health’s population focus, public
health ethics are not diametrically opposed to the Canadian constitution’s protection of
individual rights. In fact, it seems to have been clearly informed by them. Ethics,
informed by law, could re-inform the law (specifically, emergency legislation) to enhance
our legal preparedness.
3.2.4

Second Example: Relational Feminism
Another example of public health ethics scholarship, the relational feminist174

approach, illustrates by contrast that public health ethics and the constitution are not
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necessarily always so compatible. This is, in some scholars’ views, potentially a good
thing. Francoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny and Susan Sherwin, three prominent relational
feminist scholars, wrote in their extremely pertinent and helpful piece “A Relational
Account of Public Health Ethics”175 about the need to re-conceptualize ethical
discussions in the public health context. They call for an ethical discussion that is in
direct opposition to the one put forward by Michael J. Selgelid above in the previous
section (where he highlighted the tension between individual rights and the rights of the
population during an infectious disease emergency). These relational feminist scholars
deny that this should be the primary starting point:
Much of the recent discussion of public health ethics among policy
makers has occurred in the context of pandemic planning. This focus is
not surprising given the urgent, uncertain, risky and fear-generating
conditions of pandemic. What is surprising, however, is the primary
focus in pandemic planning on the values and priorities of individuals.
Many pandemic plans appear to privilege the values of liberty, dignity,
and privacy and highlight the rights and interests of individuals with
particular attention given to such issues as restrictions on individual
liberty and freedom, potential social stigma and isolation and access to
antivirals, vaccines and other potentially scarce resources. From the
perspective of pandemic planning and public health, this is an odd and
limited list of ethical concerns – a list that likely would not have been
generated but for the fact that the analysis remains steeped in an
individual rights discourse inherited from clinical ethics and research
ethics, and consonant with the dominant moral and political culture.176
[Emphasis added]
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Throughout the article, the authors are openly critical of approaches similar to the
one taken above by Singer et al., especially the one taken by the University of Toronto
Joint Centre for Bioethics.177 Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin argue for a new focus:
The nature and scope of public health require an approach to ethics that
is itself ‘public’ rather than individualistic, i.e., one that understands the
social nature of public health work. It must do more than simply
identify the tensions between individual benefit and community benefit,
individual freedom and public safety, resource allocation to known
affected individuals and to the community as a whole. It must make
clear the complex ways in which individuals are inseparable from
communities and build on the fact that the interests of both are
interrelated.178
This new approach flows from the authors’ wider school of thought, which is to
say, relational feminist theory. This is a theory of the human condition which posits that
we are not, in the way we experience and behave in the world, independent, rational, selfinterested deliberators. We are neither capable of independently knowing what we value,
nor can we independently make choices based upon those values. Rather, humans are
socially constructed entities, existing as systems of complex relationships. The authors
sum up their theory of relational, feminist human existence in this way:
Persons are constituted by their relationships, and the communities they
inhabit are complex layers of different sorts of social connections. Their
interests cannot be easily divided into discrete units that operate
independently of the interests of others since the interactions among
persons are constitutive of persons to the point that we cannot fully
make sense of individual interests apart from those of her/his
community.179
The authors go on to advocate for a “relational” approach to public health ethics.
Some of the real-world benefits of this approach, the authors argue, will be greater
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consideration given to the impact pandemic plans will have on historically marginalized
groups,180 alongside an increased focus upon communities rather than individuals.
Relying on the relational feminist accounts of relational autonomy and relational
solidarity, the authors suggest that:
A commitment to social justice requires us to recognize the special
disadvantages that face members of social groups who are subject to
systematic discrimination and reduced power. As regards matters of
public health, it is important to remember, as Powers and Faden (2006)
stress, that health risks are generally higher for those with [the] lowest
social status and power and these risks are compounded by the multiple
dimensions of hardship that affects members of the most vulnerable
groups. Hence, when we attend to relational solidarity, we need to be
attentive to the increased and quite particular risks faced by members of
some social groups as compared with others. While this sort of
attentiveness should not deteriorate into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality,
it does require us to be more specific in our attitudes of solidarity and to
eschew a vague concern for all of humanity and replace it with one that
is cognizant of, and responsive to, the particular types of needs
experienced by those who are socially and economically
disadvantaged.181
[Emphasis added]
Given the population focus contained within public health by definition, it is not
surprising that relational feminist scholars would apply their relational theory to public
health problems, including responses to public health emergencies. Their re-framing of
public health ethics is compelling. Instead of trying to construct an ethics that can assist
in coming to ethically permissible decisions or actions when the mission and vision of
public health comes into conflict with the public’s own views about right, wrong, and
what has value (i.e. liberty, dignity, privacy etc.), the authors posit that this “dominant
moral and political culture” is misinformed about how humans really exist, and therefore
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incorrect. Rather, public health ethics ought to be based upon a kind of “public” values,
and the focus of decisions shifted accordingly.
Were an emergency decision maker to today use this theory as a foundation for
legal decision-making, it might be legally risky. Whether or not it is true or correct in
theory, it would at present appear to be opposed to the prevailing constitutional
jurisprudence, seen in chapter two, which indicates that the protection of the individual
against popular desire for “the greater good” is precisely what the constitution is for. The
relational feminist account of public health ethics seems to call for a radical change in
how individual rights are regarded, and indeed how each individual is regarded in se.
But this does not mean relational feminism is any less of a valuable tool to inform
law reform. Robert Leckey aptly captured in his book Contextual Subjects: Family, State,
and Relational Theory182 why this is so: there is nothing so radical about applying a
relational, or as he would have it, “contextual”, approach to human problems within the
legal sphere. While he finds great value in applying the approach to human problems in
the legal arena, he does not view that approach alone to be determinative of the outcome.
He separates relational approaches into two categories. The first, what Leckey calls the
‘weak’ conception, employs the relational theory as a methodology alone. For Leckey,
this generates no real results; similar to descriptive ethics, simply paying attention to
relationships instead of individuals will not necessarily yield a particular, or desirable,
policy:
Given the feminist political orientation of relational theorists, I think
there is an implication that merely undertaking a relational inquiry is
likelier than not to lead to policy outcomes congenial to feminist
182
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missions… When given this sense, relational theory implies, I think
unhelpfully, that the basis for dispute between relational theorists and
others will not be, as it sometimes is, normative disagreement over the
definition of desirable relationships, but simply the difference between
those who have turned their minds to relationships and those who have
not.183
This assessment calls unto question whether applying the relational approach
championed by Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin would truly bring the theory into conflict
with the underlying Canadian constitutional values at all. Simply having emergency
decision makers recognize that humans have and value relationships as they deploy
exceptional measures would not seem controversial. Why not consider relationships? It is
not as if this inquiry tells us at the outset which relationships the decision maker ought to
safeguard, nor which he or she ought to hold in lesser esteem than another.
‘Relationships’ could just as easily be incorporated into the proposed legislative guidance
as any other ethical value. Were the decision maker to employ a relational approach as he
or she went about deciding what extraordinary measures to deploy, their legal advisor
should have no cause to provide caution to the contrary. Such an approach would likely
enrich the process.184
But reconciliation is not so easy as that. What is really going on in Baylis et al.’s
article is not the mere suggestion of a methodology. They are plainly adopting what
Leckey refers to as the ‘strong’ conception of the relational approach, which is, in his
words, “frankly substantive and normative”. He goes on:
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It is not indifferent to the kinds of relationships that should be regarded
as desirable in a particular setting. The normative conception dives right
into substantive debates. Nailing its colours to the mast, it adopts
relational autonomy as its highest or one of its highest values.185
What exactly is meant by “relational autonomy” can, of course, vary from scholar to
scholar.
Leckey goes on to give many examples of how relational theory alone cannot
justify the conclusions made by relational feminist scholars without admitting to the
underlying, normative values driving the analysis. This commitment to a normative
center is not a bad thing. It allows scholars to promote a compelling agenda, through a
potentially valuable methodology. This can lead Canadians towards genuine policy and
law reform (such as the reform proposed in this thesis). It allows us, in Leckey’s words,
to “[criticize] the judge who excuses the homicidal cuckold”.186 Like all ethical
scholarship, it can express itself as powerful rhetoric as easily as compelling apologetics.
In claiming the declared values of public health, arguably with the broadest view of
public health, the relational feminist approach to public health ethics seeks, in a
compelling way, to further the normative commitments shared between academic
feminism and public health – which is to say, deep commitments to substantive equality
and social justice.
And yet, “strong” relational feminism as applied to public health ethics is still
largely in dissonance with Canadian constitutional jurisprudence concerning the
protections of individual rights. The “values of liberty, dignity, and privacy” are still
privileged, and “the rights and interests of individuals, with particular attention given to
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such issues as restrictions on individual liberty and freedom, potential social stigma and
isolation and access to antivirals, vaccines and other potentially scarce resources” are still
‘highlighted,’ as a matter of ethics, as a matter of policy, and at law. To subordinate the
interests of individuals, on ethical grounds, to some focus upon the “complex ways in
which individuals are inseparable from communities and build on the fact that the
interests of both are interrelated”, would not (yet) be legally advisable to the decision
maker. As the law currently stands, the emergency decision maker does not have much of
a choice. He or she can either make use of the status quo soft-law ethical framework(s)
which their legal advisors find consistent with Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence, or
they can take a leap of faith towards a re-imagined view of what it means to be human in
order to achieve more progressive, equitable results.
This is one important reason why this thesis argues for legislation. Through
statute, the legislature can import core public health values, including those that coincide
with a “strong” relational feminist conception of rights (e.g. social justice), into the law
without waiting for a shift in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. Given that the
history of constitutional, and especially Charter, jurisprudence seems to presume
individuals exist in the way that relational feminists challenge, it may be a long road to
fully realizing their desired end state by attempting incremental change through
litigation.187 But a partial realization could be achieved by incorporating relational
feminist values and approaches into legislation that also instructed the decision maker to
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consider underlying constitutional principles (like the protection of minorities) as well as
Charter values. There is no reason to wait for the constitution to catch up.
In a way, this thesis is arguing for a kind of re-alignment in the law similar to the
re-alignment of ethics proposed by Kenny, Baylis, and Sherwin. Without needing to
weigh in on the metaphysical justification for relational feminism, it is easy to agree with
the claim that it shares some of the same core values as public health – and in particular,
the core value of social justice. When this core value of both relational feminism and
public health is placed alongside the unwritten constitutional principle of the protection
of minorities, it becomes clearer how public health, ethics, and the law might be bridged
through progressive legislation, while at the same time rendering that legislation, and
decisions taken on its authority, more robust in the case of a constitutional challenge.
3.3

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This chapter began by claiming that fundamental constitutional principles could

be used to reconcile, at least in part, the discrepancies between different ethical models,
while at the same time ensuring that at least some of the underlying values of a given
system are paid attention as we reform the law. The descriptive ethics of Singer et al.,188
already informed by Canadian constitutional law and Charter values, could be easily
integrated into legislative guidance. Relational feminist public health ethics could be
partially integrated by explicitly declaring that attention be paid to protection of
(vulnerable) minorities, taking advantage of the fact that Canada’s underlying
constitutional principle of the protection of minorities corresponds to the similar
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emphasis given to the protection of vulnerable minorities in those ethics. Going even
farther, social justice concerns could be brought into the legislation, progressively
reforming the law towards that core value of public health, one that it shares with
relational feminism. In the context of an infectious disease emergency, there may be any
number of vulnerable minorities depending upon how the outbreak develops:

the

impoverished; visible minority populations; persons with disabilities; the elderly; the very
young; refugees and certain immigrant populations, are a few easily imagined
possibilities. The list is not closed. By taking hold of public health and feminism’s core
value of social justice, and correlating it with the public health ethical-and-relationalfeminist value of the protection of vulnerable minorities, we can build a bridge to
Canadian constitutional legal principles and import progressive reform into the law.
To be clear, any ethical model could be brought to bear to enrich the proposed
legislative (or, if legislation is not possible, soft-law) reform, so long as it paid homage to
Canada’s fundamental constitutional values, including Charter values. Descriptive and
relational feminist ethics were chosen for illustration due to their contrast, but this thesis
asserts neither that they are the only models, nor that they are the best ones, to inform the
proposed legislation. They are simply examples used to demonstrate how we can bridge
public health, ethics, and law in order to try to achieve public health benefits (and
potentially, other benefits). It is true that public health and Canadian constitutional law
have some clear differences in focus. This is to be expected given that constitutional law
must regulate decision-making in public health just as it must regulate decision-making in
other realms of legislative and administrative action. At the same time, they have enough
in common that each can inform, while still respecting, the other.
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CHAPTER 4

HARD LAW

It has been asserted since the beginning of this thesis that the powers granted to
decision makers during an infectious disease emergency are truly extraordinary, but those
powers have not yet actually been discussed in any detail. This chapter will examine the
current state of Canada’s infectious disease emergency laws, with a view to creating a
better understanding of both the complex legal landscape, and the gravity of the current
authorizations. At the same time, it will demonstrate that the spirit behind the kind of
guidance this thesis proposes may already find some expression in the current statutes,
just not at the level required to truly leverage its effect.
4.1

STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS
In the context of public health emergencies (and specifically infectious disease

emergencies), there are two parallel bodies of law that are engaged at both the federal and
provincial/ territorial level. On the one hand, there are general emergency preparedness
and action statutes designed to deal with a multitude of disasters and threats to the
public’s welfare. These laws cover a wide variety of topics, from natural disasters to
epidemics to states of war or insurrection. They are general instruments that tend to
provide for the swift deployment of aggressive measures without the need for extensive
bureaucratic processes or before-the-fact procedural safeguards. These measures might
include, for example: the closure of roads, businesses, or public places; the conscription
of buildings, land, or supplies for the emergency efforts; or the evacuation of certain
territory. The main federal law in this vein is the Emergencies Act.189 Provincial statutes
go by various names, but are usually entitled the “Emergency Measures Act,” or words to
189
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that effect. A table of each province’s current legislation is provided at the end of this
chapter.
At the same time, there exist specific health, or public health, statutes. At the
federal level, and in the infectious disease context, the non-emergency Quarantine Act190
is this type of statute, which is aimed at preventing the spread of diseases from
individuals entering (or leaving) Canada through airports, seaports, and other kinds of
international border crossings.191 This act is a completely new, post-SARS version of its
archaic predecessor, and was passed nearly contemporaneously with the federal Public
Health Agency of Canada Act.192 The federal agency that Act created has a narrow
(though important) mandate when compared to its provincial counterparts. It serves,
amongst other public health roles, as an infectious disease surveillance agency,
information collector, disseminator, and public relations conduit.
Even outside of the infectious disease context, the federal Parliament in Canada
has legislated, under its federal constitutional mandate, in many other areas within the
public health domain. The Food and Drugs Act193 and Tobacco Act194 are examples of
federal statutes which fit within the narrow definition of public health. Broader
definitions of public health might include, for example, the new Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act, 2012.195 Whether one subscribes to a broad or narrow view of the
legitimate scope of public health and public health law, it is sufficient to say that in
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Canada, the federal parliament, and by extension the executive, has a role to play in
ensuring the public’s health, including by combating infectious diseases. However, as
suggested in chapter two, the greater part of infectious disease management law comes
from provincial legislatures.
Provincial public health legislation, as might be expected, is eclectic. There are
however some general commonalities, and infectious diseases tend to be one of them;
they are almost always dealt with in some fashion by these provincial laws. The general
trend over the last decade has been for provinces to move away from specific infectious
or venereal disease statutes towards ones incorporating infectious (or “communicable”)
disease laws and regulations into more generalized regimes. These general public health
statutes may or may not consider emergency situations.
Some provinces, such as Ontario196 and New Brunswick,197 have public health
statutes with no, or very few, emergency (or “epidemic”) provisions. These provinces’
public health statutes, vis-à-vis infectious diseases, rest upon measures designed to
contain infectious disease through the normal, non-emergency public health system. They
leave the emergency measures strictly within the sphere of their general, emergency
management statutes.
Other provinces, such as Alberta,198 Nova Scotia,199 and Quebec,200 have special
emergency regimes and powers within both statutes simultaneously. Though it is beyond
the scope of this current thesis, it is worth noting that there exists great potential for at
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best confusion and at worst, conflict, if states of emergency exist simultaneously under
both statutes. In such a case, different decision makers would have different but
overlapping mandates and authorities to deal with the same facts. This is especially so in
the case of jurisdictions where the precedence between the statutory powers in unclear.201
Coupled with the potential for an emergency to be declared under the federal
Emergencies Act as well, there exists even greater potential for the best-intentioned
cooperative plans to become confused or delayed.202
One criticism that can be levied against this arrangement is that general
emergency legislation, insofar as it can be used to deal with infectious disease
emergencies, passes off as ‘general’ what is really a public health issue. Potentially, it is
possible to conceptualize all emergencies, be they public disturbances, wars, natural
disasters or infectious diseases, as public health emergencies. At a minimum, even within
a single layer of constitutional authority, the existence of multiple statutes, ministries, and
staffs each with its own legal mandate, authority, and process, has the potential to delay
or derail any emergency response.
Jacob Shelley has argued that, for the sake of academic and legal classification,
infectious disease emergencies should conceptually be viewed as general public welfare
emergencies, as opposed to uniquely and specifically public health emergencies governed
by public health law.203 It is not necessary for this thesis to support or disagree with his
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argument, but it is mentioned at this stage to further drive home the point that, under the
current legal regimes, the possibility of a legal “turf war” during an emergency is a real
one (even by accident). If the law does not clarify who is in charge (as opposed to who
has the public health expertise), or worse yet, seems to give charge to more than one
individual,204 the results could be at best delay and at worst non-response during an
emergency. Law reform in this area could alleviate some of this tension if and when it
reaches the stage of enactment if the Bill contained provisions designed to clarify
authority. The Campbell Commission called for just such clarity.205
Since SARS, many provinces have passed updated and modernized legislation
promoting the public’s health, managing communicable diseases, and dealing with
emergencies. To give some examples, British Columbia passed its new Public Health
Act206 in 2008, proclaimed in force in March 2009.207 New Brunswick, passed a new
Public Health Act208 before SARS in 1998, but did not proclaim it until November, 2009,
after subsequent amendments and the preparation of regulations. Nova Scotia passed its
Health Protection Act209 earlier (2004), and Manitoba enacted its modernized Public
Health Act210 in 2006. Ontario made several amendments to its Health Protection and
Promotion Act211 in the wake of SARS, and took steps to refurbish its general emergency
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legislation.212 Ontario’s statute, as we saw in chapter one, got the attention of the
Campbell Commission for multiple reasons, not the least of which was its use of an
aggressive basket clause.
For the territories, the Northwest Territories also passed a new public health
statute, the Public Health Act,213 in 2007 and proclaimed it in 2009 (Nunavut has yet to
follow suit, and retains the Public Health Act214 of 1988, with no amendments save
changing the French name of their workers compensation legislation 215). The Yukon
made substantial amendments to its Public Health and Safety Act,216 also in 2009.
These statutes, for the most part, are the essential217 legal tools for authorizing
public health measures. Rules about sanitation, disease monitoring and reporting, clean
water, and food preparation are usually found within these statutes. Infectious diseases
are also generally dealt with, as well as emergency provisions for those jurisdictions that
have chosen to incorporate them in to these types of statutes.
The legal bastions of infectious disease control are these non-emergency public
health statutes. Detection, reporting, tracing, monitoring, and isolation, coupled with
treatment and/or immunization are the day-to-day measures that truly deal with infectious
disease risks: robust, effective non-emergency systems, it is hoped, prevent states of
emergency from ever arising. The legal tools available to decision makers and actors in
the non-emergency system can in themselves be quite coercive, especially in the case of a
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recalcitrant patient. There need not be an emergency situation for someone’s
constitutional rights to liberty and bodily integrity to be at stake. Chapter two gave some
examples of individuals who, with mixed results, challenged the legitimacy of infectious
disease control measures in the circumstances.218
But even though it is the non-emergency system that does the heavy lifting of
infectious disease control, this does not diminish the appropriateness of improving
emergency legal preparedness.
4.2

STATUTORY CONTENT – THE SCALE OF POWERS
At both the federal and provincial levels, the scale of powers in an emergency can

be found in either general emergency legislation, specific public health legislation, or
both.219
For the federal government, under the general emergencies statute, the
Emergencies Act,220 the specific legislative powers conferred in the event of an infectious
disease emergency are actually quite conservative. Even in the preamble, the statute
declares the government’s obligations towards Canadians:
WHEREAS the safety and security of the individual, the
protection of the values of the body politic and the
218
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prerogative, which if not extinguished by statute or otherwise limited by the legislature
would legally endure. For our purposes, it is not really necessary to argue whether or not
contemporary statute law has displaced crown prerogative within the context of
infectious disease emergencies. I mention it now only to flag that statutes are not the sole
source from which a decision maker could ever draw their authority.
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preservation of the sovereignty, security and territorial
integrity of the state are fundamental obligations of
government;
AND WHEREAS the fulfilment of those obligations in
Canada may be seriously threatened by a national
emergency and, in order to ensure safety and security during
such an emergency, the Governor in Council should be
authorized, subject to the supervision of Parliament, to take
special temporary measures that may not be appropriate in
normal times;
AND WHEREAS the Governor in Council, in taking such
special temporary measures, would be subject to the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Canadian Bill of Rights and must have regard to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
particularly with respect to those fundamental rights that are
not to be limited or abridged even in a national
emergency;221
[Emphasis added]
Though not having the force of law on its own, the mentioning of the Charter, the
Bill of Rights, and the International Covenant in the preamble is helpful.222 This is so
even considering that regardless of whether or not it is mentioned, no statute can
contravene the Charter since it is a part of the Constitution.223 If the Emergencies Act
were to be in violation, then the offending provisions would simply be of no force or
effect under s.52 of Canada’s 1982 Constitution, regardless of the preamble. 224 But
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Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp) E-4.5, preamble.
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The War Measures Act, which was replaced by the Emergencies Act, explicitly
provided for the overriding of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
223
Keeping in mind the legislature can expressly use the override clause (s.33), or argue
before the courts that the measure, though a breach on its face, is justified under the
Charter’s own s.1 (and so no violation at all).
224
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
This is admittedly a bit of an oversimplification. The courts have employed various
remedies under the authority under s.52 beyond declarations of nullity, including delayed
declarations, reading in, and reading down.
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before the day in court, any decision maker relying upon the statute for his or her
authority could take account of that preamble as they went about determining the scope
of their statutory authority, as well as when and how to use it. The proposal in this thesis
would take this general preamble statement to the next level, and provide specific,
articulable principles that the decision maker must consider. Courts make substantial use
of preambles when helpful for statutory or constitutional interpretation. While judicial
review of administrative action will be discussed in more detail in chapter six, suffice it
to say at this stage that if a decision maker were to ignore, or inappropriately weigh, this
statement in the preamble, then it would be difficult to justify the decision as either
correct, or even as reasonable, on review before the court.
The limits placed upon emergency action under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which is also included in the preamble, are of interest,
especially considering that a few of the rights enumerated in that covenant cannot be
limited even during an emergency (Article 4 explicitly allows for the limiting of most
rights during times of national emergencies, though it does oblige states to report on and
justify those infringements). The rights that are inviolable under the Covenant even in
times of national emergency are: the right to life (that is, the right not to be deprived of
life, not to be kept alive);225 the right against subjection to cruel or unusual punishment or
medical experimentation without consent;226 the prohibition on slavery and servitude (but
not compulsory labour in time of emergency);227 imprisonment for breach of contract
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171, Can TS 1976 No 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19
May 1976), art 6.
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Ibid, art 7.
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Ibid, art 8.
103

(debtor’s prison);228 the right not to be found guilty of an offense which did not exist at
the time of the act;229 the right not to be deprived of legal personality;230 and the right to
freedom of conscience, belief, and religion (but with limits, if prescribed by law, on the
“manifestation” of religious beliefs to “protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”).231 Notably absent from the Covenant’s
list of inalienable rights are two that could be most notably engaged during an infectious
disease emergency, namely liberty and security of the person (i.e. autonomy regarding
bodily integrity).
Concerning diseases, the federal Emergencies Act neither authorizes the kinds of
measures that might be considered excluded by the Covenant, nor those that the Covenant
tolerates in times of emergency. The actual powers conferred during a “public welfare”
emergency are quite limited when compared to some provincial statutes.
The preamble of the Emergencies Act indicates that Parliament has turned its
mind to providing some form of guidance to emergency decision makers. They also,
potentially, express a kind of Parliamentary constitutional interpretation – indicating that
certain values must be given weight. Some provincial statutes have similar provisions.
Such provisions and preambles are the seedlings of the kind of principled, legislative
guidance that ought to be available to decision makers in emergency situations.
The federal statute, as a general emergency statute, distinguishes between kinds of
emergencies and the powers they may require. Under the law, a “public welfare
emergency” is:
228
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an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent
(a) fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon,
(b) disease in human beings, animals or plants, or
(c) accident or pollution
and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social
disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or
resources, so serious as to be a national emergency. 232
The co-required state of “national emergency” means:
is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of
such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a
province to deal with it, or
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to
preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of
Canada.233
If both the conditions of national emergency and public welfare emergency are
established, and such an emergency is declared by the Governor-in-Council under s.6,
then specific regulatory powers become available to the Governor-in-Council. They read:
8. (1) While a declaration of a public welfare emergency is in effect, the
Governor in Council may make such orders or regulations with respect
to the following matters as the Governor in Council believes, on
reasonable grounds, are necessary for dealing with the emergency:
(a) the regulation or prohibition of travel to, from or within any
specified area, where necessary for the protection of the health or
safety of individuals;
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Emergencies Act, supra note 220, s.5.
ibid, s. 3.
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(b) the evacuation of persons and the removal of personal property
from any specified area and the making of arrangements for the
adequate care and protection of the persons and property;
(c) the requisition, use or disposition of property;
(d) the authorization of or direction to any person, or any person of a
class of persons, to render essential services of a type that that
person, or a person of that class, is competent to provide and the
provision of reasonable compensation in respect of services so
rendered;
(e) the regulation of the distribution and availability of essential
goods, services and resources;
(f) the authorization and making of emergency payments;
(g) the establishment of emergency shelters and hospitals;
(h) the assessment of damage to any works or undertakings and the
repair, replacement or restoration thereof;
(i) the assessment of damage to the environment and the elimination
or alleviation of the damage; and
(j) the imposition
(i) on summary conviction, of a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both that
fine and imprisonment, or
(ii) on indictment, of a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or
imprisonment not exceeding five years or both that fine and
imprisonment,
for contravention of any order or regulation made under this
section.234
Canada’s constitutional federalism manifests itself in the subsections immediately
following, which dictate that the emergency powers may be exercised only within the
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Emergencies Act, supra note 220, s. 8(1).
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specific area to which the emergency is confined,235 and further oblige the Governor-inCouncil to avoid making rules that might interfere with provincial capacities or
measures.236 Still further, if the public welfare emergency situation is confined to one
province, the state of emergency can only be declared and the special powers exercised
with the de facto consent of the executive branch of government of that province:
14. (1) Subject to subsection (2), before the Governor in Council issues,
continues or amends a declaration of a public welfare emergency, the
lieutenant governor in council of each province in which the direct
effects of the emergency occur shall be consulted with respect to the
proposed action.
(2) The Governor in Council may not issue a declaration of a public
welfare emergency where the direct effects of the emergency are
confined to, or occur principally in, one province unless the lieutenant
governor in council of the province has indicated to the Governor in
Council that the emergency exceeds the capacity or authority of the
province to deal with it.237
Viewed in light of these provisions, it is probable that if an infectious disease
outbreak were confined to one province, then the federal government, in an emergency
measures capacity, would be in a supporting role (as opposed to directly managing the
situation pursuant to federal law).
It should be highlighted that the federal Parliament has only granted the executive
specific powers (above) during a public welfare emergency. This can be contrasted with
the powers granted in the event of a War Emergency, an event just as serious:
40. (1) While a declaration of a war emergency is in effect, the
Governor in Council may make such orders or regulations as the
Governor in Council believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary or
advisable for dealing with the emergency.
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The only measure explicitly exempted from this broad authority is the ability to institute
military conscription by regulation.238 This broad authority to deal with a War
Emergency is a “basket clause”. Unlike the specific, enumerated powers detailed for
public welfare (which include infectious disease) emergencies, basket clauses grant broad
powers, with few limits (e.g. articulated conditions, such as that orders must be made “on
reasonable grounds”; the constitution; or the rules of statutory interpretation). We saw
above in chapter one that the Campbell Commission expressed trepidation over Ontario’s
post-SARs emergencies Bill, which included a basket clause.239
The federal Emergencies Act does not employ basket clauses for any other kind of
emergency besides a War Emergency. The Campbell Commission was concerned with
Ontario, but in fact nearly every provincial legislature, in contrast to the federal
Parliament, has employed basket clause language in either their general emergency
legislation or their public health laws, or both. Alberta, for example, contains such basket
clauses in its public health statute, characteristically contained within other enumerated
powers:
29(1) A medical officer of health who knows of or has reason to suspect
the existence of a communicable disease or a public health emergency
within the boundaries of the health region in which the medical officer
of health has jurisdiction may initiate an investigation to determine
whether any action is necessary to protect the public health.
(2) Where the investigation confirms the presence of a communicable
disease, the medical officer of health
(a) shall carry out the measures that the medical officer of health is
required by this Act and the regulations to carry out, and
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“Recommendations”, at 1187-1188.
239

108

(b) may do any or all of the following:
(i) take whatever steps the medical officer of health considers
necessary
(A) to suppress the disease in those who may already
have been infected with it,
(B) to protect those who have not already been exposed
to the disease,
(C)
to break the chain of transmission and prevent
spread of the disease, and
(D)
(ii)

to remove the source of infection;

by order
(A)

prohibit a person from attending a school,

(B)
prohibit a person from engaging in the person’s
occupation, or
(C) prohibit a person from having contact with other
persons or any class of persons
for any period and subject to any conditions that the medical officer of
health considers appropriate, where the medical officer of health
determines that the person’s engaging in that activity could transmit an
infectious agent;
[…]
(2.1) Where the investigation confirms the existence of a public health
emergency, the medical officer of health
[…]
(b)
may take whatever other steps are, in the medical officer of
health’s opinion, necessary in order to lessen the impact of the public
health emergency.240
[Emphasis added]
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Public Health Act, RSA 2000, c P-37, s.29.
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Similarly, in Nova Scotia:
Where the Minister has declared a public health emergency, the Chief
Medical Officer may implement special measures to mitigate or remedy
the emergency including
[…]
any other measure the Chief Medical Officer reasonably believes is
necessary for the protection of public health during the public health
emergency.241
[Emphasis added]
And in Quebec:
123. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, while the public
health emergency is in effect, the Government or the Minister, if he or
she has been so empowered, may, without delay and without further
formality, to protect the health of the population,
(1) order compulsory vaccination of the entire population or any part of
it against smallpox or any other contagious disease seriously
threatening the health of the population and, if necessary, prepare a list
of persons or groups who require priority vaccination;
(2) order the closing of educational institutions or of any other place of
assembly;
(3) order any person, government department or body to communicate
or give to the Government or the Minister immediate access to any
document or information held, even personal or confidential
information or a confidential document;
(4) prohibit entry into all or part of the area concerned or allow access
to an area only to certain persons and subject to certain conditions, or
order, for the time necessary where there is no other means of
protection, the evacuation of persons from all or any part of the area or
their confinement and, if the persons affected have no other resources,
provide for their lodging, feeding, clothing and security needs;
(5) order the construction of any work, the installation of sanitary
facilities or the provision of health and social services;
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(6) require the assistance of any government department or body
capable of assisting the personnel deployed;
(7) incur such expenses and enter into such contracts as are considered
necessary;
(8) order any other measure necessary to protect the health of the
population.
The Government, the Minister or another person may not be prosecuted
by reason of an act performed in good faith in or in relation to the
exercise of those powers.242
[Emphasis added]
It is evident that the scale of powers available to statutory decision maker under these
statutes can be quite extraordinary, depending upon the circumstances.
The kind of legislative guidance proposed in this thesis would be an evolution of
current statute law, not a radical novelty. Analogous to what was seen in the preamble to
the Emergencies Act, many provinces have gone further and actually included guidancerelated provisions into their emergency statutes. For example, Ontario’s Emergency
Management and Civil Protection Act declares in section 7.0.2:
The purpose of making orders under this section is to promote the
public good by protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people of
Ontario in times of declared emergencies in a manner that is subject to
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.243
Taking a different approach, section 2 of Nova Scotia’s Health Protection Act reads:
Restrictions on private rights and freedoms arising as a result of the
exercise of any power under this Act shall be no greater than are
reasonably required, considering all of the circumstances, to respond to
a health hazard, notifiable disease or condition, communicable disease
or public health emergency.244
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This is very similar to the approach taken my Manitoba, which states in its own public
health statute (passed two years after Nova Scotia’s):
If the exercise of a power under this Act restricts rights or freedoms, the
restriction must be no greater than is reasonably necessary, in the
circumstances, to respond to a health hazard, a communicable disease, a
public health emergency or any other threat to public health.245
British Columbia, in its Public Health Act, limits the use of emergency powers by stating:
Conditions to be met before this Part applies
52 (1) A person must not exercise powers under this Part in respect of a
localized event unless the person reasonably believes that
(a) the action is immediately necessary to protect public health from
significant harm, and
(b) compliance with this Act, other than this Part, or a regulation made
under this Act would hinder that person from acting in a manner that
would avoid or mitigate an immediate and significant risk to public
health.246
Like the preamble to the Emergencies Act, these provisions could imply some
intention of the legislature to balance, or restrain, the power. They could be interpreted as
the legislature taking account of Canada’s underlying constitutional principles. They
oblige the decision maker to consider “all of the circumstances”. Ontario’s statute makes
an explicit reference to the Charter, communicating to the decision maker that the
legislature does not consider emergencies so special as to place them outside of the
constitutional order. These provisions may modestly enhance legal preparedness by
increasing, in a humble measure, transparency and accountability. They at least make it
clear the decision maker has to turn his or her mind to the general question of consistency
of a proposed action with constitutionally protected rights.
245
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It is questionable however whether the above provisions are specific enough to
give full effect to this thesis’s goal of improved legal preparedness As they are very
general, it is difficult to imagine them providing much ammunition to the decision
maker’s legal advisors. It is likewise difficult to imagine them either as reassuring or
restraining the decision maker appreciably. But the greatest shortcoming with these
general provisions is that they suffer from the inverse inadequacy that was levied earlier
against reliance upon professional codes of ethics alone. Though some of these
provisions are obviously informed by public health values (e.g. “protect public health
from significant harm”; “promote the public good by protecting the health, safety and
welfare of the people of Ontario in times of declared emergencies”), they represent an
impoverished incorporation. A more thorough articulation of the principles to be
considered by the decision maker would lead to better legal decisions and to tighter
accountability. And further, if those principles were informed and enriched by public
health values and ethics, we could bridge them with Canadian constitutional, (including
Charter) values and produce better decisions for both public health and law. In other
words, our legal preparedness to defeat the emergency would be enhanced.
4.3

COMPLIANCE
Even after a decision is made, an order is only a piece of paper. It is not just

statutory powers that make law in such scenarios relevant – it is the real-world ability to
see them carried out. Under normal circumstances, government decisions made within
lawful authority are expected to be obeyed, with the threat of administrative, quasicriminal, or criminal sanction as the penalty for disobedience. The administrative state
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and the Rule of Law rely on the fact that the majority of people will obey, if not out of
respect for the law then out of anxiety in the face of possible sanction.
However, during an infectious disease emergency, the motivation to obey the law
may be diminished or entirely absent. For example, some health care or other emergency
workers may quite rationally opt to accept the risk of some form of legal sanction (e.g.
professional discipline) in the future if it means not having to work in an infectious
environment today.
Is the decision maker then to order police officers to round up health care workers
and escort them to work? In the context of an infectious disease emergency, would police
officers be able to enforce such an order with reasonable means and minimal force?
Would they even be willing to do so? Under s. 273.6 of the National Defence Act,247
provinces can request the support of the armed forces. More powerfully, under part VI of
that Act, titled Aid of the Civil Power, in the event of a riot or disturbance of the peace,
provinces can actually requisition the armed forces. Would our decision maker avail him
or herself of these provisions in order to see his or her directions obeyed?248
Probably not. It is widely agreed that physically coercive measures are not the
most effective tools for achieving public health outcomes. The situation would have to
rise to a science-fiction state of severity in order for the decision maker to contemplate
calling out the armed forces to effect his or her orders. As we saw in chapter three, public
cooperation is best achieved through community consultation and buy-in, rather than

247

RSC 1985 c N-5 [NDA].
Hollywood films, such as Outbreak and Contagion, certainly seem to predict that this
would be the case in the United States.
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physical coercion. As we saw above, the Campbell Commission made precisely this
point:
Laws are only the last resort. Legal procedures are useless without
overwhelming public cooperation of the kind demonstrated in SARS.
While it is important to strengthen the legal machinery available to
public health officials, it is even more important to strengthen the things
that encourage public cooperation.249
In other words, cooperation would not be encouraged by calling out soldiers, but rather
by making transparent, reasonable decisions according to law, based upon a demonstrable
and articulated public health need or risk. The proposed legislation is designed to achieve
that. If a member of the public, or a specific community, is still dissatisfied, then they
always have the option of launching a challenge in a court of law. 250 If the legislature has
enacted its guidance, and the decision maker has had occasion to follow it, such a
challenge could incidentally turn out to be very productive for Canada’s constitutional
discourse.
4.4

TABLE OF LEGISLATION

* An “implicit” basket clause is one where the legislation employs an open list of powers,
rather than having an explicit provision authorizing the decision maker to take ‘all other
necessary measures’, or words to that effect.
Jurisdiction
Federal
Alberta

Statute
Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp)
E-4.5, s.8(1)
Public Health Act RSA 2000, c P-37, s. 29.

Emergency Management Act RSA 2000, c E6.8, s. 19(1);
249

Emergency Decision
Maker
Governor-in-Council
Local Medical Officer
of Health, Minister of
Health and Wellness,
or Regional Health
Authority.
Minister of Municipal
Affairs

Powers
Enumerated
Enumerated

Implicit
Basket

Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 251.
Alternatively, if the legislature found it a wise policy decision, it could provide for an
administrative appeal mechanism form the duration of the emergency.
250
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Designation and Transfer of Responsibility
Regulation, AR 38/2008, s. 17(1).
British
Columbia

Public Health Act SBC 2008, c 28, ss. 54-57.

Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111,
s.10.
BC Reg 477/94 [up to B.C. Reg. 200/98], s. 6,
Schedule 1.

Manitoba

Public Health Act, 2006, SM 2006, c 14,
[CCSM c P-210], s. 67(1), (2), (3)

Emergency Measures Act, CCSM c E-80, s.
12; s.1 “minister”;

A health officer, a
medical health
officer, the provincial
health officer, and the
Minister of Health.
Minister of Public
Safety/ Minister of
Health
British Columbia is
an interesting case.
Under the
Interpretation Act,
RSBC 1996, c 238,
the minister
responsible for the
Act is the “minister”
mentioned in the Act
(and so, would be the
emergency decision
maker). This is
currently the Minister
of Public Safety.
However, under the
Emergency Program
Management
Regulation, s. 6, the
minister responsible
for “coordinating the
government’s
response to the
occurrence” of an
infectious disease
emergency is the
Minister of Health.
Chief public health
officer (for certain
powers, under the
supervision of the
Minister of Health)
Minister of
Infrastructure and
Transportation

Enumerated

Implicit
Basket

Enumerated

Implicit
Basket

Manitoba OIC 349/2009, 3 November 2009
(The Executive Government Organization Act,
C.C.S.M. c. E170).
New
Brunswick

Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c P-22.4, s. 1,
s. 26(1), s.26.1(1).
(Ambiguous emergencies)
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Minister of Health
(Limited powers appropriation of real
property and

Enumerated

Emergency Measures Act, SNB 2011, c 147,
s.12.
Newfoundland
and Labrador

Communicable Diseases Act, RSNL 1990 c
C-26, s.2;
Department of Health and Community
Services Notice, 2003, OC 2003-370;
Department of Government Services and
Lands Notice, 2003, OC 2003-369 (Executive
Council Act, RSNL 1990, c E-16.1).
Emergency Services Act, SNL 2008 c E-9.1.

Northwest
Territories

Department of Municipal and Provincial
Affairs Notice, 2003, OC 2003-377 (Executive
Council Act).
Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c 17, s.33.

Civil Emergency Measures Act, RSNWT
1988, c C-9, s.12.
Nova Scotia

Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c 4, s.
53(2).
Emergency Management Act, SNS 1990, c 8,
s.2(g), s.14.
NS OIC 2011-22 (Public Service Act).

Nunavut

Public Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-12.
Government of Nunavut, online:
<http://www.gov.nu.ca/en/Departments.aspx>
.
Emergency Measures Act, S Nu 2007, c 10.

Ontario

Government of Nunavut, online:
<http://www.gov.nu.ca/en/Departments.aspx>
.
Health Protection and Promotion Act, RSO
1990, c H-7, s.1, s.77.5, s.18(3).
(Very limited emergency provisions)

designation of new
disease only)
Minister of Public
Safety
Minister of Health
and Community
Services; and the
Minister of
Government Services
and Lands,
simultaneously
(some powers need
approval of Lt.
Governor-in-Council)
Minister of Municipal
and Provincial Affairs

Enumerated

Chief Public Health
Officer (once a state
of emergency is
declared by Minister
of Health and Social
Services)

Enumerated

Minister of Municipal
and Community
Affairs
Chief Medical Officer
of Health
Minister of
Emergency
Management
(currently, the
Minister of Justice).
Minister of Health
and Social Services

Implicit
Basket

Minister of
Community and
Government Services

Implicit
Basket

Minister of Health
and Long-Term Care
(Procurement of
supplies only)

Limited

Chief Medical Officer
of Health (directives
to boards of health
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Implicit
Basket

Implicit
Basket

Explicit
Basket
Explicit
Basket

Silent

Prince Edward
Island

Emergency Management and Civil Protection
Act, RSO 1990, c E-9, s. 7.0.2(4)
Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988 c P-30.

Emergency Measures Act, SPEI 1990, c 11,
s.1.

Quebec

Government of PEI, online:
<http://www.gov.pe.ca/jps/
index.php3?number=1030226&lang=E>
Public Health Act, RSQ, c S-2.2, s. 2; s.123.
Civil Protection Act RSQ c S-2.3, s. 93.

Saskatchewan

Public Health Act, 1994, SS 1994, c P-37.1,
s.2
Government of Saskatchewan, online:
<http://www.health.gov.sk.ca/
legislation>.
Emergency Planning Act, SS 1989-1990, c E8.1, s.2, 18(1).

Yukon

Government of Saskatchewan, online:
<http://www.cpsp.gov.sk.ca/saskemo>.
Public Health and Safety Act, RSY 2002, c
176.
Civil Emergency Measures Act, RSY 2002, c
34.
Government of the Yukon, online:
<http://www.gov.yk.ca/legislation/cs.html>
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and medical officers
only)
Lieutenant-Governorin-Council
Chief Health Officer
(requires approval of
Minister of Health
and Wellness for
some measures)
Minister of
Environment, Labour,
and Justice.

Explicit
Basket
Enumerated

Implicit
Basket

Government or
Minister of Health
and Social Services
Government, or an
empowered Minister
Minister of Health

Explicit
Basket

Minister of
Corrections, Public
Safety, and Policing

Explicit
Basket

(No special
emergency
provisions0
Minister of
Community Services

N/A

Explicit
Basket
Enumerated

Explicit
Basket

CHAPTER 5
5.1

PROPOSED REFORM

SAMPLE DRAFT LEGISLATIVE TEXT
Below is an attempt to incorporate the values of public health, ethics, and

Canadian constitutional law into draft legislative provisions. The draft section and
subsection numbers are arbitrary. The empowering article (s. 99) was not created from
scratch, but was built upon the frame of the emergency provisions in Nova Scotia’s
Health Protection Act.251 If the kind of law reform this thesis calls for were to be enacted
in Nova Scotia and applied to that Act, below is an example of what that reform might
look like.
The sample provisions are not held out as ideal or perfect. Rather, they are
submitted principally with the modest view of exhibiting how the drafting of such reform
is in fact possible.
The draft provisions should also not be taken as an assertion of what this author
believes the reform ought to look like, nor what particular principles ought to be given
greater status or more consideration than others. In keeping with the principle theme of
this thesis, the underlying constitutional principle of democracy and the public health
value of community consultation are central to the proposed law reform’s credibility and
ultimately its effectiveness; it is the legislature, using all of its tools, which needs to
decide what status, if any, to give to each principle. The draft principles are only meant to
reveal how the theoretical arguments in the preceding chapters might cash out in a
statute. They are however drafted in a manner that is intended to be constitutionally
compliant (admittedly, perhaps conservatively so).
251

SNS 2004, c 4.
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The reader may notice that the emergency decision maker in the sample text is the
Chief Medical Officer [of the jurisdiction]. This is simply because the Chief Medical
Officer [of Health] is the decision maker in the Nova Scotia legislation. The decision
maker could just as easily be some other official, a cabinet minister, or the Lieutenant
Governor-in-Council. As was seen above in chapter four, Canada’s many jurisdictions
have between them chosen a wide variety of decision makers in their emergency
legislation. The question of who the decision maker ought to be – whether for legitimacy
reasons, expertise, or some other reason, is a relevant line of inquiry, but it is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
DRAFT TEXT
99. Where the Minister has declared a public health emergency, the Chief Medical
Officer may implement special measures to mitigate or remedy the emergency including
any measure the Chief Medical Officer reasonably believes is necessary for the protection
of public health during the public health emergency.
Guidance for Exercising Powers
100. (1) Restrictions on individual rights and freedoms arising as a result of the exercise
of any power under this Part shall be no greater than are reasonably required, considering
all of the circumstances, to respond to a public health emergency.
(2) In deciding whether to exercise the powers conferred by section 99 and this section,
the Chief Medical Officer shall take into account all of the factors that the Chief Medical
Officer determines to be relevant, including, but not limited to, the following guidance:
(a) the Chief Medical Officer, on behalf of and with the government of Nova
Scotia, has a mandate to safeguard the health, security, and well being of the
population, and for this common good has a duty to respond rapidly and
effectively to the public health emergency;
(b) actions that will or that will have the potential to interfere with the rights and
freedoms of individuals must be justified in relation to the best available
assessment of the public health risk;
(c) wherever practicable, voluntary cooperation of individuals shall be sought
before mandatory orders or coercive measures are imposed;
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(d) interference with, seizure, confiscation, or use of private property under the
authority of the Chief Medical Officer must be in furtherance of a demonstrable
public health benefit that can be derived from such action, which justifies such
interference, seizure, confiscation, or use when balanced against the best available
assessment of the public health risk;
(e) the liberty of individuals should only be limited when there is a demonstrable
benefit that can be derived from such action, which justifies any such limitation
when balanced against the best available assessment of the public health risk;
(f) the coercive interference with the bodily integrity of individuals should only be
taken as a last resort, and must in all circumstances be justified when balanced
against the best available assessment of the public health risk; and
(g) all reasonable efforts shall be taken to avoid or minimize any disproportionate
burdens or restrictions of rights that may be experienced by any individual or
group, with particular attention to the circumstances of vulnerable or historically
marginalized groups or communities.
Transparency Required
101. (1) Upon deciding to exercise the special powers conferred by sections 99 and 100,
the Chief Medical Officer shall, within seven days, cause the decision to be
communicated or published by such means as the Chief Medical Officer considers the
most likely to make the contents of the decision known to the people of the area affected.
(2) Any publication under subsection (1) shall contain the reasons for the decision,
including the consideration of the applicable guidance in s. 100(2) and any other factors.
(3) Unless, in the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer, it is necessary to include the
personal information of individuals in a publication under subsection (1), such personal
information shall not be included.
No Appeal From Decisions
102. (1) Decisions made during a public health emergency by Chief Medical Officer
pursuant to sections 99 and 100 are final.
5.2

IMPROVED LEGAL PREPAREDNESS
The above proposal fits into the body of scholarly literature that emerged mostly

over the last fifteen years in the wake of Anthrax and SARS, and continues today.
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Infectious diseases never really went away, and if Ebola,252 MERS253 and Zika254 are any
indication, they are not going anywhere. This thesis proposes that we build a bridge
between public health, ethics, and the law through new legislation in order to be better
prepared for infectious disease emergencies. In an emergency the stakes will be high,
with a correspondingly high potential for disputes between individuals or vulnerable
groups and the state. While the potential for disputes cannot be eliminated, the law should
be able to help us reduce their occurrence and mitigate their effects. The law should also
be able to help us make better decisions. This chapter discusses the implications of this
thesis’s research by reaffirming exactly how the proposed law reform will better legally
prepare us for the next infectious disease emergency.
5.3

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Nearly every single ethical structure cited in chapter three claimed transparency

as a central value.255 Administrative law scholarly literature generally considers increased
transparency in government decision-making desirable, even if difficult to achieve.256
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World Health Organization, Ebola virus disease outbreak, online: <http://www.
who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/>.
253
World Health Organiztion, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERSCoV), online: <http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/>.
254
World Health Organization, Microcephaly/Zika virus, online: <http://www.who.int/
emergencies/zika-virus/en/>.
255
Peter A. Singer, et al., “Ethics and SARS: lessons from Toronto” Chapter 3 in Michael
Freeman, ed. The Ethics of Public Health, Vol II (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012); Alison K
Thompson et al, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness; an Ethical Framework to Guide
Decision-making” (2006) 7:12 BMC Medical Ethics; United Kingdom, Department of
Health, “Responding to Pandemic Influenza – The Ethical Framework for Policy and
Planning” (London: Department of Health, 2007); Kenny, Sherwin & Baylis, supra note
72;
256
See: Martin Shapiro, “The Giving of Reasons Requirement” in Martin Shapiro & Alec
Stone Sweet, eds, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) 228); David Markell, “The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen
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Public health scholarship generally considers increased transparency a tool for increasing
the effectiveness of any infectious disease outbreak response.257 Both SARS commissions
called for increased transparency.258 Indeed, as one audience member commented when
the preliminary research for this thesis was presented at the University of Toronto in
2011, “it is difficult to argue against more transparency.”
Transparency is a value that already finds some expression in the statutes.
Consider Nunavut’s Emergency Measures Act, which provides:
Immediately after declaring a state of emergency, the Minister shall
cause the details of the declaration to be published in the manner that
the Minister considers is most likely to make the contents of the
declaration known to the majority of the population of the area
affected.259
Other provinces and territories have similar provisions in their general emergency
statutes.260 The above proposal contains a section (s. 101) which is largely based upon

Participation: Transparency, and accountability,” (2010) 45 Wake Forest L Rev 425;
William Funk, “Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law – Three
Examples as an Object Lesson” (2009) 61 Admin L Rev 171; Bojan Bugaric, “Openness
and Transparency in Public Administration: Challenges for Public Law”, (2004) 22:3 Wis
Int’l LJ 483. There are rare exceptions, for example national security cases. But even
those cases cry out for as much transparency as is possible in the circumstance. See:
Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350, and
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37, [2014] 2 SCR 33; Craig
Forcese, “Clouding Accountability: Canada’s Government Secrecy and National Security
Law ‘Complex,' (2004/2005) 36:1 Ottawa L Rev 49.
257
Lawernce O Gostin and Benjamin E Berkman provide a useful summary in
“Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health,” (2007) 59:1 Admin L Rev
121at 149-150.
258
Campbell Commission, First Interim Report, supra note 6, at 48-51; Second Interim
Report, supra note 6, at 433 and 439; Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 72.
259
Emergency Measures Act, SNu 2007, c 10, as amended by SNu 2010, c 14, s. 11(3).
260
e.g. New Brunswick: Emergency Measures Act, SNB 1978 c E-7.1, s. 12; Nova
Scotia: Emergency Management Act, SNS 1990, c 8, s. 13; Manitoba: Emergency
Measures Act, CCSM c E-80, s 10(3). There are also statutory provisions that enhance ex
post transparency. For example, in Nova Scotia, section 6(1)(i) of the Health Protection
Act, supra note 199, states that the Minister of Health shall: “after a public health
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these similar provisions requiring publication, but that applies specifically to the special
measures taken (as opposed to the declaration only, which the legislation should also
require) and adds the requirement for reasons. The reasons must include the consideration
of the guidance in ss. 100 (2), as well as any other factors (since our decision maker must
turn her mind to “all of the circumstances” if a special measure is to restrict any
individual right or freedom: s. 100(1)).
Transparency of decisions is a deep-seated value in Canadian law, and often results
in a demand for cogent reasons to be given for a decision.261 The Supreme Court of
Canada commented in the Provincial Judges Reference:
The importance of reasons as the basis for the legitimate exercise of
public power has been recognized by a number of commentators. For
example, in “Developments in Administrative Law: The 1992-93
Term” (1994), 5 S.C.L.R. (2d) 189, at p. 243, David Dyzenhaus has
written that
what justifies all public power is the ability of its incumbents to offer
adequate reasons for their decisions which affect those subject to
them. The difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the
democratic right of the latter to require an accounting for acts of
public power.
Frederick Schauer has made a similar point (“Giving Reasons” (1995),
47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, at p. 658):
. . . when decision makers . . . expect respect for decisions because
the decisions are right rather than because they emanate from an
authoritative source, then giving reasons . . . is still a way of showing
respect for the subject. . . .262

emergency has ended, direct that a review be conducted and, within one year, report to
the House of Assembly on the cause and duration of the emergency and on the measures
implemented in response to the emergency.”
261
See for example the decisions in: Northwestern Utilities Ltd and al v Edmonton,
[1979] 1 SCR 684; Baker, supra note 160; R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 SCR
869 (criminal law).
262
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 89, at para 181.
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The Court in the Provincial Judges Reference then immediately clarified that in the
passage above it was not “endorsing or establishing a general duty to give reasons,
neither in the constitutional nor in the administrative law context.”263 But in the case of
Baker v Canada, the Supreme Court wrote that “in certain circumstances, the duty of
procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision.”264
In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, the Court went as far as to say that “[i]n judicial review,
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process.”265 The Court refined the law
surrounding reasons in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and
Labrador (Treasury Board),266 ruling that the adequacy of reasons was not a stand-alone
ground for appellate intervention, nor were reasons necessarily always required by every
kind of case.
Concerning an infectious disease emergency, it is debatable whether reasons
would be required of the decision maker at common law. Emergencies can justify
relaxed, perhaps even suspended, procedural fairness requirements.267 In any case, the
Supreme Court has been willing to be flexible concerning what will qualify as reasons in
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Ibid at para 182.
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, at para

43.
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Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190, at para 47 [Dunsmuir].
2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Labrador Nurses].
267
Grant Huscroft, “From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content, and the Role
of Judicial Review” Chapter 5 in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds. Administrative
Law in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013) at 162; Cardinal v Director
of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643 at para 16; Walpole Island First Nation v Ontario,
(1996), 31 OR (3d) 607 (Ont Ct Gen Div, Div Ct).
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the administrative law context;268 even if there were a duty for reasons at common law
(and there probably is not), the minimum requirements should be easy to satisfy. The
Supreme Court of Canada has also indicated an openness to the idea that the procedural
fairness requirements under the Charter, and in particular the principles of fundamental
justice under s. 7, might be justifiably infringed in emergency situations. 269 This will be
discussed again briefly in chapter six.
But though neither the common law nor the Charter would likely require reasons,
the legislature need not tolerate a lack of transparency from its chosen decision maker.
Through statute,270 the legislature should demand reasons in order to enhance
transparency and improve the quality of judicial review. For this reason, the draft
legislation includes a specific legal duty to publish reasons.
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In Labrador Nurses, supra note 266, the Supreme Court ruled, at para 20: “Baker
stands for the proposition that “in certain circumstances”, the duty of procedural fairness
will require “some form of reasons” for a decision (para 43). It did not say that reasons
were always required, and it did not say that the quality of those reasons is a question of
procedural fairness. In fact, after finding that reasons were required in the circumstances,
the Court in Baker concluded that the mere notes of an immigration officer were
sufficient to fulfil the duty of fairness (para 44)”.
269
Ref Re: BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, at 518, [1985] SCJ No 73 (QL).
270
It is not unusual for a statute to require reasons from a decision maker. See for
example: Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985 c T-2, s. 18.23 (reasons required from the
court); Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985 c C-46, s. 264 (5); s 719(3.2) (reasons
required from the court); Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985 c L-2, Part I, s. 146.1(1);
147.1(2); 224(4); 251.05(2) (reasons required from both administrative decision makers
and private actors); Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s. 17(4) (reasons
required from the Human Rights Commission); Children and Family Services Act, SNS
1990 c 5, s.41(5) (reasons required from the court); Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004 c 28,
s. 37(3) (reasons required from the Barrister’s Society); Utilities and Review Board Act,
SNS 1992 c 11, s. 27 (reasons required from an administrative tribunal).
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Giving reasons, according to some authors, may actually increase the “risk” of
judicial intervention.271 It is not necessary to enter the debate on the rightness or
wrongness of various strengths of judicial review. In Canada, judicial review will be
irresistible – and through the above-proposed law-reform the courts will be better
equipped to provide the applicants and decision makers with meaningful judicial review.
If the legislature communicates to the courts the factors the official must consider, and
the decision maker provides his or her reasons according to those principles based upon
the facts known at the time, that judicial review will become more meaningful. Judges
would be better situated to analyse both the basket clause itself and the decision made
under it against underlying ethical principles and constitutional and Charter values,
interpret them,272 and then apply the rules established in Dunsmuir and Doré to review
the actual decision.
This enhanced, more meaningful judicial review could provide a powerful method
of accountability. As we will see in chapter six, the powers of Canada’s superior courts
are extensive, and especially so whenever a Charter right is in the balance. If decision
makers rely on a statutory framework that has incorporated the relevant (applicable)
ethical principles and Canada’s constitutional rights and values, and which also requires
reasons explaining how those principles, rights and values were balanced with public
health protecting objectives, judicial review could be more focused. It would remain a
necessary check on the administrative state and maintain the rule of law. It is of course
possible, perhaps even probable, that when conducting the legal balancing our decision
271

Manfredi (2007), supra note 279; Martin Shapiro, “The Giving of Reasons
Requirement” in Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, eds, On Law, Politics and
Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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For the basket clause, using the rule in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes, supra note 86.
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maker, being human, will get a decision wrong. Holding him or her to account through
the courts is not a bad thing. Having the discussion already framed by the legislature, not
as a challenge, but as assistance to the courts, can only serve to give confidence to our
decision maker (and his or her legal advisors).
Lastly, the courts are not the only avenues available to hold our decision makers
accountable, nor are they necessarily the best or most effective one. Transparent
decisions, with reasons, publicly justified (for example through publication), will yield
significant practical benefits. It will not take long for the press and the public to make it
known if the reasons for a decision are found wanting. This may or may not become a
source of concern for our decision maker (likely it will depend upon the reasons for the
dissatisfaction), but whether concerned or not they will certainly be accountable.
Compared with whatever benefits that could be gained from an ex post inquiry and
report, contemporaneous publication and explanation would have the potential not only to
expose abuses or shortcomings, but also to highlight justifications, excellence, and
identify areas for improvement and future prevention. Like transparency, public
accountability could also improve the effectiveness of measures through increased
cooperation and compliance – knowing that the decision maker will be held to account,
and in fact seeing him or her so held, could encourage public trust, and so public health
effectiveness.
5.4

EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

As was noted by the Campbell Commission in its Second Interim Report:
Emergency powers are inherently dangerous. They carry the
twin dangers of overreaction and underreaction.
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The first danger is overreaction. Every emergency power,
once conferred, “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” To a hammer, everything looks
like a nail. To some emergency managers, every problem
may look like an opportunity to invoke emergency powers.
The second danger is underreaction. In the face of a deadly
new disease with an uncertain incubation period, ambiguous
symptoms, no diagnostic tests, uncertainty as to its
infectiveness and mechanisms of transmission, and no idea
where in the province it may be simmering, decisive action
may be necessary that turns out in hindsight to have been
excessive.273
Providing a legal, constitutionally considered framework within which to conduct
an analysis should waylay legal hesitation or doubt on the part of the decision makers.
This could help guard against the twin dangers of overreaction and underreaction.
Obliging the decision maker to consider Charter values alongside other legislative
guidance should guard against the spectre of over-reaction (with the improved safeguard
of a more focused judicial review). At the same time, having a statute that lays out
specific principles the legislature wants the decision maker to consider, and knowing
those things were in fact considered in good faith, should provide the decision maker
with confidence when faced with controversial but critical choices. It should therefore
mitigate the risk of under reaction.
There would be another benefit. By including provisions obliging the decision
maker to consider the effects of her decision on vulnerable individuals or groups, and to
take account of the proportionality of any such effects, a core value of public health social justice (shared with the public ethics proposed by relational feminism) - would be
brought into the decision making process. At the same time, this principle should be
273

Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6 at 9.
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defensible before the courts as it is grounded in the constitutional principle of the
protection of minorities. By bringing this value into the process through statute, it will do
more than bring an ethical dilemma to the attention of the decision maker where one may
not have been thought to exist before. It will create a legal dilemma where one did not
exist before. As was seen above in chapter three, public health, even in the narrow sense,
is concerned with more than keeping the maximum number of human bodies alive.
Obliging the decision maker to take account of social justice concerns during her
decision-making process would reflect this.
Increased attention to the risks faced by vulnerable minorities, and more generally
taking account of social justice concerns, are not merely symbolic gestures. Having these
principles etched in statute should lead to better emergency decisions based upon public
health’s own core values. And if the law, passed through the democratically elected
legislature, can be used to re-orient the administrative decision making-process away
from the binary tension between the individual and the greater good and towards a
broader discourse taking account of public health, ethics, and constitutional values, the
novel aspects of that broader discussion would be at least more transparent and
potentially more legitimate in the eyes of the real people living through the emergency.
Admittedly, stronger legislative guidance on how to go about deciding may not
automatically lead to the swift implementation of public health professional
recommendations, but it would at least add clarity to the emergency decision-making
process. If the legislation was seen to take note of Charter rights, and to incorporate
Charter values, other constitutional principles and administrative law, and public health
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and ethical principles, the legal advisors to the decision maker would be better positioned
to provide them with swift, useful support.274
After a legal decision has been made to deploy a measure (especially a potentially
coercive one), the cooperation of the public is critical for its success. Notwithstanding the
dramatic suggestions of some Hollywood films, it is quite simply not feasible to coerce
large portions of the population. The Campbell Report acknowledged this:
Voluntary compliance is the bedrock of any emergency response. Even
the most exquisite emergency powers will never work unless the public
cooperates.
Legal powers are false hopes during a public crisis. No law will work
during a disaster without the public cooperation and individual sacrifice
shown during SARS. Nor will any law work without the machinery that
supports and compensates those who sacrifice for the greater good of
public health.
Voluntary compliance also depends on public trust in those managing
the emergency and public confidence that medical decisions are made
on medical evidence, not on grounds of political expediency or
bureaucratic convenience.275
In sum, coercion (and the laws that enable it) is a last resort.276 Public trust is
fundamental.
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The next time around, they may even be able to advise that the orders are enforceable.
The Ontario SARS Commission reported that during the crisis legal advisors to public
health officers doubted whether judges would enforce orders issued under pursuant to the
then-extant legislation. Such opinions are remarkable precisely because they were given
during the SARS crisis: the decade’s most infamous infectious disease emergency!
[Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 274]
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Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 308.
276
Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 251. George Annas,
has made similar observations in the United States. Analyzing surveys from 2004, he
argued in supra, note 21, that the key factor in getting people to voluntarily follow
emergency orders was if they trusted the public figured to tell the truth. In the specific
context of the SARS outbreak, he further commented at 222: “It is a public health myth,
the equivalent of an urban legend, that quarantine was necessary to stop the SARS
epidemic. It was not, and where it was used it probably did more harm than good. This is
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The above-proposed reform is meant to maintain the public trust. If a drastic,
coercive measure is actually required, it will be taken by a decision maker whose
authority depends on the consideration and weighing of values that give legitimacy to
decision-making. That decision maker will be required to publicly give reasons for that
decision in light of those values. Such a law will not by itself create public trust, but it
will be a considerable step in the right direction.
5.5
MORE MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW, RESPECT FOR RIGHTS,
AND ENRICHED CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
We will discuss below Canada’s constitutional requirement for recourse to
judicial review in order to ensure that the choices of decision makers are made in
compliance with the constitution. But a few words are necessary here to completely flesh
out the argument for the proposed reform. This is because, in the context of an infectious
disease emergency, the right to request review is too little, too late.
Individuals or groups seeking interlocutory injunctions or mandatory orders
during the emergency itself are going to be controversial figures. During a true
emergency, the stakes, and emotions, are going to be high, and it will be provocative if a
party asks a judge to grant an interlocutory order while the press is reporting newly
confirmed cases of infection or death. In most instances, it will be extraordinarily
difficult for any judge to deliver a decision which does justice to the needs of the
applicants and the public in such an expedited manner.
because not only liberty is at stake in deciding to quarantine, but the effectiveness of
public health itself. To be effective in preventing disease spread from either a new
epidemic or a bioterrorist attack, public health officials must also prevent the spread of
fear and panic – and, as important, must not panic themselves. Maintenance of public
trust is essential to achieve this goal.”
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But once the emergency is over, if it is judged that the decision maker’s choices
unjustifiably violated constitutional or other legal rights of individuals or vulnerable
minority groups, it will be too late. This is not to say that after the fact review will not
have value. Quite the opposite is true. After the fact decisions could provide the very kind
of guidance for the future that this thesis proposes. In fact, judicial guidance could end
up being more detailed and therefore more useful guidance than could be provided by
general provisions in a statute. Depending upon the content of the decision, it could be
more powerful guidance, and might conveniently come from the same courts that would
be reviewing future decisions. In any case, there will always be the potential for some
circumstance that could not have been anticipated by the legislature such that judicial
review will need to be the vehicle for interpretation and refinement.
Nevertheless, such precedent could only come after the real people, who were
affected on the ground, needed it. No ex post remedy, not even those available under the
Charter, is like to make right the wrong done to those applicants who may have been,
(now)-unlawfully and against their will quarantined, isolated, inoculated, or treated. The
fact that the courts could be helpful in establishing guidance for the emergency decision
maker is no reason for the legislature not to do so. Insofar as potential circumstances can
be foreseen, the legislature can speak now, in proactive anticipation of a public health
emergency and the decisions which may have to be taken to manage it. It can bridge
public health, ethics, and the law to give real content to, and display respect for, the rights
of individuals and vulnerable minorities before the emergency happens. This approach is
the only one that makes sense if we are to honestly take account of what, in an
emergency, the lived experiences of real people in the world are like to be.
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But more than this, our context provides a target of opportunity. By speaking first
on a matter of fundamental individual rights, concerning conditions where the public
good must take a prominent place, the legislature will be assisting the courts in their role
as arbiters of the rule of law. It is an opportunity for the beginning of, as Gregoire
Webber imagines,277 a true dialogue as dialectic, delivering to Canada and Canadians a
renewed and enriched constitutional discourse.
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Gregoire CN Webber, “The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature
Dialogue” (2009) 42:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 443.
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CHAPTER 6

MORE MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW AND

ENRICHED CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
6.1

INTRODUCTION
So far, we have dug into Canada’s underlying constitutional principles, canvassed

the core values of public health, public health law, and public health ethics, and surveyed
the content of Canadian legislation concerning infectious disease emergencies,
particularly the prominence of basket clauses. To contribute to the literature of
emergency legal preparedness, this thesis proposed draft legislative provisions providing
more extensive guidance for decision makers on the values they should weigh and
balance in exercising the authority that basket clauses give to them. This proposal
connected the values of public health and ethics with Canadian constitutional principles,
including Charter values, with a view to creating the benefits of increased transparency,
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. This thesis also argues that one of the
benefits of this legislative reform would be more meaningful judicial review, should any
application be made in response to a decision made under the reformed legislation.
This penultimate chapter begins with a brief note concerning procedural fairness
before recounting the approach the courts will likely take when reviewing emergency
decisions taken under the kind of statutory authority canvassed in chapter four. It will
then estimate how the reform proposed in this thesis might fit into that framework. It goes
on to consider what the suggested approach of legislating-in-advance might mean in the
greater context of Canadian administrative law, judicial review of both executive278 and
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legislative action, and Canada’s larger constitutional discourse by referencing the
‘dialogue’ metaphor279 of Canadian constitutional scholarship.

SCR 982; Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817
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Carissima Mathen, “Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A
Comment on “Charter Dialogue Revisited” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 125; Andrew
Peter, “Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn’t
Such a Good Thing After All)” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 147; Kent Roach,
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It is precisely because of the extraordinary potential for the state to overstep
individual constitutional rights during an infectious disease emergency that all three
branches of government must be engaged in order to achieve the full effect of this
thesis’s proposed reform: the legislature, to improve the written law; the executive, who
will better defeat the emergency through the emergency decision maker so empowered by
that law; and the judiciary, which will have a crucial part to play regarding the
maintenance of the rule of law as the powers are exercised.
Judges seized of cases of judicial review brought before them during, or after, an
infectious disease emergency will have the final word on whether the challenged
decisions are defensible in light of the relevant and applicable values and principles.280
The Campbell Commission believed that the legislation itself (as opposed to the decisions
alone) would inevitably be challenged.281 But notwithstanding who will speak last, it is
the legislature that actually ought to speak first in ‘balancing’ the constitutional rights and
values at stake during the emergency with the exigencies of managing the emergency
effectively in the interests of population health. The unique context provided by an
infectious disease emergency is one where the legislature is actually much better
equipped to speak first regarding what the administrative decision maker must consider
when faced with challenging questions about “what weight(s) do the rights, values and

“Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007) 45 Osgoode
Hall LJ 169; Peter W Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “A Reply on
“Charter Dialogue Revisited”, (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 193; Rosalind Dixon, “The
Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference”, (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall
LJ 235. Gregoire CN Webber, “The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature
Dialogue” (2009) 42:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 443.
280
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public health objectives have?” The legislature is likewise properly equipped to
incorporate not only Canadian constitutional and administrative legal principles, but also
the principles of public health, public health law, and ethics – which principles, as we
saw in chapter three, are not necessarily at odds with Canadian constitutional, and in
particular Charter, values. The benefits resulting from such an approach would include
improved transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and were canvassed
in chapter five.
6.2

A BRIEF NOTE ON PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Though this thesis is concerned predominantly with substantive review, a few

brief comments on procedural fairness are warranted. As was mentioned briefly in
chapter five, during an emergency, common law procedural fairness requirements are
likely to be extremely relaxed and perhaps even suspended (if the situation so
warrants).282 But even if this is the case at common law, the fact that Charter rights (and
especially section 7 rights) could be breached by emergency decisions may breed
uncertainty. Although this thesis has for the most part focussed on the potential for
individuals or groups to allege overreaction, the suspension or relaxing of procedural
rights could conceivably be relevant to those worried about underreaction as well,283
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creating a very large pool of potentially aggrieved section 7 ‘fundamental justice’
claimants.
A complete analysis of this potential issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but
the Supreme Court of Canada has established a few clues as to how it might be resolved.
It has written, though in obiter, that if administrative efficiencies or expediencies that
violate the principles of fundamental justice (which for this purpose, could be natural
justice) were to be upheld under constitutional scrutiny, they would likely have to be in
response to serious emergencies. In Ref. Re: BC Motor Vehicle Act, Lamer J. (as he then
was), referring to absolute liability offenses for which imprisonment was a penalty,
wrote:
Section 1 may, for reasons of administrative expediency,
successfully come to the rescue of an otherwise violation of
s. 7, but only in cases arising out of exceptional conditions,
such as natural disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics,
and the like.284
[Emphasis added]
Later on, however, in New Brunswick v G (J), a child protection case concerning the
rights of a parent, he in contrast elaborated:
… First, the rights protected by s. 7 -- life, liberty, and
security of the person -- are very significant and cannot
ordinarily be overridden by competing social interests.
Second, rarely will a violation of the principles of
fundamental justice, specifically the right to a fair hearing,
nor restricted the movement of potential vectors, then that community may feel affected
by such underreaction and assert a right to be heard on the matter (legal or otherwise).
284
[1985] 2 SCR 486, at 518, [1985] SCJ No 73 (QL). These comments may reflect the
sentiment that emergency laws and measures, even those which engage s.7 of the
Charter, do not automatically require recourse to a s.33 “notwithstanding clause”
override. As was seen in chapter two, infectious disease response has long been
considered a legitimate exercise of government power - In other words, justifiable in a
free and democratic society.
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be upheld as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.285
These comments from the Supreme Court of Canada may indicate a willingness
on the part of the courts to be flexible when considering what markers of procedural
fairness and natural justice will be required during emergencies, including
“epidemics”.286 Flexibility, however, does not equate to suspension. As the remarks of
Lamer J. disclose, the standard of justification will be high.
6.3

JUDICIAL REVIEW
In 2008, The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to revisit and

rearticulate the underlying rationale for judicial review of administrative action287 in the
significant case Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.288 On the function of judicial review,
Justices Bastarache and Lebel wrote for the majority:
As a matter of constitutional law, judicial review is
intimately connected with the preservation of the rule of
law. It is essentially that constitutional foundation which
explains the purpose of judicial review and guides its
function and operation. Judicial review seeks to address an
underlying tension between the rule of law and the
foundational democratic principle, which finds an
expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to
create various administrative bodies and endow them with
broad powers. Courts, while exercising their constitutional
functions of judicial review, must be sensitive not only to
the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity
285
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of avoiding undue interference with the discharge of
administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated
to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.
By virtue of the rule of law principle, all exercises of public
authority must find their source in law. All decision-making
powers have legal limits, derived from the enabling statute
itself, the common or civil law or the Constitution. Judicial
review is the means by which the courts supervise those
who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not
overstep their legal authority. The function of judicial
review is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness
and the fairness of the administrative process and its
outcomes.289
[Emphasis added]
When the Charter is engaged,290 the approach the courts will take towards
challenges291 to administrative actions can become more complex than in administrative
law cases with no Charter element. In the 2006 case of Multani,292 the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada decided that the administrative law standard of review was not
applicable when a Charter right was infringed by a government decision. Charron J.
wrote for the majority:
With respect for the opinion of Deschamps and Abella JJ., I am
of the view that [the administrative law] approach could well
reduce the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Canadian Charter to mere administrative law principles or, at
the very least, cause confusion between the two. It is not
surprising that the values underlying the rights and freedoms
289
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guaranteed by the Canadian Charter form part — and
sometimes even an integral part — of the laws to which we are
subject. However, the fact that an issue relating to constitutional
rights is raised in an administrative context does not mean that
the constitutional law standards must be dissolved into the
administrative law standards. The rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter establish a minimum
constitutional protection that must be taken into account by the
legislature and by every person or body subject to the Canadian
Charter. The role of constitutional law is therefore to define the
scope of the protection of these rights and freedoms. An
infringement of a protected right will be found to be
constitutional only if it meets the requirements of s. 1 of the
Canadian Charter. Moreover, as Dickson C.J. noted in Slaight
Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, the more
sophisticated and structured analysis of s. 1 is the proper
framework within which to review the values protected by the
Canadian Charter (see also Ross v New Brunswick School
District No. 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825, at para 32). Since, as I will
explain below, it is the compliance of the commissioners’
decision with the requirements of the Canadian Charter that is
central to this appeal, it is my opinion that the Court of Appeal’s
analysis of the standard of review was inadequate and that it
leads to an erroneous conclusion.
As this Court recognized in Ross, judicial review may involve a
constitutional law component and an administrative law
component (para 22). In that case, for example, the appeal
raised two broad issues. From the point of view of
administrative law, the Court first had to determine whether,
based on the appropriate administrative law standard of review,
namely reasonableness, the human rights board of inquiry had
erred in making a finding of discrimination under s. 5(1) of the
Human Rights Act, RSNB 1973, c H‑11, and whether that Act
gave it jurisdiction to make the order in issue. (It should be
noted here that the Court did not confuse the protection against
discrimination provided for in s. 5(1) of the Act with the right
guaranteed in s. 15 of the Canadian Charter.) However, the
conclusion that there was discrimination and that the Act
granted the board of inquiry a very broad power to make orders
did not end the analysis. Since the respondent had also argued
that the decision infringed his freedom of expression and
religion under the Canadian Charter, the Court also had to
determine whether the board of inquiry’s order that the school
board remove the respondent from his teaching position was
valid from the point of view of constitutional law. As the Court
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recognized, “an administrative tribunal acting pursuant to its
delegated powers exceeds its jurisdiction if it makes an order
that infringes the Charter” (para 31; see also Slaight
Communications). The Court therefore conducted an analysis
under ss. 2(a) and (b) and 1 of the Canadian Charter to decide
the constitutional issue. The administrative law standard of
review is not applicable to the constitutional component of
judicial review.293
[Emphasis added]
But in the 2012 case of Doré v Barreau du Quebec,294 the Supreme Court, with
unanimous reasons authored by Abella J., overruled Multani, deciding instead that the
administrative law approach was applicable to the constitutional component of judicial
review:
It seems to me to be possible to reconcile the two regimes in a
way that protects the integrity of each. The way to do that is to
recognize that an adjudicated administrative decision is not like
a law which can, theoretically, be objectively justified by the
state, making the traditional s. 1 analysis an awkward fit. On
whom does the onus lie, for example, to formulate and assert the
pressing and substantial objective of an adjudicated decision, let
alone justify it as rationally connected to, minimally impairing
of, and proportional to that objective? On the other hand, the
protection of Charter guarantees is a fundamental and pervasive
obligation, no matter which adjudicative forum is applying it.
How then do we ensure this rigorous Charter protection while at
the same time recognizing that the assessment must necessarily
be adjusted to fit the contours of what is being assessed and by
whom?
We do it by recognizing that while a formulaic application of the
Oakes test may not be workable in the context of an adjudicated
decision, distilling its essence works the same justificatory
muscles: balance and proportionality. I see nothing in the
administrative law approach which is inherently inconsistent
with the strong Charter protection — meaning its guarantees
and values — we expect from an Oakes analysis. The notion of
deference in administrative law should no more be a barrier to
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effective Charter protection than the margin of appreciation is
when we apply a full s. 1 analysis.
In assessing whether a law violates the Charter, we are
balancing the government’s pressing and substantial objectives
against the extent to which they interfere with the Charter right
at issue. If the law interferes with the right no more than is
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, it will be found
to be proportionate, and, therefore, a reasonable limit under s. 1.
In assessing whether an adjudicated decision violates the
Charter, however, we are engaged in balancing somewhat
different but related considerations, namely, has the decisionmaker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a
Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is
an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the
purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are
not unreasonably limited.
As this Court has noted, most recently in Catalyst Paper Corp v
North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5, the
nature of the reasonableness analysis is always contingent on its
context. In the Charter context, the reasonableness analysis is
one that centres on proportionality, that is, on ensuring that the
decision interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee no more
than is necessary given the statutory objectives. If the decision
is disproportionately impairing of the guarantee, it is
unreasonable. If, on the other hand, it reflects a proper balance
of the mandate with Charter protection, it is a reasonable one.295
[Emphasis added]
The decision in Doré was not without commentary.296 In the 2015 case Loyola
High School v Quebec (Attorney General),297 Abella J. for the majority applied the ratio
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from Doré, but in a separate concurring opinion, McLachlin C.J and Moldaver J (with
Rothstein J concurring) seemed to apply the approach from Multani as if Doré had not
overruled it.298 This calls for a degree of caution in predicting what judicial review of
administrative action would look like under the proposed legislative reform.
But assuming that the approach endorsed by the entire Supreme Court in Doré
and the majority in Loyola endures until the next infectious disease emergency, then the
proposed law reform will be fitting, both for effective decision-making and for judicial
review.299 Emergency measures are going to impact protected Charter rights.300
Under the rule in Doré, the emergency decision maker must ensure that her decisions
interfere with relevant Charter guarantees no more than necessary in order to achieve her
statutory objective.301 The sample draft legislative provisions in chapter five contained a
provision to that effect – an explicit and specific reminder of constitutional concerns,
similar to the general ones seen in contemporary emergency statutes throughout Canada
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in chapter four. But the new legislation would do more than merely restate the idea of
minimal impairment. Minimal impairment must be thought of in relation to the statutory
objective. The draft legislation gives context to that objective, and provides the principles
that must be considered when deciding whether or not a decision is proportional to the
expected public health gain. No legislation could ever guarantee that the courts will agree
with the decision maker’s proportionality assessment, but the law reform proposed in this
thesis would at least let the decision maker know what they are supposed to be weighing.
It would be ignominious for the decision maker to have a decision declared unreasonable
after failing to consider principles and factors they did not, at the time of the decision,
know they were supposed to be considering.302
Consider the case of Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration).303 In that case, the Minister possessed significant discretion to decide
whether to permit a non-national to remain in Canada on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds. In addition to finding that the process afforded Ms. Baker had
been unfair owing to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the assessing
immigration officer, the Supreme Court of Canada found the Minister’s decision to deny
Ms. Baker’s claim was in any case unreasonable. The Court quashed the refusal, and
remitted it back for reconsideration.
In finding the Minister’s (really, his delegate’s) decision unreasonable, the Court
did recognize the discretionary nature of the decision. Notwithstanding that neither the
regulations, nor their authorizing statute, delineated mandatory factors for the Minister to
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consider, L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for the majority, determined that the Minister was
obliged to consider the best interests of Ms. Baker’s children in accordance with: the
Court’s interpretation of one of the objectives of the statute304; the Convention on the
Rights of the Child;305 and the values and principles expressed in the Minister’s own
Ministerial Guidelines. She further stated that the Minister was required to give
substantial weight to that factor.306
Reflecting on the rulings in both Doré and Baker, it is possible to forecast to a
certain degree the types of principles and factors the courts might expect the emergency
decision maker to weigh307 in the absence of legislation. These would of course include at
a minimum Charter values and the objectives of the authorizing statute, but could
potentially also include international legal instruments;308 soft-law documents (for
example Ministerial guidelines); and potentially public health and public health law
principles, practices, and approaches. Legislation is capable of capturing all such
considerations. And while in Baker the Court expressed a positive attitude towards using
soft-law instruments as interpretive aids, the danger posed by over-reliance on them was
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seen in chapter three through the very recent case of Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration),309 where the Supreme Court ruled that a decision maker’s overreliance on Ministerial Guidelines resulted in a fettering of her own discretion and so her
decision was unreasonable (notwithstanding that those very same guidelines had
previously been given favourable treatment by lower courts).310 Legislation, then,
remains the preferred tool for proactively ensuring the decision maker knows what she is
supposed to be balancing when she decides if a particular emergency measure is
proportional, or justified, in light of the Charter rights it may impact or limit.
6.4

THE DIALOGUE METAPHOR
In 1997, Peter Hogg and Allison A. Bushell wrote an article311 in the Osgoode

Hall Law Journal describing the post-1982 relationship between the legislature and the
judiciary as one of “dialogue”. Using the examples of legislative responses to judicial
declarations of invalidity (under s. 52 of the 1982 Constitution312), the authors attempted
to challenge the anti-majoritarian criticism of judicial review of legislation under the
Charter by empirically demonstrating that in a majority of cases where the courts struck
down democratically enacted legislation for lack of compliance with the Charter, the
legislature responded by either invoking s. 33313 of the Charter (which was rare),314
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enacting revised legislation envisioned as justified under s.1315, or by enacting reformed
legislation in accordance with the court’s decision. This phenomenon, according to the
authors, weakened the anti-majoritarian claim that unelected and unaccountable judges
were usurping the role of democratically elected, and accountable, lawmakers.
By 2007, the scholarly and juridical discourse concerning the metaphor they had
unleashed led to an entire volume of that journal316 being dedicated to the topic. Writing
the first article in that volume, the original authors (now joined by others) commented
upon the state of the phenomenon they had ten years ago set in motion:
We could not possibly have anticipated back in 1997 that the article, and in
particular our use of the dialogue metaphor, would become the subject of
so much discussion, debate, and deconstruction by judges, law professors,
and political scientists. By 2006, a total of 27 reported decisions (ten
Supreme Court of Canada decisions, five provincial appellate decisions,
seven decisions by superior courts of the provinces or territories, one
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, and one of a provincial court) had
referred to the concept of Charter dialogue. Charter dialogue has been the
subject of speeches by members of Parliament and members of the

this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of
this Charter referred to in the declaration.” This provision is subject to a five-year sunset
clause, capable of re-enactment.
314
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judiciary, and has been a topic for academic for academic discussion in
numerous courses in law and political science.317
As indicated, scholarship considering the metaphor is as varied as it is abundant.
The authors themselves summarize that:
Scholarly critique has ranged from articles that suggest that dialogue has
the potential to undermine judicial review to articles that accuse it of
lending a false legitimacy to the influence of an undemocratic “court
party” over courts and legislatures. The use of legislative sequels as a
proxy for dialogue has been criticized by some as overstating the
relationship between courts and legislatures, by some as understating it,
and by others as simultaneously doing both.318
The metaphor was powerfully brought to bear by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Justice Iacobucci’s decision in Vriend v Alberta,319 where the Supreme Court added
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination to Alberta’s antidiscrimination statute by “reading it in”. Since the Alberta legislature had debated and
explicitly rejected the proposal to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground, this
decision was of course bound to be controversial. Iacobucci J. was not blind to the
criticism being levied against judges. While he was unequivocal in ruling that the Court,
since at least the advent of the Charter, had the power to strike down law, he
acknowledged that: “giving courts the power and commandment to invalidate legislation
where necessary has not eliminated the debate over the “legitimacy” of courts taking such
action.”320 Invoking the dialogue metaphor in an aspirational manner, Iacobucci J.
highlighted the constitutional importance granted to the protection of minorities before he
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asserted that the Court’s ruling was not the ending of the law’s development. Legislative
response was always available, and in any case s.33 of the Charter provided the ultimate
safeguard.321
Perhaps the most promising decision, if one were to favour the idea that the socalled “dialogue” between courts and legislatures might resemble some kind of
continuing discussion, was R v Mills.322 A “second look” case, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld an amendment to the Criminal Code notwithstanding that the amendment
was not in compliance with one of its earlier decisions (Parliament had, instead, largely
adopted the reasons of the dissent). Writing for the majority, Justices McLachlin (as she
then was) and Iacobucci developed what had begun in Vriend:
A posture of respect towards Parliament was endorsed by this Court in
Slaight Communications, supra, at p. 1078, where we held that if
legislation is amenable to two interpretations, a court should choose the
interpretation that upholds the legislation as constitutional. Thus courts
must presume that Parliament intended to enact constitutional legislation
and strive, where possible, to give effect to this intention.
This Court has also discussed the relationship between the courts and the
legislature in terms of a dialogue, and emphasized its importance to the
democratic process. In Vriend, supra, at para 139, Iacobucci J. stated:
To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue
among the branches is that each of the branches is made
somewhat accountable to the other. The work of the legislature is
reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions
can be reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new
legislation (or even overarching laws under s. 33 of the Charter).
This dialogue between and accountability of each of the branches
have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying
it.
See also P. W. Hogg and A. A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures” (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. If the common
321
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law were to be taken as establishing the only possible constitutional
regime, then we could not speak of a dialogue with the legislature. Such a
situation could only undermine rather than enhance democracy.
Legislative change and the development of the common law are different.
As this Court noted in R. v. Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1991] 3
S.C.R. 654, at p. 666, the common law changes incrementally, “while
complex changes to the law with uncertain ramifications should be left to
the legislature”. While this dialogue obviously is of a somewhat different
nature when the common law rule involves interpretation of the Charter,
as in O’Connor, it remains a dialogue nonetheless.
Moreover, in this Court’s recent decision Reference re Secession of
Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, we affirmed the
proposition that constitutionalism can facilitate democracy rather than
undermine it, and that one way in which it does this is by ensuring that
fundamental human rights and individual freedoms are given due regard
and protection (at paras 74-78). Courts do not hold a monopoly on the
protection and promotion of rights and freedoms; Parliament also plays a
role in this regard and is often able to act as a significant ally for
vulnerable groups. […] If constitutional democracy is meant to ensure that
due regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable to being overlooked
by the majority, then this court has an obligation to consider respectfully
Parliament’s attempt to respond to such voices.323
[Emphasis added]
Most poignant for our purposes, the court went on to state: “Parliament has enacted
this legislation after a long consultation process that included a consideration of the
constitutional standards outlined by this Court in O’Connor. While it is the role of the
courts to specify such standards, there may be a range of permissible regimes that can
meet these standards.”324
Despite the promise that Mills seemed to hold, since Mills,325 the judicial responses
to requests from the government for deference under the banner of dialogue have ranged
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from lukewarm326 to completely hostile. Indeed, in Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer),327 McLachlin CJ, in her majority decision, was openly contemptuous of the idea
that the Court should show deference to the legislature just because it had made an
answer to a previous Charter decision:
My colleague Justice Gonthier proposes a deferential approach to
infringement and justification. He argues that there is no reason to accord
special importance to the right to vote, and that we should thus defer to
Parliament’s choice among a range of reasonable alternatives. He further
argues that in justifying limits on the right to vote under s. 1, we owe
deference to Parliament because we are dealing with “philosophical,
political and social considerations”, because of the abstract and symbolic
nature of the government’s stated goals, and because the law at issue
represents a step in a dialogue between Parliament and the courts.
I must, with respect, demur. The right to vote is fundamental to our
democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it
require not deference, but careful examination. This is not a matter of
substituting the Court’s philosophical preference for that of the legislature,
but of ensuring that the legislature’s proffered justification is supported by
logic and common sense.
[…]
The core democratic rights of Canadians do not fall within a “range of
acceptable alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose at
its discretion. Deference may be appropriate on a decision involving
competing social and political policies. It is not appropriate, however, on a
decision to limit fundamental rights. This case is not merely a competition
between competing social philosophies. It represents a conflict between
the right of citizens to vote — one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Charter — and Parliament’s denial of that right. Public
debate on an issue does not transform it into a matter of “social
philosophy”, shielding it from full judicial scrutiny. It is for the courts,
unaffected by the shifting winds of public opinion and electoral interests,
to safeguard the right to vote guaranteed by s. 3 of the Charter.
[…]
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Finally, the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed
judicial rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean
that the Court should defer to Parliament as part of a “dialogue”.
Parliament must ensure that whatever law it passes, at whatever stage of
the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important
promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not
be debased to a rule of “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again.”328
[Emphasis added]
We might glean from the cases referenced in chapter two, and could infer from the
obiter above in section 6.2,329 that the judiciary might take a more supportive attitude
towards showing deference to legislative choices concerning infectious diseases. But all
the same, these words from the Chief Justice of Canada temper the enthusiasm over the
prospect that infectious disease emergency law reform might develop through a discourse
begun with the legislature. The legal rights at stake in an infectious disease emergency
will of course be ‘fundamental,’ and their prospective definition and balancing will of
course also be topics of philosophical, political, and social consideration (in addition to
scientific attention).
Thankfully, public health, public health law, and ethics lend themselves attractively
to the kinds of constitutional legal assessments which both the legislature and the courts
are likely to make. If the law providing the decision maker with guidance were crafted, as
has been suggested in this thesis, with a view to enhancing attentiveness to Charter
values, giving life to unwritten constitutional principles such as democracy and the
protection of minorities, improving transparency, providing accountability, and
improving public health efficiency and effectiveness, it would stand a better chance of
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being shown “deference as respect” by the courts as one of many permissible regimes
within a range. Surely, it will stand a better chance of being shown deference than the
status quo we saw in chapter four, namely, the complete absence of articulable legislative
guidance. And yet, the legislature does not have to act in this way. It could take an
entirely different approach to the rights, but would still be proactively participating in the
discourse.
An exhaustive analysis of scholarship and jurisprudence considering the dialogue
metaphor would be a thesis in itself, but the metaphor, along with the judicial usage of it,
is nonetheless pertinent. This author agrees with Peter Hogg et al. when they write: “If
‘genuine dialogue’ can occur only where legislatures share coordinate authority with the
courts to interpret the constitution, then by definition it cannot exist in Canada, where
legislatures have no such authority.”330 That is, if by “interpret” those authors are
referring to interpretation in the course of adjudication or dispute-resolution. In the
Canadian legal structure, the courts will always have the final word in resolving any such
constitutional dispute.331 But, this does not mean the legislative branch of government
does not have coordinate authority before any such dispute is live before the courts. In his
2009 article “The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue”,332
Gregoire Webber lamented how Canadian legal discourse had missed an opportunity to
develop the dialogue metaphor, which is his view was more aptly described as a kind of
dialectic, to enhance the interpretation of constitutional rights:
330
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In this way, dialogue provides a richer epistemological account than the
idea of judicial deference. Whereas deference is generally understood in
spatial terms such that the court exercises voluntary restraint in favour
of a legislative choice that is not, according to the court, either
unreasonable or sufficiently within the court’s sphere of competence to
evaluate (Hunt, 2003) dialogue focuses on the exchange of reasons
justifying constitutional meaning. Each institution’s reasons for action
are subject to critical evaluation by the other. The court evaluates the
justification for legislation and highlights its insufficiency, if any. In
light of the court’s judgment on the failed justification, the legislature in
turn further participates in the exchange of reasons either by re-enacting
the same legislative account of rights with a different justification or by
enacting a modified legislative proposal. The aim of the dialogic
exchange is reasoned agreement.
[…]
The argument developed here does not depend on the view that the
legislature or the court has poorly performed the task of expounding the
meaning of the constitution, or that one or the other is institutionally
unsuited to that task. Nor does the argument depend on comparative
institutional analysis, evaluating the different institutional capacities of
court and legislature before concluding in favour of one or the other as
the preferred expounder of constitutional meaning (see Komesar, 1994;
Fuller, 1978: 393ff). Rather, it is grounded in the conviction that the
court should not be the sole or supreme expounder of the constitution.
Constitutional scholarship should forgo the thought that any legislative
challenge to a judicial determination of constitutional meaning
“diminishe[s] respect for the Court as an institution, trivializes the
Court’s precedents, and allows the rights of the most unpopular people
to be defined by elected politicians” (Roach, 2001a: 276). It is no
violation of the rule of law to question a judicial ruling on the meaning
of the constitution. It does not require one to confront false statements
like “either the Constitution is supreme or it is not” (Cameron, 2000:
[27]). Unless one erroneously equates the court’s constitutional
decisions with the constitution itself, a legislative challenge to the
court’s judgment is no affront to the supremacy of the constitution
(Huscroft, 2004: 249). Rather, it is a challenge to judicial supremacy, a
challenge to the court’s delimitation of a constitutional provision, but
not a challenge to the constitution which the legislature is itself
committed to expound.333
In this thesis, we are considering the case for anticipatory and preventative
legislative action where there is no such specific judicial decision or interpretation for the
333
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legislature to ‘challenge’. In any case, it is unhelpful to characterise the interaction that
will occur between courts, decision makers, and legislatures in this way. Should the
legislature “speak first” in a genuine attempt to breathe constitutional life into emergency
decision-making, the decider (and their advisors) will ex ante be in a better position to act
in accordance with the rule of law.334 The trepidation expressed by the Campbell
Commission concerning emergency statutes would be mitigated. Instead of a void, the
courts will have a statute (debate, preamble and all), along with argument from an
Attorney General, to assist it as it wrestles with intricate constitutional issues. And lastly,
concerning the decision or decisions being impugned, it is of course possible that the
emergency decision maker, being human, may get some decisions wrong. Armed with
the expanded legislation, the court will be pre-equipped with a stronger statutory context
within which to judge the reasonableness (or correctness) of any decisions taken under
that same statutory authority. This does not describe any branch of government
challenging another. It is rather the purest form of teamwork: the three branches of
government fighting together to ensure that the infectious disease emergency is
overcome, constitutional rights are valued, and the rule of law is maintained in the face of
adversity.
This approach has the added benefit of incorporating the federalist nature of
Canada. As Webber writes: “[t]he dialogues about the meaning of the constitution can be
as multiple as the range of constitutional meaning. By allowing the legislatures of Canada
334
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to assume a co-ordinate role in expounding this meaning, the actualization of
constitutional rights may differ from one jurisdiction to another.”335 Though Canada’s
constitutional design has bestowed upon the courts final interpretive authority, there is no
reason for the legislature not to tackle difficult issues of rights definition, scope, and
balancing.336 A legislature sitting in ‘peace time’ has some considerable advantages over
a judge sitting alone during (or even immediately after) an emergency. Peter Hogg et al.
seem to share this position in the broad sense:
We should make clear that our support for the traditional role of the
courts as the authoritative interpreters of the constitution should not be
taken to suggest that the courts are more important or useful or
progressive institutions than the legislative and executive branches. In a
democracy, that would be a ridiculous position. Important change
inevitably comes primarily from the legislative and executive branches
of government, not from the courts. The courts have very limited power
to cause social change. They are not accountable to public opinion (and
have no way of canvassing it anyway); they have no power to order
independent research or to hold public hearings on policy issues; they
have no power to create many of the policy instruments that legislatures
routinely use; they have no access to public funds; and, they have no
capacity to administer programs. Unemployment insurance, workers’
compensation, old age pensions, social assistance, food and drug
standards, labour standards, public health care, public education and
human rights codes are among the progressive measures initiated and
implemented by the legislative and executive branches of
government.337
Concerning emergencies, David Dyzenhaus similarly accepted the role of the
legislature and the executive when he wrote: “Certain situations, and emergencies are
one, might require that Parliament or the executive play the lead role. The rule of law
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project does not require allegiance to a rigid doctrine of the separation of powers in
which judges are the exclusive guardians of the rule of law.”338 But, Dyzenhaus offered
the following caveat: “Nevertheless, judges will always have some role in ensuring that
the rule of law is maintained even when the legislature and the executive are in fact
cooperating in the project. Judges also have an important role in calling public attention
to a situation in which such cooperation wanes or ceases.”339 That critical role is the one
just described in the vision above.
6.5

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION
Canadian courts may never return to the constitutional discourse that appeared

briefly in Mills, but this does not truly inhibit our design. Mills concerned law passed in
response to a judicial decision; on our facts, it is actually only the legislature that can
meaningfully create a “permissible regime” ex ante. To propose otherwise, i.e. to await
for a challenge and direction from a judge once the emergency powers are deployed, is to
doom all parties to a legal regime which will be pronounced unacceptably late: both for
the public as a whole, who are counting on the emergency being successfully met in
accordance with the rule of law, and for the individuals or vulnerable groups whose rights
may be at risk of unjustified infringement. If even one person falls sick and dies as a
consequence of inaction due to legal uncertainty, it is too late to pass a statute relying on
section 1 or invoking section 33 of the Charter. In contrast, once a mandatory inoculation
is unjustifiably administered under an insufficient statutory regime, it will be too late to
draw out the serum.
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Emergencies will most likely result in flexibility from the courts, but only insofar
as they are convinced such flexibility is justified; law reform in this area does not need to
be purely reactionary and fear-driven, and indeed this thesis is driven by neither. As we
saw in both chapters one and three, public health emergency legal preparedness is
forward-looking, with a view to ultimately improving the concrete outcomes experienced
by the public. The legal advantages that decision makers (and their advisors and staffs)
will gain from law reform will not be insular. By incorporating both Canadian
constitutional requirements and public health principles, the emergency law will be a
stronger tool for public health, better able to serve what Gostin posited as “the prime
objective of public health law… to pursue the highest possible level of physical and
mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.” 340 And
lastly, using legislation, or hard law, to achieve this objective seizes a prime opportunity
to breathe a new kind of life into Canadian constitutional law and the dialogue metaphor.
By speaking first when only it can, the legislature can provide the courts with a
constitutionally informed public health decision-making framework, allowing for a more
focused and meaningful judicial review that is less likely to get it wrong from either a
public health or constitutional perspective.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Since SARS, Canada has taken some steps towards improving its preparedness to
deal with infectious diseases, both in their everyday occurrences, and in the event of an
emergency. This preparation includes legal preparedness. However, as we have seen,
there has been a lack of attention paid to an important component of legal preparedness.
The legislature should act to remedy this deficiency.
In chapter five there are sample draft legislative provisions. A full discussion
about how this legislation ought to look, and what its provisions ought to say, would be
an entire thesis in itself, and if the democratic aspirations of public health and Canada’s
constitution are to be respected, then the legislature, with its inherent legitimacy and the
ability to engage in public consultation, is the appropriate body to take on this challenge.
In any event, the argument of this thesis is not that the guidance to be embedded in
legislation should reflect precisely the values this author thinks it ought to. Rather, it is
that legislation should provide more guidance than it now does in any jurisdiction in
Canada, informed by the principles of public health, ethics, and Canadian constitutional
law. This will enrich our constitutional discourse and improve Canada’s readiness to
meet future infectious disease emergencies. The sample legislation sketched here is
meant only to serve the modest purpose of demonstrating that what is proposed, namely
the integration of public health and ethical principles into legislative guidance, is not
impracticable. It can be done.
And we ought to do so. Silence on the issue is a choice. Intentionally or not, it
communicates something about our underlying normative values. To let the law remain
silent, and perpetuate the risks of legal uncertainty, will be unfair to both the majority and
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the vulnerable minority; harmful to both the public good and individual rights. It would
also be a tragic waste. The fruits of further research, debate, and jurisprudence in this area
could be relevant to other professional and scholarly fields beyond the already numerous
fields of emergency legal preparedness, public health, public health law, public health
ethics, and constitutional and administrative law. It could encourage research and the
exchange of ideas, leading to the development of stronger theoretical and ethical
frameworks. Perhaps some of them will challenge and test the argument that professional
ethics ought to be informed by law. Such research and discussion can only benefit
Canada’s emergency legal preparedness. I agree with Tracey M. Baily et al.: “The Time
for Talk is Now.”341 Let us reflect now upon whether we are being guided by the best
principles, and even whether we are asking the right questions. Let us step back from the
question “In an emergency, what are we going to do?” and ask a deeper, more
fundamental question.
“In time of emergency, what kind of a people do we want to be?”.
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